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Abstract
It has been suggested that gambling behaviour may not be solely controlled 
by schedules of reinforcement, but may be under the control of verbal behaviour. 
Relational frame theory is a contemporary account of verbal behaviour which may be 
able to account for aspects of gambling behaviour that cannot be explained by a pure 
schedule of reinforcement account. Chapter 2 demonstrated that contextual cues may 
influence preferences for concurrently available slot-machines, thus overriding the 
contingencies of reinforcement in place. Chapter 3 demonstrated that the presence of 
accurate or inaccurate rules may influence slot-machine choice and affect gambling 
persistence. Participants that received inaccurate rules regarding the payout 
probability of a slot machine, gambled for longer than those given accurate rules. 
Chapter 4 reported that the discriminative functions of slot-machines could be 
transformed in accordance with derived same and opposite relations, such that 
participants showed preferences for slot-machines that had never been experienced 
before. Chapter 5 demonstrated that not only could preferences for concurrently 
available slot machines be transformed in accordance with derived comparative 
relations, but found that preferences for slot machines increased relative to the 
relational network that had been trained. In Chapter 6, ratings of wins, near-misses 
and losses on a computer simulated slot-machine could be altered in accordance with 
derived same and opposite relations, and could even override the non-arbitrary 
properties of a slot-machine. It was concluded that gambling is verbal behaviour and 
can be accounted for by derived relations and the transformation of function. These 
findings may explain instances of gambling behaviour which cannot be accounted for 
by the direct acting contingencies.
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Chapter 1
Gambling, Gambling Research, and Behaviour Analysis
1
K ,n u p ie r  1
Gambling has been defined as “playing a game of chance for money” or 
“risking much in the hope of great gain” (Oxford Dictionary, 2000, p.358). It is an 
activity that has been part of society for thousands of years with the first lottery 
offering monetary prizes apparently taking place in Florence in 1530 (Brenner & 
Brenner, 1990; Everitt, 2009). Queen Elizabeth I established a lottery in 1569 as a 
means of raising money. Prizes included money, goods and even seven days free 
from arrest, unless a serious crime was committed (Brenner & Brenner, 1990).
Until the twentieth century, those who gambled were considered criminals or 
sinners. These perceptions did not change until Gamblers Anonymous was founded, 
which resulted in increased interest in psychoanalytic explanations of gambling 
behaviour (Lesieur & Custer, 1984). This led to gambling being seen as an ‘illness’ 
to be treated, as opposed to criminality and resulted in social acceptance of gambling 
as an acceptable leisure activity (Lesieur & Custer, 1984). Today, gambling remains 
a popular social pastime with a wide range of gambling games available such as card 
games, gaming machines and sports betting.
For the majority of the population, gambling is a form of recreation to be 
enjoyed responsibly, but for a minority it can develop into a problem leading to debt, 
jeopardised relationships, and even suicide. This poses the challenging question: why 
can some individuals gamble regularly without developing a problem, whereas others 
will go on to suffer severe hardship as the result of a gambling problem. For 
clinicians, this also means that they must be able to distinguish between the 
recreational and the problem or pathological gambler. Several instruments have been 
developed to identify such individuals, with two of the most commonly used being 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual and the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS; 
Lesieur & Blume, 1987).
Measures of problem and pathological gambling
The release of the DSM-V (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fifth Edition) 
is expected to bring about changes to the way in which pathological gambling is 
classified (Mitzner, Whelan, & Meyers, 2011). Previously, in the DSM-IV, 
pathological gambling was considered an impulse control disorder. The DSM-V 
however is expected to. class it in the Addiction and Related Disorders section. 
Additionally, only four items from the diagnostic criterion are required to meet 
classification for pathological gambling according to DSM-V, whereas the DSM-IV
2
required five. According to the DSM-IV, pathological gambling can be defined by 
“persistent and recurrent maladaptive gambling behavior that disrupts personal, 
family, or vocational pursuits.” (DSM IV-TR, p. 615). In order to be diagnosed with 
pathological gambling, an individual must display a minimum of four out of ten 
diagnostic items (see Table 1.1)
Table 1.1. Criteria for a diagnosis of pathological gambling as measured by the 
DSM-V.
Criteria* for Pathological Gambling from the DSM-V
1) Preoccupied with gambling.
2) Gambles with increasingly larger amounts of money.
3) Repeated unsuccessful efforts to reduce or cease gambling.
4) Restless or irritable when trying to decrease gambling.
5) Gambles to escape problems or relieve negative mood.
6) Attempts to win back lost money.
7) Lies to others to conceal extent of gambling.
8) Risks losing or loses important relationships or jobs due to gambling.
9) Relies on others to relieve financial problems caused by gambling.
Note: *Criteria have been paraphrased for the purposes of the present literature 
review.
One measure that has been used frequently in gambling research is the SOGS 
(Lesieur & Blume, 1987). The SOGS is a widely used 16-item inventory for 
identifying potential problem and potential pathological gambling. The SOGS is a 
gambling screen, therefore not strictly a diagnostic tool, however it can be used in 
research as a means of assessing a participant’s gambling history, as well as 
indicating potential gambling problems (P'etry, 2005). Items on the SOGS include 
questions involving deception when gambling, such as claiming to be winning when 
in fact they were losing money, hiding betting slips, and borrowing money. A score 
of 3-4 indicates that there is the potential for problem gambling whereas a score of 5 
and above indicates potential pathological gambling. According to Lesieur and 
Blume (1987) the instrument has good reliability and validity in clinical samples.
3
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Stinchfield (2002) found that the SOGS could correctly distinguish between a 
general population sample and a gambling sample which consisted of individuals 
receiving treatment for gambling problems. However, it overestimates gambling 
severity in the general population by producing a 50% false positive rate (Stinchfield,
2002). It must be emphasised, however, that the SOGS was specifically developed as 
a diagnostic tool for problem gamblers within a clinical setting and not for use with 
the general public (Stinchfield, 2002).
Whilst most assessment tools measure the extent to which an individual may 
have a problem with the gambling, the Gambling Functional Assessment (GFA), 
developed by Dixon and Johnson (2007), identifies the functions that may be 
maintaining a gambler’s behaviour, therefore ascertains the extent to which the 
consequences of gambling may be sustaining behaviour. The GFA is a 20 item 
instrument which identifies the extent to which four key functions of behaviour may 
be maintaining gambling behaviour. These functions consist of; a sensory function 
(for example, lights, sounds of the machine), an escape function (avoiding a stressful 
home life), a tangible function (to win money), or an attention function (attention or 
social reinforcement from peers, spouse). For example, an individual that visits the 
casino because he enjoys meeting friends may score highly on the measures that 
assess an attention function (Dixon & Johnson, 2007). Miller, Meier, and Weatherly
(2009) reported that the GFA had good internal consistency and acceptable 
reliability. However, one limitation of this study was that participants were 
undergraduate students and not a clinical population.
Prevalence of problem and pathological gambling
For many, gambling is a social activity and a form of entertainment. Others 
may see gambling as a chance to win money for little effort (Wagenaar, 1988). For 
the vast majority of the population, gambling is a relatively harmless pursuit 
although international estimates of recreational gambling and problem gambling 
differ. China reports high levels of pathological gambling with 2.5% to 4% of the 
population falling within this category (Loo, Raylu, & Oei, 2008). European 
estimates suggest that Norway has few problem and pathological gamblers. A phone 
survey of 2014 respondents revealed that 0.45% and 0.15% of the Norwegian 
population surveyed met the diagnosis for problem and pathological gambling, 
respectively (Gotestam & Johnson, 2003). Switzerland shows a higher incidence of
K s T lU J J l lZ r  1
problem gambling with estimates of 2.2% (Bondolfi et al., 2000) whereas 
pathological gambling is approximated at 0.8%.
Reports indicate that a large population in the UK partake in recreational 
gambling with an estimated 73% of the population gambling in 2010 (Wardle et al., 
2010). This figure includes those who play the National Lottery. When the National 
Lottery is excluded, this figure drops to 56%. The next most common forms of 
gambling consist of other lotteries (25%), followed by scratch cards (24%), betting 
on horse races (16%), slot-machine gambling (13%), and finally private betting 
(11%). Seventy-five per cent of men gambled in 2010 compared to 71% of women, 
with those aged between 44 and 64 being most likely to gamble.
Although over two thirds of the UK population gamble annually, the 
prevalence of problem gambling according to DSM-IV is thought to be 
approximately 0.9%. This figure suggests that problem gambling has risen by 0.3% 
since 2007 (Wardle et al., 2010). Measures o f ‘at risk’ gambling estimate that 5.5% 
of the UK population are at low risk, whereas 1.8% are at moderate risk of 
developing a problem with gambling (Wardle et al., 2010).
Research on Gambling:
Biomedical, Neuroscience, Social, and Cognitive Approaches
Various explanations have been offered regarding the factors that may cause 
and maintain problem gambling. With such a large proportion of the population 
participating in recreational gambling yet only a minority presenting with a problem, 
the difficult task for researchers is to account for why some seem to develop a 
problem whereas others do not. The present literature review will firstly consider 
how various approaches within psychology have sought to explain and undertake 
research on gambling behaviour. Then, the development of the gambling literature 
within behaviour analysis, from initial research on schedules of reinforcement to 
current theories of verbal behaviour and its integral role in explanations of gambling 
behaviour, will be outlined.
Biomedical The biomedical approach assumes that there is an “organic 
condition that exists within the body that contributes to the onset and continuation of 
pathological gambling” (Porter & Ghezzi, 2006, p. 24). Serotonergic dysfunction has 
been implicated as a factor in the development of pathological gambling (De Caria et 
al., 1996) and numerous studies have found that selective serotonin reuptake
5
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inhibitors (SSRIs) such as fluvoxamine and clomipramine are able to reduce 
gambling severity in pathological gamblers (Hollander et al., 1998, 2000). The 
neurotransmitter dopamine has been suggested as a factor in many reward-seeking 
behaviours including gambling behaviour. Bergh, Eklund, Sodersten, and Nordin 
(1997) revealed that the pathological gamblers had significantly smaller 
concentration of dopamine in the cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) and an increased level of 
noradrenalin compared to non-gambling controls. Nordin and Sjodin (2006) found 
that pathological gamblers showed decreased levels of dopamine in the CSF 
compared to healthy control whereas levels of noradrenalin were equal in the 
gambling sample and the control sample. The somewhat contradictory findings of 
Bergh et al. (1997) and Nordin and Sjodin (2006) suggest that there is still much 
work to be done in order to understand the role of neurotransmitters in gambling 
behaviour.
With regard to a genetic cause for problem gambling, Walters (2001) 
conducted a meta-analysis of the behaviour-genetic literature involving family and 
twin studies and estimated that heritability could account for approximately 16% of 
problem gambling. However, family studies are likely confounded by the fact that all 
participants generally share the same environment therefore it is difficult to discern 
between environmental influences and the genetic influences (Walters, 2001). 
Monozygotic twin studies are a possible solution to the difficulties in researching 
phenomena that have both an environmental and genetic influence. Eisen et al.
(2001) studied 3356 male twins with regard to gambling behaviour and concluded 
that genetic factors accounted for 62% of the variance in symptoms of gambling.
Genetic explanations have been criticised, as they cannot account for all 
problem gamblers. Comings et al. (1996) suggested that approximately 40-60% of 
pathological gamblers possessed the D2A1 allele. If as many as 60% of gamblers 
posses the D2A1 allele, this means that the remaining 40% of gamblers do not posses 
such an allele, therefore their gambling cannot be accounted for by this particular 
gene.
Neuroscience. Research that examines the differences in brain activation 
between pathological gamblers and non-problem gamblers is steadily increasing 
(Potenza, 2008). Potenza et al. (2003) reported functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) data, in which changes in blood flow in the brain and spinal cords 
are measured, and found that pathological gamblers showed decreased activity in the
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frontal and orbitofrontal cortex, basal ganglia and thalamus compared to the 
recreational gamblers, when viewing a video of a gambling scene (Potenza et al.,
2003). These areas of the brain are thought to be involved in impulse regulation 
(Potenza et al., 2003). Reuter et al. (2005) reported that pathological gamblers 
showed significantly lower right ventral striatal activation than non-gambling 
controls, and a negative correlation was reported between gambling severity and 
activation. This lower activation is also observed in individuals who are substance 
dependent (Reuter et al., 2005).
Recent fMRI studies have tended to focus on the neural underpinnings of the 
near-miss. A near-miss occurs when two out of three matching symbols appear on 
the payout line of a slot-machine. Clark, Lawrence, Astley-Jones, and Gray (2009) 
undertook fMRI with non-gambling participants whilst they played a simplified 
computer simulated slot-machine. Participants were asked to rate their chances of 
winning following every trial. It was found that near-misses were associated with 
increased blood oxygen level demand (BOLD) signal in the ventral striatum and the 
anterior insula which were also the areas that were associated with winning trials 
(Clark et al., 2009). Near-misses were also rated as being more unpleasant than a full 
miss, although a near-miss lead to greater motivation to continue to play. These self- 
report ratings correlated with insula activity (Clark et al., 2009). Chase and Clark
(2010) replicated the experiment with regular gamblers and pathological gamblers. In 
support of their previous experiment, near-misses were associated with increased 
ventral striatal activity. It was also found that gambling severity was an accurate 
predictor of increased dopaminergic activity in the midbrain when presented with a 
near-miss. These findings provided much insight into the neural underpinnings of the 
phenomenon of the near-miss. Given that a near-miss elicits similar activity to that of 
a win, this demonstrates how powerful a near-miss may be for persistence in 
gambling (Chase & Clark, 2010).
Neuroscientific approaches to gambling behaviour are a welcome and 
valuable contribution to the literature and have demonstrated that differences are 
seen in brain activation of gamblers in comparison to non-gamblers; however, such 
an account is limited. First, it is not able to explain how or why certain individuals 
may develop a problem with gambling whereas other do not, and secondly, as fMRI 
is a measure of behaviour it may only measure differences in brain activation
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therefore does not necessarily add to our understanding of the causes of gambling 
behaviour.
Socio-cultural research. There is evidence that individual differences may 
exist across cultures which suggests that gambling may be socially reinforced. 
Ellenbogen, Gupta, and Derevensky (2006) reported higher incidences in problem 
gambling in adolescents who did not have English or French as their first language, 
and suggested that this may be due to differences in parental attitudes. Zitzow (1996) 
reported that 9.6% of Native American youths obtained scores on the SOGS 
indicative of pathological gambling compared to 5.4% in the non-Native population. 
The first casinos appeared on Native American reserves in the 1970s as part of a 
solution to the high rates of unemployment within Native Americans (Dixon & 
Moore, 2006). This increased availability to gamble is a possible factor in the high 
incidences of Native American pathological gambling.
The Chinese community also has high incidences of pathological gambling. 
In China, gambling is a widespread activity with the game majiang being played by 
so many people and being such an integral part of Chinese culture that it is barely 
considered a form of gambling (Papineau, 2005). Treatment seeking is very low for 
gambling problems in China (GAMECS Project, 1999; VCGA, 1999) which may in 
part be due to the Chinese Classification of Mental Health Disorders (CCMD-2-R, 
1995) which does not recognise problem gambling as a mental health problem 
(Blaszczynski et al., 1998). In China, excessive gambling is viewed as “the product 
of a sick, dysfunctional, individualistic society” (Papineau, 2005, p. 163) therefore 
those with a gambling problem may be stigmatised. While prevalence studies can 
demonstrate that differences exist, they do not supplement our understanding as to 
why they exist.
Personality. Personality has been implicated as an explanation for why some 
may develop a problem with gambling whereas others may not. There are data to 
suggest that co-morbidity exists between personality disorders and pathological 
gambling. Dell, Ruzicka, and Palisi (1981) found that pathological gamblers seeking 
treatment from Gamblers Anonymous scored significantly higher on scales of 
gregariousness, narcissism, and aggression on the Millon Multiaxial Clinical 
Inventory (MMCI; Millon, 1978) compared to the normative sample (Dell et al., 
1981). Black and Moyer (1998) reported that 87% of pathological gamblers met
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criteria for a personality disorder, especially avoidant, schizotypal, obsessive- 
compulsive, and paranoid personality disorders.
Until the publication of DSM-V, pathological gambling had been classified as 
an impulse control disorder, which generated research examining whether levels of 
impulsivity differed in problem and pathological gamblers compared to non­
gamblers. Impulsivity is defined as “actions that are poorly conceived, prematurely 
expressed, unduly risky, or inappropriate to the situation and that often result in 
undesirable outcomes” (Evenden, 1999, p.348). It has been suggested that showing 
impulsive behaviour in childhood may correlate with gambling problems later in life 
(Vitaro, Arseneault, & Tremblay, 1999). Vitaro et al. (1999) reported that 12-14 year 
old boys that scored highly on measures of impulsivity were more likely to develop a 
gambling problem by age 17. Similarly, it has been found that adults with gambling 
problems measured significantly higher on self report measures of impulsivity and 
adult ADHD symptoms compared to healthy controls (Lawrence, Luty, Nadine, 
Bogdan, Sahakian, & Clark, 2009).
Cognitive explanations.
The cognitive literature has sought to explain problem gambling in terms of 
cognitive distortions in beliefs, termed cognitive bias. Some of the irrational thought 
patterns that have been implicated include inaccurate estimation of probability, 
believing certain variables co-vary, and an individual believing they have control 
over the outcome of a game (Wagemaar, 1988). Slot-machine players for example, 
have reported using skill when gambling on such machines even though the design of 
a slot-machine makes it impossible for any skilful behaviour to take place (Griffiths, 
1990). Griffiths (1994) conducted an experiment in which the vocalisations of 30 
non-gamblers and 30 regular slot-machine gamblers were analysed while playing 
slot-machines. It was found that the regular gamblers were more likely to emit 
irrational vocalisations regarding their play and were more likely to report that their 
skill was important in determining the outcome of the machine, than non-gamblers 
(Griffiths, 1994). Furthermore, the regular gamblers played for significantly longer 
than the non-gamblers. Given these results, Griffiths concluded that the difference 
between regular gamblers and non-gamblers was cognitive stating that “regular 
gamblers process information differently and think there is more skill than there 
actually is” (Griffiths 1994, p. 367). The cognitive distortions that will be discussed 
in more detail are the illusion of control and representativeness.
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Illusion o f control The ‘illusion of control’ was first described by Langer 
(1975). This is the belief that an individual has control over the outcome of a game of 
chance. To examine the theory of the illusion of control Ladouceur and Sevigny
(2005) conducted an experiment with recreational gamblers in which a stopping 
device was installed on a video lottery terminal. In the first phase of the experiment, 
participants played the game without the use of the stopping device, before being 
presented with a questionnaire that measured illusion of control. In the second phase, 
participants were able to use the stopping device during play followed by a second 
questionnaire. It was found that when this device was made available, participants 
reported that the device could affect how the reels stopped, thus affecting their 
chance of winning. Ladouceur and Sevigny (2005) also reported that the device 
increased gambling persistence. These findings demonstrated that the manipulation 
of a structural characteristic such as the presence of a stopping device may interact 
with an individual’s evaluation of a slot-machine such that they believe their chances 
of winning are increased. This may result in greater persistence of slot-machine play 
with machines containing similar devices.
Taking a more qualitative approach, Toneatto, Blitz-Miller, Calderwood, 
Dragonetti, and Tsanos (1997) conducted open-ended interviews with regular and 
heavy gamblers in which they were asked about their strategies, techniques and 
rituals when gambling. According to Toneatto et al. (1997) the most frequently 
reported cognitive distortion amongst problem gamblers is what is known as active 
illusory control with 32 of the 38 participants reporting a distortion from this 
category. The active illusory control category included self-efficacy, cognitive 
control and behavioural control, for example, the reliance on lucky numbers, lucky 
objects, ‘winning’ systems and other superstitious behaviours. Probability control 
was the second highest distortion recorded. This included chasing losses, belief in 
false contingencies and probability errors (believing the probability of a win is better 
than it is). The authors noted that only 8% of the sample did not report any form of 
cognitive distortion which was interpreted as support for the theory that such 
distortions are implied in problem gambling.
Representativeness. According to Kahnemann and Tversky (1972), 
representativeness refers to instances in which individuals judge “a sample to be 
likely or not on the basis of similarity and random appearances” (Petry, 2005, p.214). 
According to Griffiths (1994), representativeness can explain Wagenaar’s (1988)
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‘gambler’s fallacy’. The gambler’s fallacy maintains that gamblers believe that as the 
number of successive losses increases, the probability that a win will follow soon 
also increases. Comey and Cummings (1985) reported that participants were more 
likely to predict that tails would follow next, if there had been a string of coin tosses 
in which heads had been the outcome, despite each coin toss being completely 
independent from the previous one.
However, Delfabbro and Winefield (1999) were unable to provide evidence 
for the gamblers fallacy. Eighteen regular poker machine gamblers and 21 occasional 
poker machine gamblers were video recorded whilst playing a poker machine in a 
casino. Participants were required to rate how confident they were that the machine 
would pay out a large amount over the next 1-10 trials as well as saying aloud a 
number between 1 and 10 to indicate how confident they were. Given the gambler’s 
fallacy, it was predicted that following a string of losses participants would become 
more confident that the machine would pay out, whereas following a win, confidence 
of a payout would decrease. The results revealed little evidence that participants 
behaved in accordance with the gambler’s fallacy as the participants that only 
gambled occasionally were more likely to alter their expectancies than the regular 
gamblers (Delfabbro & Winefield, 1999). This questioned the idea that the gambler’s 
fallacy is complicit in the development of gambling problems.
Aside from the gambler’s fallacy, the heuristic of representativeness has been 
used to account for why gamblers may believe that a lottery ticket containing the 
numbers 1, 2,3,4,5 is less likely to win that a ticket with the numbers 7, 16, 22, 39,
45 despite the probability of winning for both these tickets being identical (Petry, 
2005). Hardoon, Baboushkin, Derevensky, and Gupta (2001) reported that 
participants showed an increased preference for lottery tickets containing numbers 
that appeared random. However, no significant differences were found between non­
problem or pathological gamblers in cognitive distortions, which suggest that such 
distortions were present across all groups. These findings challenge the view that 
individuals develop problems with gambling due to such distortions (Petry, 2005). If 
non-gamblers show the same cognitive distortions as those with extreme problems 
with gambling, then how can this explain why some individuals develop a problem 
whereas others do not?
Blaszczynski and Silove (1995) have criticised accounts .that explain problem 
gambling in terms of false irrational belief, as they claim that there is no direct
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evidence that such beliefs are causal in developing a problem with gambling. If a 
large number of heavy gamblers exhibited irrational beliefs then it would be 
expected that many regular gamblers would become problem gamblers (Ladouceur, 
Paquet, & Dube, 1996), yet the vast majority of regular gamblers do not become 
pathological gamblers. Additionally, these explanations cannot inform how such 
faulty cognitions develop. Clearly, such explanations cannot fully account for the 
development of problem gambling.
12
^ n u p i e r  1
Structural Characteristics of Electronic Gaming Machines
Structural characteristics of Electronic Gaming Machines (EGMs) may have 
an effect on the development and persistence of problem gambling (Griffiths, 1990; 
Parke & Griffiths, 2006). Much of the research so far has been conducted using 
computer-simulated slot-machines. There are some significant benefits to using 
computer-simulated slot-machines as in the UK, slot-machines are legally controlled 
to ensure a certain payout probability (Parke & Griffiths, 2007), and in some states in 
America it is illegal to own casino equipment (Weatherly & Phelps, 2006).
Therefore, using computer-simulated slot-machines in a laboratory environment can 
overcome some of these legalistic obstacles.
Charles Le Fey developed the first gaming machine in the United States in 
1895 (Dickerson, 1996). This primitive machine contained reels with fruit symbols. 
Over the past century, gaming machines have developed considerably and presently, 
many types of electronic gaming machine (EGMs) exist. As mentioned earlier, slot- 
machines are the fourth most common form of gambling after the national lottery, 
scratch cards and betting on horses (Wardle et al., 2010), and account for 60% of a 
casino’s revenue (Ghezzi et al., 2006). Clearly these machines have proven popular, 
however it has been suggested that such machines may be a particularly detrimental 
form of gambling with some researchers going as far as claiming that EGMs are the 
‘crack-cocaine’ of gambling due to the severity of addiction and the speed at which 
this addiction may be acquired (see Dowling, Smith, & Thomas, 2005). There is data 
suggesting that EGMs are the most popular form of gambling amongst problem 
gamblers (Griffiths et al., 1999; Lund, 2006) and in Norway EGMs were considered 
so harmful that they were banned in 2007 (Lund, 2009).
In a review of the literature regarding EGMs, Dowling et al. (2005) 
concluded that whilst EGMs are strongly implicated in problem gambling, the 
analogy that such machines are considered the crack-cocaine of gambling should be 
disputed. Dowling et al. (2005) argue that although there is evidence that EGMs are 
harmful, it remains to be seen whether problem gambling progresses more rapidly in 
EGM players compared to other forms of gambling. However, the authors do 
maintain that there appear to be differences in the so-called ‘addictive potential’ of 
the numerous types of gambling activity and warned against upholding the traditional 
view that all types of gambling are comparable. Dowling et al. (2005) state that vast 
differences exist between the different forms of gambling activity such as the way in
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which they are played, bet size, probability of a win, the environment in which the 
gambling takes place and so on, therefore gambling is not only one type of activity. 
Many gamblers persist with a specific type of gambling activity and the populations 
that seem to engage in each activity are not a homogenous group (Dowling et al.,
2005). This highlights the need for research to be specifically designed towards a 
specific game and cautions against generalising findings across all forms of 
gambling. One of the most widely researched structural characteristics in the 
cognitive literature is that of the near-miss.
Near-miss. A near-miss is said to have occurred when two out of three 
matching symbols appear on the payoff line of a slot-machine (Langer, 1975). 
Although Skinner (1953) has been credited as one of the first to describe the 
phenomenon commonly known as the near-miss (Habib & Dixon, 2010) it has 
attracted much research from scientists within all domains of psychology. Skinner 
(1953) described the near-miss as “almost hitting the jackpot", therefore acting as a 
conditioned reinforcer. It is believed that a near-miss may encourage play even 
though the probabilities across trials remained constant (Reid, 1986). A survey on 
regular slot-machine gamblers found that many respondents reported increased heart 
rate and excitement not just when they were winning but also when they were nearly 
winning (Griffiths, 1993).
Kassinove and Schare (2001) suggested that there maybe an optimal 
percentage of near-misses for greatest persistence in slot-machine play. Participants 
were required to play a slot-machine across 50 trials in which the percentage of near- 
misses was either presented on 15, 30, or 45% of trials. In the final phase, 
participants played a slot-machine under conditions of extinction, therefore no wins, 
losses or near-misses were presented. The participants that had been presented with a 
near-miss on 30% trials played for longer in the extinction phase. Least persistence 
in gambling was seen in participants who had experienced a near-miss on 15% of 
trials or 45% of trials. It was suggested that when a near-miss occurred on only 15% 
of trials, the near-miss was not followed frequently enough by a winning trial 
therefore was not reinforcing, whereas for those who had encountered a near-miss on 
45% of trials, the effect was lost due to extinction.
Cote, Caron, Aubert, Desrochers, and Ladouceur (2003) also demonstrated 
that near-misses may increase persistence in slot-machine play. An experimental 
group and a control were exposed to 48 slot-machine trials, during which 9 wins and
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12 near-misses occurred. During the second part of the experiment, further slot- 
machine trials were presented except no wins occurred therefore every trial was a 
losing trial. For the experimental group approximately 25% of the losses were near- 
misses, whereas for the control group no near-misses occurred. Participants could 
play the slot-machines for a maximum of 240 trials. It was found that the 
experimental group which had continued to be presented with near-misses played 
significantly more slot-machine trials than the control group (Cote et al., 2003).
Taking a different approach to the near-miss research, Wohl and Enzle (2003) 
investigated how nearly winning a large amount (near big win) and the nearly losing 
a large amount (near big loss) can affect an individual’s perception of luck. In 
Experiment 1, participants played a computer-simulated wheel of fortune. In the near 
big loss condition, the wheel stopped just next to the bankrupt outcome. In the near 
big win condition, the wheel stopped just next to the jackpot outcome. Participants 
were given the Belief in Good Luck questionnaire (Darke & Freedman, 1997). It was 
found that those in the near big loss condition perceived themselves to be more lucky 
than those in the near big win condition (Wohl & Enzle, 2003). Wohl and Enzle 
explained their findings in terms of counterfactual thinking. Upward counterfactual 
thinking consists of perceiving an event that is better than the potential outcome, 
whereas downward counterfactual thinking consists of an event being worse than the 
potential outcome. In the case of the participants who nearly hit bankrupt, they may 
have thoughts such as “I nearly lost everything” (downward counterfactual) and see 
themselves as more lucky because they avoided losing money.
Although research from cognitive psychologists has supplemented the 
gambling literature greatly, it is not without its criticisms. Delfabbro (2004) 
questioned the emphasis and integrity of the illusion of control. Whilst there seems to 
be much support for this heuristic being involved in gambling, Delfabbro (2004) has 
argued that this distortion may not be as reliable as or integral to gambling as 
believed. Langer and Roth (1975) found that early wins in a simple coin toss 
experiment lead to a greater illusion of control. However, this effect was not 
replicated in subsequent studies by Coventry and Norman (1998) or Ladouceur and 
Mayrand (1984). Anderson and Brown (1984) suggested that the reason these studies 
failed to replicate the effect was partly due to the nature of the task being 
unrepresentative of a genuine gambling task and partly due to the use of non­
gamblers or infrequent gamblers as participants. However, given the findings of
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Hardoon et al. (2001) it seems that cognitive distortions are present in non-gamblers 
as much as they are in gamblers therefore findings of the illusion of control should 
not differ between these populations.
The notion that irrational beliefs and faulty cognitions may cause behaviour 
is a mechanistic or meditational account of gambling characteristic of much of 
cognitive psychology. In cognitive science, causation is often attributed to internal 
systems (Chiesa, 1992). However, given the findings of Hardoon et al. (2001) and 
the criticisms of Blaszczynski and Silove (1995) that cognitive distortions are not 
causal in the development of gambling, it seems that cognitive explanations of 
gambling behaviour appear lacking. Behavioural accounts however, look to 
environmental causes of behaviour and identifying functional relations between the 
environment and behaviour. Perhaps a behaviour analytic account of gambling may 
be able to provide a more comprehensive explanation of gambling behaviour.
Behaviour Analysis, Schedules of Reinforcement & Gambling
Early behavioural accounts explained gambling behaviour in terms of the 
direct contingencies of reinforcement. According to Skinner “the variable ratio is at 
the heart of all gambling” (1971, p.35). Skinner (1953, 1971) maintained that the 
variable-ratio (VR) schedule of reinforcement made gambling behaviour resistant to 
extinction. In a VR schedule of reinforcement, a variable number of responses are 
required in order for that response to be reinforced. For example, a VR-5 schedule 
would mean that a response is reinforced after an average of every five responses, 
but reinforcement could occur after only one response or after ten responses, as long 
as the average number of responses is equal to five. Behaviour that has been 
reinforced on a VR schedule of reinforcement is more resistant to extinction than 
those responses reinforced on fixed ratio (FR) schedules. In an FR-5 schedule, 
reinforcement is delivered consistently after every five responses. With fixed 
schedules, if reinforcement is no longer delivered after the wth response, the 
organism will quickly stop emitting the response. However, in the case of the VR 
schedule, on some occasions responses may have been reinforced after only one 
response and other times it may have been after twenty responses. The organism 
may, therefore, show persistence in responding.
For many years Skinner’s account of gambling in terms of a VR schedule was 
widely accepted without challenge until Crossman (1983) pointed out that many slot-
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machines in the USA are programmed on random-ratio (RR) schedules of 
reinforcement. In an RR schedule, every spin is independent of the last; the criterion 
for reinforcement does not, therefore, depend on the number of responses from one 
reinforce to the next. Research into the effects of schedules of reinforcement 
surrounding gambling behaviour has revealed many complexities regarding 
participant’s behaviour (Weatherly & Phelps, 2006) as will be discussed later. 
Nonhuman research.
Research supporting the influence that schedules of reinforcement have on 
gambling was provided by Fantino (1967) who presented pigeons with a concurrent 
choice between a FR-50 schedule and a mixed-ratio schedule said to represent a 
gambling schedule. In the first phase, pecking on one key led to the mixed ratio 
schedule becoming available which resulted in one of three FR schedules becoming 
available (therefore reinforcement occurred on alternating fixed ratio schedules), 
whereas pecking a second key lead to an FR-50 schedule becoming available. The 
FR schedule that became available on the mixed-ratio schedule was of equal 
probability; however, the different schedules were programmed such that overall the 
arithmetic mean of the mixed-schedules was the same as the FR-50. In the second 
phase, choosing the mixed schedule resulted in either an FR-1 or FR-99 becoming 
available, whereas for the fixed schedule was now varied. It was found that pigeons 
showed most response allocation to the mixed-ratio ‘gambling like’ schedule 
(Fantino, 1967).
Kendall (1987) provided further support for Fantino using pigeons. Pigeons 
were given the choice between an FR-30 and a second gambling-like schedule which 
sometimes led to the presentation of an FR-10 schedule. If the FR-10 was not 
presented, a 60 second timeout occurred in which neither schedule was available. If 
the pigeon chose the FR-30 they had to expend more time and effort responding to 
receive reinforcement, however reinforcement was guaranteed. Selecting the 
gambling schedule resulted in the possibility of an FR-10 which led to more 
reinforcement being delivered and for less key pressing. However, if the FR-10 did 
not become available the pigeon would be unable to obtain any food. Kendall (1987) 
reported that pigeons showed most response allocation to the gambling-like schedule.
In an additional study, Kendall (1989) replicated and extended the previous 
experiment with two additional changes. First, a closed economy was implemented 
so that the only food available to the pigeons was the food given as reinforcement
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during the experiment. Secondly, the timeout following a loss varied between 1 and 
30 minutes. On the gambling like schedule there was a 10% probability of being 
presented with the FR-10 low response schedule and a 90% chance of a lengthy time 
out. The non-gambling schedule consisted of an FR-30. Kendall (1989) found that 
the pigeons still showed increased preference for the gambling like schedule, even 
though the long timeout sessions meant that the subjects lost out on food overall.
Weatherly and Derenne (2007) designed an experiment that simulated human 
gambling more closely than previous non-human experiments by using flashing 
lights to indicate whether reinforcement would be delivered. Weatherly and Derenne 
(2007) measured whether rats would show a post-reinforcement pause following 
wins and losses. Human research has shown that following a win a pause is observed 
before the individual initiates the next gamble, termed a post-reinforcement pause. 
Following a loss, the latency between the loss and the initiation of the next gamble is 
much smaller. It has also been shown that larger wins lead to increased latencies 
(Delfabbro & Winefield, 1999; Schreiber & Dixon, 2001).
In an experiment by Weatherly and Derenne (2007), rats were required to 
press a lever for food reinforcement, which was delivered on an FR-5 schedule. A 
Cue condition was implemented which was designed to represent a human slot- 
machine whereas in the No-Cue condition no such lights were used. In the Cue 
condition, upon completing the FR-5, a grid of lights began to flash. The grid 
consisted of three rows of three lights (therefore nine lights in total). Once the 
flashing lights had stopped, only three of the lights remained which signalled 
whether reinforcement would be delivered, and if so, the quantity of reinforcer that 
was about to be delivered. If three diagonal lights were illuminated then 
reinforcement was delivered, therefore signalling a losing trial. If the first, second or 
third columns were illuminated, then a small, medium or large amount of food 
reinforcement was delivered, respectively. In the No-Cue condition, the flashing 
lights board was not used. It was found that the smallest duration of post­
reinforcement pauses were seen following a loss, with duration steadily increasing as 
size of reinforcer increased. These findings are akin to human studies. However, no 
differences in duration of post-reinforcement latencies were seen between the Cue 
and No-Cue conditions which the authors claimed would have been expected in a 
human study.
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In an attempt to address some of the limitations of the Weatherly and 
Derenne (2007) study, Peters, Hunt, and Harper (2010) designed an experiment in 
which the near-miss was incorporated. Rats responded by a lever press on an FR-10 
schedule which led to a light display being presented. The light display consisted of 
five lights in a single row. A win was signalled by four lights (small win) or five 
lights (big win) becoming highlighted. To indicate a losing trial, one, two or three 
lights became highlighted and no subsequent reinforcement was delivered. Lights 
were illuminated sequentially to represent casino slot-machines as this sequential 
presentation is thought to be an important structural characteristic (Ladouceur & 
Sevigny, 2002). On winning trials, an additional lever was then pressed to collect 
food reinforcement. Pressing this lever on losing trials did not produce 
reinforcement. Peters et al. (2010) incorporated this extra contingency to ensure that 
the rats attended to the lights. An extinction condition in which no reinforcers were 
delivered was also administered.
It was found that rats showed the smallest post-reinforcement pauses 
following only one light being presented and these latencies increased as the number 
of lights increased, so that when five lights were illuminated, greatest post­
reinforcement pauses were observed. Peters et al. (2010) concluded that rats exhibit 
the same patterns of post-reinforcement pauses as humans. Furthermore, due to the 
methodology implemented they claimed that these pauses were a result of the light 
stimuli and not merely due to the time required to consume the reinforcer. Evidence 
for this was provided by the extinction condition in which rats continued to display 
the same response latencies depending on the number of lights illuminated, even 
though food reinforcement was not delivered.
Zentall and Stagner (2010) presented pigeons with a non-human gambling 
analogue and found that pigeons do not always make the optimal choice in terms of 
the quantity of reinforcement available. Pigeons were presented with two schedules. 
One schedule always resulted in three food pellets (fixed-ratio). The other schedule 
was a VR schedule that mimicked a gambling like schedule. On 20% of trials, 
selecting this schedule produced a red coloured stimulus followed by ten food 
pellets, whereas on 80% of trials a green stimulus was made available which lead to 
no food pellets, therefore on the gambling like schedule, an average of two food 
pellets could be earned. It was found that pigeons showed increased preference for 
the gambling like schedules even though this only resulted in an average of two
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pellets. However, it is possible that these findings are due to a preference for a VR 
schedule over an FR schedule (Zentall & Stagner, 2010), therefore a second 
experiment was designed in which one schedule resulted in either of the colour 
stimuli resulting in 10 pellets on 20% of trials, therefore neither colour was 
discriminative for the delivery of 10 pellets. An average of two pellets could be won 
on this schedule. The alternative schedule always guaranteed three food pellets. It 
was found that pigeons showed increased response allocation to the three-pellet 
schedule. The authors concluded that preference for the two-pellet schedule in 
Experiment 1 was due to the signalling value of the colour stimulus that indicated 
that 10 pellets would be delivered. In Experiment 2, this discriminative function was 
eliminated and pigeons showed increased response allocation to the optimum 
schedule in terms of the quantity of food pellet reinforcement. According to Zentall 
and Stagner (2010) these findings have potential implications for human gambling.
In terms of slot-machines, the winning display acted as a conditioned reinforcer 
signalling that reinforcement is about to be delivered. Zentall and Stagner (2010) 
question whether gamblers would continue to wager if no signals, such as lights and 
sounds, were presented when a win occurs. These findings suggest that such 
conditioned reinforcers may be implicated in gambling persistence.
Non-human research suggests that rats and pigeons show preferences for 
gambling-like schedules of reinforcement. Although some may contest the validity of 
non-human gambling research, such research has some distinct advantages. When 
investigating gambling in humans in a laboratory setting, ethical considerations mean 
that it is not possible for that individual to gamble their own money or go into debt. 
With non-human research, the experimenter can starve a pigeon before the 
experiment, which is considered an analogy of ‘debt’, and consequently makes food 
more reinforcing. It remains to be seen whether food starvation in non-humans is 
functionally equivalent to a gamblers financial debt (Weatherly & Phelps, 2006). 
Despite the advantages of conducting gambling research with non-human subjects, 
for a better understanding of the factors that influence human gambling behaviour 
and for behaviour analytic research to impact upon the wider gambling literature, it is 
critical that such research be conducted with human participants.
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Human research.
Behaviour-analytic researchers have analysed the extent to which individuals 
are sensitive to the schedules of reinforcement of a slot-machine and how this may 
influence slot-machine choice. Dixon, Maclin, and Daugherty (2006) used computer- 
simulated slot-machines to investigate the relationship between schedule and 
magnitude of reinforcement and slot-machine choice. Participants were presented 
with two slot-machines, one which paid out on a VR-10 (little and often) and the 
other slot-machine paid out on a VR-50 (larger sums but less often), therefore if 
equal bets were placed on each slot-machine overall payout would be the same. It 
was found that 86% of participants allocated most responding to the VR-10 slot- 
machine as it resulted in more instances of reinforcement (Dixon et al., 2006).
In an extension of the experiment by Dixon and colleagues, Haw (2008) 
investigated the effect of rate of reinforcement on concurrent slot-machine choice. 
Dixon et al. analysed the effect of frequency of wins on slot-machine choice, 
however Haw (2008) examined the effect of payback rate. Payback rate was defined 
as the monetary value of wins expressed as a percentage of wins and expenditure.
For example, if a gambler bets £1.00 and wins 70 pence, the payback rate would be 
70%. As well as measuring payback rate, Haw (2008) analysed the point at which 
participants switched machines. Participants completed an initial practise phase in 
which they were exposed to both slot-machines and could gamble between one and 
eight dollars. Once participants had built up a history with both machines, they 
played each slot-machine a further 40 times. Finally participants were given $500 
credits to bet on either slot-machine. In this phase, participants could freely switch 
between both slot-machines, with every win size and frequency being recorded by 
the experimenter.
It was found that only 61% of participants most frequently chose the slot- 
machine that had paid out the most in the practise phase. A chi-square revealed that 
this was not a statistically significant effect, therefore it was concluded that there was 
no significant relationship between reinforcement and slot-machine choice (Haw, 
2008). These findings did not support those of Dixon et al. (2006). When accounting 
for the differences in the findings between the two studies, Haw (2008) suggested 
that preferences for a particular slot-machine may only occur when the differences 
between the machines are enlarged, for example when there are large differences in 
payout probabilities. Haw (2008) suggested that this may explain why these findings
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were not in accordance with Dixon et al. (2006) as the payback percentages in Haw’s 
study did not differ as greatly.
It is possible that the participants in Haw’s study were not sensitive to the 
schedules of reinforcement in place as there is evidence that human participants do 
not always show a preference for the slot-machine with the highest percentage 
payout. This is consistent with the literature on schedules of reinforcement that has 
reported that human participants do not always maximise responding on schedule of 
reinforcement (Hayes, Zettle, & Rosenfarb, 1989; Madden & Perone, 1999). 
Weatherly, Thompson, Hodny, and Meier (2009) presented six non-pathological 
gamblers with concurrently available slot-machines that paid out at different rates. 
Participants were given $5 worth of tokens and instructed which two slot-machines 
they could play. All of the payout percentages programmed corresponded to actual 
casino payout probabilities with the overall percentage payouts experienced by each 
of the participants being 97.9%, 90.3%, 78.4%, 91.8%, 75.2%, and 139.9%, 
respectively. Participants were able to switch freely between two slot-machines and 
played until either the participant quit or 20 minutes had passed. The frequency of 
plays on each slot-machine and amount bet were recorded. Once participants had 
shown stable responding towards one particular slot-machine, the schedule of 
reinforcement was altered by the researcher for one or both of the slot-machines.
It was found that the payout percentage of each slot-machine had very little 
effect on slot-machine choice with participants not necessarily preferring the slot- 
machine that paid out the most (Weatherly et al., 2009). Three of the participants 
played almost exclusively on the slot-machine that paid out at the highest rate; 
however Weatherly et al. could not conclude that this was as a result of the 
contingencies of that slot-machine, as these participants rarely played the other slot- 
machines therefore did not experience the contingencies of the other machines. The 
participants who allocated responding to both slot-machines only went on to show 
preference for the slot-machine with the highest payout contingencies in five out of 
25 conditions. Weatherly et al. (2009) concluded that factors other than payout 
contingencies, influence slot-machine choice, and that participants’ behaviour was 
perhaps partly rule-governed and not solely determined by the schedule of 
reinforcement of the slot-machines.
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Behaviour Analytic Research on Gambling
Illusion o f control Behaviour analytic gambling research has evolved over 
recent years such that research aims to go beyond an explanation based purely upon 
direct contingencies of reinforcement. Dixon, Hayes, and Ebbs (1998) and Dixon 
(2000) looked at the cognitive phenomenon of the illusion of control and 
demonstrated that it can in fact be brought under experimental control. It was found 
that given the choice between the experimenter selecting numbers in a game of 
roulette compared to the participant being able to select their own numbers, 
participants preferred to select their own numbers even though they would have to 
lose an extra chip in order to do so and the probability of winning remains the same 
(Dixon et al., 1998). In a later experiment, Dixon (2000) gave participants accurate 
and inaccurate rules informing the participants of their chance of winning in a game 
of roulette. Dixon (2000) found that when given accurate rules participants wagered 
fewer chips than when given inaccurate rules. This finding is important as it 
demonstrates that external rules given to an individual can influence their gambling 
behaviour, and is not indicative of an internal belief or cognitive distortion.
Extending research on the illusion of control to video poker Dixon, Jackson, 
Delaney, Holton, and Crothers (2007) concurrently presented participants with two 
computer simulated poker machines to play. One of the poker machines allowed 
participants to choose which cards they wanted to hold or discard whereas the 
computer selected the optimal cards on the other slot-machine. Participants could 
freely switch between each poker machine. Prior to playing the poker machines, 
participants were either given accurate rules in which they were told that the 
computer-selected option was the optimal choice, or inaccurate rules stating that self- 
selecting cards would increase their chance of winning. No significant differences 
were found between the effects of the accurate or inaccurate rule on the number of 
hands played; however, participants played more hands on the machine which 
allowed them to self select their cards, although this was not a statistically significant 
difference. This finding suggests that individuals prefer to believe that they have 
control over a game, even when it means forfeiting the optimum.
In the second experiment, participants were presented with a non-rule 
baseline followed by an inaccurate rule and later, an accurate rule. It was found that 
12 out of 13 participants preferred the self-select game and once given the inaccurate 
rule that this option was a better option, participants increased their allocation to the
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self-selecting game even more. Once given the accurate rule that the computer- 
selected option was the optimal option, only half of participants adhered to that rule 
by switching from the self-select game. As the authors had employed a protocol 
analysis element to the experiment they were able to examine the subtle differences 
between those who followed the rule and those who did not. Dixon et al. (2007) 
reported that participants that followed the accurate rules seemed to pay more 
attention to reinforcement and how much they had won or lost, and were less 
attentive to performance. Those who ignored the accurate rule seemed to evaluate 
their play on a trial by trial basis and were less aware of their winnings. Perhaps then, 
illusion of control relates to a lack of attention to wins and losses (Dixon et al.,
2007).
Near miss. Behaviour analytic accounts of the near-miss propose that it is a 
verbal event which has reinforcing properties that are similar to that of a win, with an 
individual believing that a win may happen soon (Dixon & Schreiber, 2004). Human 
behaviour can be considered a verbal event if it involves responding to arbitrary 
relations between stimuli and in the absence of a direct history of reinforcement (see 
later for a more detailed discussion). For example, a near-miss may have 
considerable reinforcing properties by an individual merely reflecting on how they 
would have spent any winnings if a win had occurred (Dixon & Delaney, 2006). This 
is in itself is a reinforcing event even though there is no direct contingency of 
reinforcement for this event, that is, a win has not occurred. Dixon and Delaney
(2006) suggested that the near-miss has a discriminative function so that a person 
may view a near-miss as a win. Dixon and Schreiber (2004) reported that when 
individuals are asked to rate how close they are to a win or a loss following a spin on 
a slot-machine, participants’ rated a near-miss as closer to a win compared to trials in 
which no matching symbols occur.
Maclin, Dixon, Daugherty, and Small (2007) concurrently presented 
participants with three computer simulated slot-machines in which near-misses were 
presented on 15, 30, or 45% trials. It was found that participants showed a greater 
preference for the slot-machine with the highest number of near-misses. These data 
are interesting as Kassinove and Schare (2001) found that 30% near misses lead to 
greatest persistence in play. The differences in findings may be related to the 
measures that were taken in the two experiments as Maclin et al. (2007) were 
measuring preference by means of response allocation to each machine whereas
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Kassinove and Schare (2001) measured persistence. Maclin et al. (2007) concluded 
that having encountered a string of losses, the slot-machine with the most near- 
misses is most preferred. This is interesting because the payout probabilities for the 
three slot-machines in the first part of the experiment were identical, therefore 
participants did not win any more money on these machines. Furthermore, a near- 
miss is still in fact a losing trial therefore a higher incidence of near-misses will not 
mean that an individual wins any more money.
Structural characteristics. Research has been conducted into the effects of 
structural characteristics of slot-machines, such as colour, on gambling behaviour. 
Zlomke and Dixon (2006) demonstrated that preferences for concurrently presented 
computer simulated slot-machines that were identical in payout probability, but 
differed in colour (yellow or blue) could be altered. Initially, participants did not 
show any significant preference for either slot-machine. However, following a non- 
arbitrary relational training task in which colour yellow was trained as a contextual 
cue for more-than and colour blue was trained as a contextual cue for less-than, 
participants showed an increased preference for the yellow (more-than slot-machine).
These findings were replicated and extended by Hoon, Dymond, Jackson, and 
Dixon (2007, 2008) by employing a modified non-arbitrary relational training and 
testing procedure. The results supported those of Zlomke and Dixon (2006) in that 
participants also showed an increased preference for the more-than slot-machine at 
post-test. The findings of these experiments were significant as the payout 
probability and schedule and magnitude of reinforcement for the two slot-machines 
were identical and all participants were exposed to the direct contingencies of the 
machines, yet participants shifted their preference towards one of the slot-machines. 
These findings cannot be explained by contingencies alone, but suggest that 
additional factors such as structural characteristics may be implicated in gambling 
behaviour.
A further modification of Zlomke and Dixon (2006) and Hoon et al. (2007, 
2008) was conducted with children using a computer-simulated board game. Using a 
pre-test post-test design, participants played the board game using either a red or a 
blue coloured die (Johnson & Dixon, 2009). A non-arbitrary relational training and 
testing phase established colour blue as a contextual cue for less-than and colour red 
as contextual cue for more-than. Following this intervention, six out of seven
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participants showed increased preference for red dice (more-than) when playing the 
board game.
The slot-machines seen in 21st century casinos are complex machines that not 
only vary in colour, but contain many complex structural features. Many machines 
now feature stopping devices that enable gamblers to stop the reels before they have 
finished spinning. Nastally, Dixon, and Jackson (2009) presented participants with 
two different slot-machines -  one with a stopping device and one without. 
Participants were divided into one of three experimental conditions; Button Slot 
Winner, No Button Slot Winner or Equal Win Rate. In the Button Slot Winner 
condition the slot-machine with the stopping device paid out 80% of the time. In the 
No Button Slot Winner condition the slot-machine without the stopping device paid 
out 80% of the time, whereas in the Equal Win Rate condition both machines paid 
out at a rate of 30%. In the Button Slot Winner condition nine of ten participants 
allocated most responding to slot-machine with the stopping device. In the Non- 
Button Slot Winner nine out of ten participants showed the most preference for the 
slot-machine without the stopping device. In the Equal Win Rate condition half of 
participants showed increased response allocation to the slot-machine with the 
stopping device, whereas the other half showed most preference for the machine 
without the stopping device. The findings of Nastally et al. (2009) contradict 
previous research that has reported that a stopping device leads to increased play on a 
slot-machine (Ladouceur & Sevigny, 2005), as Nastally et al. found no preferences 
for the slot-machine with the stopping device when the payout contingencies were 
equal. The authors concluded that although such devices may promote the illusion of 
control, the payout contingencies of the slot-machines are a stronger indicator of slot- 
machine preference (Nastally et al., 2009).
From the research described above, it is clear that factors affecting the 
persistence and maintenance of gambling are highly complex. Non-human work has 
demonstrated that pigeons will show an increased preference for a gambling like 
schedule even when this leads to less reinforcement resulting in a ‘debt’ of food 
supply (Kendall, 1989). Research into the near-miss has found that gamblers rate a 
near-miss trial as closer to win despite no reinforcement being delivered for a near- 
miss (Dixon & Schreiber, 2004). Furthermore, following a string of losses, 
participants show increased preference for the slot-machine that delivers the highest 
frequency of near-misses, even though a near-miss is also a losing trial therefore
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does not result in any more credit being awarded (Maclin et al., 2007). Researchers 
have also shown that participants will show increased preference for a slot-machine 
that is the same colour as a cue for more-than, even though the other slot-machine 
available is of equal payout probability (Zlomke & Dixon, 2006; Hoon et al., 2007,
2008).
Clearly the research reported cannot be explained by considering just the 
payout probability. Although contingencies of reinforcement may be fundamental in 
explaining the patterns of responding a gambler may exhibit when playing slot- 
machines and other such games of chance, this alone cannot explain why some 
people will develop a problem with gambling whereas the majority may regularly 
engage in gambling but will not develop a problem as such. Skinner highlighted the 
distinction between contingency-shaped and rule-governed behaviour, yet he did not 
discuss this with regard to gambling behaviour (Porter & Ghezzi, 2006). In a casino 
environment, individuals are exposed to many verbal stimuli such as signs informing 
them of the jackpot available or statements about their play made by those around 
them (Dixon & Delaney, 2006). If contingencies of reinforcement alone cannot 
account for problem gambling, then perhaps by accounting for the influence of 
verbal behaviour, a fuller understanding of gambling may be reached.
An integrative approach to gambling behaviour.
Recently, conceptual accounts have been proposed as to why certain 
individuals may develop a problem with the gambling whereas others do not. 
Weatherly and Dixon (2007) proposed an integrative account to gambling behaviour 
incorporating contingencies of reinforcement, verbal rules, and establishing 
operations/setting events as being integral. Establishing operations or setting events 
refer to events that alter the reinforcing value of a stimulus (Cooper, Heron, & 
Heward, 2007; Michael, 1993). In the context of gambling, lower social economic 
status (SES) may make money a more effective reinforcer (Weatherly & Dixon, 
2007). Other relevant setting events may include age, gender, and ethnicity 
(Weatherly & Dixon, 2007). In the example of lower SES as a setting event, if 
money is the primary reinforcer this may increase the likelihood of developing a 
severe gambling problem, whereas the gambler who enjoys the excitement of 
gambling may never develop a pathological problem (Weatherly & Dixon, 2007).
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Verbal rules may also be implicated in pathological gambling (see later for a 
more detailed discussion). If an individual is given false verbal rules overestimating 
the probability of achieving a win, then it is likely that they will wager increased 
amounts of money and increased persistence in play (see Dixon 2000). Self-rules 
such as “red is my lucky colour” may lead a gambler to play the red slot-machine. 
Weatherly and Dixon emphasise the importance of such rules stating that:
“if these [verbal] rules are fallacious, then they may not only promote 
gambling, but also alter the consequence(s) maintaining the gambling 
behavior. If these rules lead to losses, and thus an increase in the efficacy of 
winning money, then they will serve to promote pathological gambling.” 
(2007, p. 15).
Weatherly and Dixon argue that much of the behaviour-analytic gambling 
data conducted so far seem to support the proposed integrative model. One 
significant advantage of this model is that by incorporating mechanisms of 
contingencies of reinforcement, verbal rules, and establishing operations, the model 
may be able to account for how the exact same contingencies of a gaming machine 
have different effects on different individuals, resulting in one individual developing 
a serious problem whereas another is able to stop gambling at will (Weatherly & 
Dixon, 2007). The authors also claim that this model allows for testable predictions 
as well as an independent measure of pathology. Furthermore, it may have 
significant treatment implications through identifying causes of pathological 
gambling, thus enabling the identification of effective treatment that is specific to the 
cause of the specific individual’ s gambling problem (Weatherly & Dixon, 2007).
The Present Thesis: Towards a Verbal Account of Gambling
It has been suggested that verbal behaviour may be strongly implicated in 
gambling behaviour (Dymond & Roche, 2010). In order to discuss a verbal account 
of gambling, one must begin with Skinner’s account of verbal behaviour published in 
1957. Skinner’s book Verbal Behavior was an attempt at providing a functional 
definition of verbal behaviour. Skinner claimed that verbal behaviour occurs when a 
speaker’s behaviour is “reinforced through the mediation of other persons” (1957, 
p.2) and that such behaviour is “shaped and maintained by mediated consequences” 
(1957, p.2). It is important to note that by this definition the behaviour of a listener is 
not verbal behaviour as the listener is merely mediating the reinforcement of the
28
^ n u j j iv r  1
speaker. According to Skinner (1957), this is no different to mediating reinforcement 
for any other behaviour.
Skinner proposed that combinations of sounds by a speaker can be reinforced 
by another individual, termed the listener, by the way that listener acts as a 
consequence of the sounds uttered. For example, asking for a drink is reinforced by 
the speaker receiving a drink. This behaviour then becomes very important for social 
interaction. In the book Verbal Behavior, Skinner (1957) made a distinction between 
the formal and functional properties of language, asserting that language is a learned 
behaviour that is acquired and influenced by the same environmental variables as any 
other behaviour. Skinner proposed that verbal behaviour could be studied through a 
unit of analysis known as verbal operants. Altogether, six verbal operants were 
identified, termed tacts, mands, echoics, intraverbals, and autoclitics. A tact is 
determined by an antecedent stimulus which is then named or tacted whereas mands 
are controlled by reinforcers, such as saying the word “drink” when thirsty, and 
receiving a drink accordingly. Echoic behaviour occurs when an utterance is repeated 
or echoed. An intraverbal consists of a verbal response in which the antecedent is 
also verbal behaviour but the physical properties of the correspondence between the 
antecedent and the response is arbitrary. Finally, an autoclitic is verbal behaviour 
which alters or modifies the behaviour of the listener, for example, words such as 
“maybe”, “I think”, or “not”. A complete account of Skinner’s Verbal Behaviour is 
beyond the scope of the present thesis; however, the defining features of Skinner’s 
taxonomy aimed to provide functional definitions of verbal behaviour which were 
predicated on the principles of respondent and operant conditioning, and reinforced 
through the verbal community (Hayes, Blackledge, & Bames-Holmes, 2001).
Hayes et al. (2001) argue that Skinner’s definition is not functional and is too 
broad thus preventing further empirical investigation. One fundamental principle that 
Skinner has claimed to be key to the explanation of verbal behaviour is that of 
history of reinforcement. One major problem with this however, is that it cannot 
account for the generativity of language. This would mean that, for example, when 
learning new words, every single word would require a direct history of 
reinforcement in order for that word to be learned, therefore cannot explain how 
humans can produce many novel utterances in the absence of such reinforcement 
(Wulfert & Hayes, 1988). It seems that language can develop without a direct history 
of reinforcement (Hayes, Bames-Holmes, & Roche, 2001) as will be discussed later.
29
K snujjier 1
Returning again to the relevance of this on gambling behaviour; accounts of human 
behaviour that attempt to explain all instances of gambling behaviour through the 
direct contingencies of reinforcement, may encounter conceptual limitations. Dixon 
and Delaney (2006, p. 174) encapsulate this issue in the following analogy:
“Specifically, if two people who have never gambled before play the same 
slot-machine for the same initial amount of spins, and contact the same 
programmed contingencies, and one player continues playing while the other 
one quits, we are left without a meaningful account of the different 
behaviours.”
If these two individuals have contacted exactly the same contingencies of 
reinforcement, then a pure schedule of reinforcement account falls short of an 
explanation as to why one persists whilst the other walks away. The studies by 
Zlomke and Dixon (2006), Hoon et al. (2007, 2008) and Weatherly et al. (2009) 
highlight that preferences for slot-machines cannot solely be explained by the payout 
probability of a slot-machine. So what, then, is exerting control over a gambler’s 
behaviour? A more complete explanation of such responding may be accounted for 
by contemporary behavior-analytic accounts of verbal behaviour.
Rule-governed behaviour
One area of verbal research that developed after the publication of Verbal 
Behavior was that of rule-governed behaviour. According to Skinner, rules are 
stimuli that specify a contingency (Skinner, 1969) and are followed due to the 
reinforcement of previous behaviour for rule following (Skinner, 1966). In the 1980s 
much research was conducted into the effects of rule following on behaviour (Hayes 
et al., 2001). One area of research into rule-governed behaviour found that externally 
delivered rules may even override the control exerted by schedules of reinforcement 
(Hayes, Brownstein, Haas, & Greenaway, 1986). Hayes et al. (1986) studied the 
effects of externally delivered instructions on preference to concurrent schedules. 
Participants were presented with multiple schedules, consisting of an FR-18 and a 
differential-reinforcement-of low-rate (DRL) 6 s schedule, and required to press a 
button for a chance to win monetary reinforcement. Participants were assigned to one 
of four conditions; minimal instructions, instructed to press the button slowly, 
instructed to press the button fast or given an accurate rule informing them when to 
press slowly and when to press quickly. The schedule altered between the FR
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schedule and the DRL schedule at two-minute intervals. When given inaccurate 
instructions (Minimal, Go Slow, and Go Fast conditions), it was found that 
participants’ responding varied greatly and few points were won. Participants in the 
accurate rule condition, however, earned more points and showed schedule sensitive 
responding.
With regard to gambling, there is evidence to suggest that gambling may also 
be influenced by rule-governed behaviour (Dixon, 2000; Dixon et al., 2007; 
Weatherly & Meier, 2008). The effects of rules on a gambler’s behaviour are of great 
importance to understanding why an individual may gamble in a particular way, as in 
a casino environment there are many other verbally able individuals who may 
encourage a gambler to continue playing by emitting statements regarding how close 
he was to winning, or implying that the tactics he is employing are not working 
(Dixon & Delaney, 2006). As well as human interaction, a casino contains many 
signs such as “mega jackpots” or “you have to play to win” (Dixon & Delaney,
2006) or images of pots of gold and lucky symbols. All of these stimuli are examples 
of environmental variables or external rules, that may mediate a gambler’s behaviour 
and influence which games that individual plays and at what point he will cease 
gambling.
There is empirical evidence that externally delivered rules can influence 
gambling behaviour. As discussed earlier, Dixon (2000) demonstrated that delivering 
accurate rules that specify the probability of winning may reduce the number of chips 
wagered in a game of roulette. Dixon et al. (2007) reported that participants preferred 
to play a computer simulated poker machine in which they could select their own 
cards over a computer controlled machine which selected the optimal cards.
However, once told that the computer-selected machine was the optimal option, half 
of the participants then switched to the computer selected machine.
Whilst Dixon (2000) demonstrated that accurate rules may reduce wagering 
in roulette, Weatherly and Meier (2008) demonstrated that accurate rules may also 
reduce persistence in slot-machine gambling. Following initial exposure to a slot- 
machine, participants were either instructed about the random ratio schedule of 
reinforcement on slot-machine, warned against playing slot-machines for long 
periods of time, or given both sets of instructions. Weatherly and Meier (2008) 
reported a significant decrease in the number of slot-machine trials played across all 
groups compared to the first phase of the experiment. It was concluded that gambling
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may be partly rule-governed and that presenting gamblers with accurate information 
about the schedules involved in gambling, may reduce gambling persistence 
(Weatherly & Meier, 2008).
The rule-governed behaviour literature demonstrated that rules may override 
contingencies of reinforcement, even though the rule stated may inaccurately 
describe the contingency in place (Dixon, 2000; Hayes et al., 1986). These findings 
were important conceptually as rule following is a uniquely human capacity; 
therefore, it implied that the human ability for language may account for some of the 
behavioural differences between humans and non-humans. Whilst this was a 
significant progression for the behavioural literature, there was a limit to the extent to 
which rule-governed behaviour could be applied to human responding. Empirical 
investigations into rule-governed behaviour typically involved presenting an 
instruction, and then measuring the relative effects on schedule responding. This 
method had limitations as “instructions were treated as an object, not a term that 
referred to a functional relation between environmental stimulation and the action of 
the organism” (Hayes et al., 1989, p. 193). It also implies that verbal behaviour may 
have a causal role in performance on concurrent schedule, however, Dymond and 
Barnes (1994) argued that the two can influence each other in a non-linear fashion 
(Dymond & Barnes, 1994).
In behaviour analysis, emphasis is placed on providing functional relations 
between stimuli and the behaviour it occasions (Hayes & Hayes, 1992). That is, 
behaviour analysis seeks to predict and control behaviour by identifying the variables 
that maintain a behaviour (Skinner, 1953), thus identifying the function of a 
particular behaviour. In the rule-governed behaviour literature however, the way in 
which rules came to exert control over behaviour could not be determined. Such an 
account assumed that if instructional stimuli are discriminative for a particular 
behaviour then this insinuates that every instruction requires a direct history of 
reinforcement for the rule being followed (Hayes & Hayes, 1992). If instructions 
require a history of reinforcement, then this infers that rules will only be followed 
when they are accurate (Galizio, 1979). It is likely that much of human behaviour 
can be occasioned without a direct history of reinforcement with a particular stimulus 
(Hayes et al., 2001), yet this could not be accounted for by rule-governed behaviour. 
Additionally, the language hypothesis claimed that the behaviour of the listener was 
verbal which was contrary to Skinner’s claims (Hayes et al., 2001). Finally, although
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Skinner claimed that rules specified a contingency of behaviour, he did not define 
what it meant to specify a contingency, and this definition was integral to the 
definition of rule-governed behaviour (Parrott, 1987; Hayes & Hayes, 1989). Hayes 
et al. (2001) argued that if ‘to specify’ meant that a discriminative stimulus occasions 
behaviour, then this is no different to contingency shaped behaviour and therefore 
according to Skinner’s definition, is not considered verbal behaviour as it involves a 
direct contingency of reinforcement.
The questions that arose from these limitations together with discoveries in 
the domain of research on equivalence relations that human subjects could emit 
responding to stimuli in the laboratory that had not been directly trained, but were 
indirectly related, paved the way for research into derived relational responding and 
the development of a contemporary account of human language and cognition.
Derived Relational Responding
Stimulus Equivalence. Given the limitations of both Skinner’s account and 
the limited scope of the rule-governed behaviour literature, a new concept was 
required that would be able to answer some of the questions raised by Skinner’s 
definition of verbal behaviour. Research into stimulus equivalence has demonstrated 
that participants could respond to relations that were not directly trained or based on 
purely physical properties. It is possible that such responding may be able to explain 
the generativity of behaviour, particularly verbal behaviour. The fundamental 
principle of stimulus equivalence is that having being trained certain relations, 
humans can then derive many more untrained relations (Sidman 1971; Wulfert & 
Hayes, 1988). For example, having being trained that stimulus A is the same as 
stimulus B, and B is the same as stimulus C, humans will then derive that C is the 
same as A, in the absence of direct training. Stimulus equivalence has generated a 
great deal of research and as Barnes (1994, p.91) pointed out, “One of the main 
reasons for this attention to equivalence lies in the fact that it is not readily accounted 
for by the concept of conditional discrimination.” It is significant as it accounts for 
how a child having being taught to say “cat” in the presence of an actual cat, when 
shown a cartoon picture of a cat the child will be able to respond “cat” despite never 
being directly taught this in the presence of the cartoon.
The three defining features of stimulus equivalence are reflexivity, symmetry 
and transitivity. Reflexivity refers to correctly selecting A in the presence of A.
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Symmetry is seen when having been trained that A is the same as B, the untaught 
relation of B is the same as A emerges. After having learnt to select B in the presence 
of A, and C in the presence of B, transitivity occurs when selecting A in the presence 
of C (Sidman, Kirk, & Willson-Morris, 1985).
Much research has been conducted investigating equivalence relations. 
Sidman, et al. (1985) trained children and adults three sets of arbitrary stimuli in 
which each set of stimuli contained three stimuli (that is, Al, A2, A3; Bl, B2, B3; 
and Cl, C2, C3) through a conditional discrimination task. In the presence of Al, 
participants learned to select Bl and C l; in the presence of A2, participants learned 
to correctly select B2 and C2, and so on. Following this training, participants were 
trained three more stimulus sets of three (Dl, D2, D3; El, E2, E3; and FI, F2, F3). 
This meant that participants were presented with 12 different conditional 
discriminations in total across the six sets of stimuli. Three of the participants were 
then given further training in which they were trained Cl and El, C2 and E2 and C3 
and E3 relation. These participants were presented with a total of 15 different 
conditional discriminations. From these 15 trained relations, a further 60 conditional 
relations emerged that had not been trained.
A further defining feature of stimulus equivalence is that of transfer or 
transformation of stimulus functions. This occurs when the stimulus functions that 
have been trained to one member of an equivalence relation, transfer to other 
members of the equivalence relation without direct training (Dymond & Barnes, 
1994). For instance, Barnes and Keenan (1993) demonstrated transfer of 
discriminative stimulus functions. In Experiment 1, participants were trained two 
three-member equivalence classes consisting of A1-B1-C1 and A2-B2-C2. 
Participants then learned to emit a low rate of responding when presented with Bl 
and to emit a high rate of responding when presented with B2. In the next experiment 
the authors were able to show a transformation of these discriminative functions to 
novel stimuli that were physically similar to the stimuli in the previous experiment. 
Functions that have been shown to transform through equivalence relations include 
consequential functions (Hayes et al., 1987; Hayes, Kohlenberg, & Hayes, 1991), 
respondent eliciting functions (Dougher, Augustson, Markham, Greenway, & 
Wulfert, 1994), and avoidance functions (Augustson & Dougher, 1997).
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Relational Frame Theory
Equivalence was a key move forwards in the explanation of novel verbal 
behaviour. One criticism of the equivalence research however, was that it can’t 
account for all the relations that are part of a verbal repertoire, as equivalence 
research only examined ‘same’ relations, that is, behaviour in which a relation of 
sameness (equivalence) existed between the stimuli. For example, an individual 
could learn through arbitrary training the English word “house” is the same as the 
French word “maison”, and the word “maison” is the same as the Spanish word 
“casa”. This individual could then derive that the Spanish word for house is casa. It 
has been suggested however, that a great number of relations exist between stimuli 
other than just same relations, for example comparative relations such as better, 
worse, more, and less; temporal relations such as before, after, now, and then; and 
spatial relations such as above, below, left, and right (Hayes, Fox, Gifford, Wilson, 
Bames-Holmes, & Healy, 2001). Principles of stimulus equivalence are unable to 
account for these relations.
The research on stimulus equivalence however allowed for the development 
of relational frame theory (RET) in which complex behaviour such as human 
language and cognition can be further explored. In a similar way to equivalence, RFT 
is able to explain behaviour in the absence of a direct history of reinforcement 
through derived relations, therefore addressing some of the key limitations of 
Skinner’s definition of verbal behaviour, yet it extends the study of derived relational 
responding to all types of relations other than just relations of sameness (Hayes & 
Wilson, 1993).
RFT defines human language and cognition as a form of operant behaviour in 
which an organism responds to a stimulus in relation to another stimulus (Hayes et 
al., 2001). This is termed relational responding. Steele and Hayes (1991) define 
relational responding as being arbitrarily applicable with an “extensive history, 
largely in the context of language training, that can be brought into the experimental 
situation by virtue of contextual cues” (1991, p. 520). Contextual cues that specify a 
relation, often referred to as a Crei, have been defined as cues which symbolise “a 
context in which a history of a particular kind or relational responding is brought to 
bear on the current situation” (Hayes et al., 2001, p. 30). Contextual cues that specify 
a function or a CfunC are defined as cues that symbolise “the stimuli that select
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particular psychologically relevant, non-relational stimulus functions in any given 
situation” (Hayes et al., 2001, p. 33).
Relational responding occurs when, for example, an organism learns through 
reinforcement, that A is greater in relation to B, and B is greater in relation to C. 
Given this, the organism can deduce through mutual entailment that B must be less 
than A, and C must be less than B, despite such rules never being directly trained. 
Furthermore, combinatorial entailment will allow an individual to derive that C must 
be less than A and A must be greater than C. Derived relations have been found to 
emerge developmentally in human infants (Lipkens, Hayes, & Hayes, 1993).
Relational responding consists of mutual entailment, combinatorial 
entailment and the transformation of stimulus function. These concepts are the 
defining features of RFT. A relational frame is:
“the term used to specify a particular pattern of contextually controlled, 
arbitrarily applicable relational responding involving mutual entailment, 
combinatorial entailment, and the transformation of stimulus functions, that is 
based upon a general history of relational learning rather than on a history of 
direct nonrelational training with respect to the stimuli involved or solely on 
the formal properties of the related events.” (Hayes & Wilson, 1993, p. 286). 
The second key component of RFT is the transformation of stimulus function. 
This occurs “when a given stimulus in a relational network has certain psychological 
functions, the functions of other events in that network may be modified in 
accordance with the underlying derived relation” (Hayes et al., 2001, p 31). In other 
words, the function of a stimulus is transformed based on its relation to other stimuli 
that have not been directly trained. For example, say that participants were trained 
that arbitrary stimulus Al was the same as Bl and Cl, and A2 was the same as B2 
and C2. If an electric shock was then delivered in the presence of stimulus Bl, but 
not in the presence of B2, then Bl may acquire conditioned fear eliciting properties. 
Next, to test for transformation of functions, Cl may be presented, in the absence of 
shock. If fear is elicited, then transformation of (Pavlovian eliciting) functions in 
accordance with same relational frames may be said to have occurred (see Dougher 
et al., 1994; Roche & Barnes, 1997; Roche et al., 2000). In this example, the trained 
fear response acquired for Bl was transformed in accordance with Cl due to the 
same relation between Bl and Cl.
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In the literature on stimulus equivalence and RFT the terms ‘transfer’ and 
‘transformation’ of functions are used interchangeably (Dougher, Hamilton, Fink, & 
Harrington, 2007). Transfer of functions was initially used in the equivalence 
literature to describe the untrained emergence of stimulus functions where the 
untrained functions are the same (Dougher et al., 2007). However, RFT research 
tends to use the term transformation as relations other than equivalence or sameness 
are studied therefore the trained and untrained functions may be different (Dymond 
& Barnes, 1995; Roche et al., 2000). Where the trained and untrained functions are 
different, those functions of the stimulus cannot transfer to another stimulus, rather 
those functions transform in accordance with the derived relations (Dougher et al.,
2007). For example, given more-than and less-than relations, stimuli in the network 
do not simply acquire the same functions of the trained stimulus function; rather, the 
functions of the stimuli are transformed in accordance with the relations of more- 
than and less-than.
Dymond and Barnes (1995) demonstrated that a transformation of self- 
discriminative functions extends beyond just equivalence relations, and can be 
transformed through relations of same, more-than, and less-than. Participants first 
completed a non-arbitrary relational training task to establish contextual cues for the 
relations (that is, same, opposite, more-than, less-than). Following this, participants 
completed arbitrary relational training which established a relational network of 
same relations between A1-B1-C1, Al less-than B2, and Al more-than C2. From 
these trained relations, participants were able to respond accurately to seven derived 
stimulus relations. Participants were then trained a self-discriminative function which 
required participants to make a response on three schedules of reinforcement. If a 
response was not made, participants were trained to select novel stimulus XI, if one 
response was made then participants were required to select Bl, and finally if two 
responses were made, participants were required to select novel stimulus X2. In a test 
for transformation of function, it was found that when participants made no response, 
they selected B2, if they emitted one response they selected Cl and when they made 
two responses, they selected C2. These findings could only be accounted for through 
the transformation of the self-discriminative functions through same, more-than and 
less-than relations.
Whelan and Bames-Holmes (2004) were the first to demonstrate a 
transformation of consequential functions in non-equivalence relations, namely same
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and opposite relations. Whelan and Bames-Holmes (2004) trained arbitrary stimulus 
Al as a conditioned punisher. Secondly, contextual cues for the relations same and 
opposite were established through non-arbitrary relational training. Once these cues 
had been acquired, participants were trained the network Al is the same as Bl and 
Cl, and opposite to B2 and C2. When presented with the stimuli from the network 
under extinction conditions it was found that the C2 stimulus functioned as a 
reinforcer due to the relation of ‘opposite’ to Al, even though a reinforcing function 
had never been directly trained. These findings demonstrated that functions that are 
‘opposite’ to any given function may be acquired through the transformation of 
function. Whelan and Bames-Holmes (2004) were then able to reverse this effect by 
training B2 as a conditioned punisher, and showing that the reinforcing functions 
transformed to C2.
Whelan, Bames-Holmes, and Dymond (2006) provided further support for 
the transformation of consequential functions by training a seven member relational 
network. In this experiment, participants were trained a network of nonsense words 
A<B, B<C, C<D, E>D, F>E and G>F. In the next phase stimulus D was paired with 
the delivery of points, thus establishing D as a reinforcer. When participants were 
later presented with the stimuli from the network, participants showed an increased 
preference for the stimuli that appeared higher in the network. ,
Features of derived relations and transformation of function are integral to 
RFT, as the theory argues that in order for an event to be considered a verbal event, 
some form of arbitrarily applicable relational responding and a transformation of 
function must take place (Dymond & Rehfeldt, 2000). It has been shown that non­
humans can respond correctly when presented with non-arbitrary relational training 
tasks or tasks in which discriminative stimuli are differentially reinforced, therefore 
the ability to respond accurately in such a way does not constitute a verbal event 
(Hayes, Gifford, & Wilson, 1996). To illustrate the concept of arbitrary responding, 
consider the example given by Dymond and Rehfeldt (2000) of a child who has a 
direct history of stopping at stop signs. Given the child’s learning history, the stop 
sign is acting as a discriminative stimulus and this is event is non-verbal. However, if 
the child has derived an equivalence relation between the stop .sign, the spoken word 
“stop”, and the signal of the school crossing patrol to stop, when the child’s teacher 
later gives the instruction “stop” when crossing a road, the child will behave in the 
same way as when presented with the stop sign, as the functions of the sign will
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transform to the command “stop” (Dymond & Rehfeldt, 2000). The spoken word 
“stop” and the written word stop share no similar physical properties. Therefore this 
would be considered a verbal event as derived arbitrary relations and transformation 
of stimulus function were occasioned.
The human capacity for responding to arbitrary stimuli when it is not possible 
to respond based on the physical properties of a stimulus, is possible due to 
responding being brought under contextual control. When relational responding is 
arbitrarily applied, this gives rises to relational frames which are determined by an 
organism’s individual history of responding to a particular cue. Hayes et al. (2001) 
assert that many different features of an event can function as a contextual cue, 
although these cues often consist of written words or spoken phrases. Dymond and 
Rehfeldt (2000) suggest that RFT may be able to provide an explanation for many 
different complex behaviours where a traditional behaviour analytic account has 
typically been unable, for example, terrorism (Dixon et al., 2003) sexual arousal 
(Roche, Bames-Holmes, Smeets, Bames-Holmes, & McGeady, 2000), gambling 
behaviour (Dixon & Delaney, 2006) and psychopathology (Wilson et al., 2001), to 
name but a few.
With regard to gambling behaviour, RFT may be able to account for instances 
of gambling behaviour in which an individual shows a preference for a particular 
slot-machine despite never having experienced a win on that particular slot-machine, 
or why two individuals may experience the exact same contingencies of 
reinforcement on a slot-machine, yet one can walk away whilst the other persists 
(Dixon & Delaney, 2006). Dixon and Delaney (2006) give the hypothetical example 
of a lady named Joyce who queues for the same slot-machine, named Lucky 7s, 
every time she gambles, despite their being hundreds of other slot-machines of 
similar perhaps even better, payout probabilities being available. To Joyce, Lucky 7s 
is the best slot-machine to play. When we delve into Joyce’s history, it transpires that 
Joyce had a dog named Lucky as a child, whom Joyce remembers with much 
affection. In this example, the psychological functions of the dog named Lucky have 
transformed through arbitrary relations such that the slot-machine has now acquired 
some of the positive functions, despite there being no common formal properties 
which would otherwise relate Joyce’s dog with a slot-machine. Perhaps then, 
gambling may be, at least in part, a verbal event which participates in derived 
relations and transformation of functions.
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The impact of derived relational responding on gambling behaviour:
Illustrative research
Currently, only a handful of studies on the role of derived relational 
responding in gambling behaviour have been conducted. One such study using 
equivalence relations and a children’s pre-gambling game was conducted by 
Dymond, Bateman, and Dixon (2010). Ethical and legal restrictions mean that 
children cannot be exposed to gambling, however, games of chance such as those 
involving dice, are often played by children and may represent a form of pre­
gambling. Dymond et al. (2010) first trained and tested children for the formation of 
two, three-member equivalence relations (A1-B2-C1- and A2-B2-C2). Upon 
reaching mastery criterion, children were then exposed to a computer simulated 
gambling game. To play the dice, children had to select one of two concurrently 
presented dice. The dice were labelled Bl and B2. The game was programmed such 
that the die labelled Bl always rolled 4, 5, or 6 (high roll) and the die labelled B2 
always rolled 1, 2, or 3 (low roll). Once participants had completed the game they 
were exposed to a further game, in which the dice were labelled Cl and C2. This 
phase was under extinction, therefore, participants selected a die as before but could 
not see what number they rolled. All participants except for one showed increased 
preference for the die labelled Cl due to its participation in an equivalence relation 
with Bl (the high roll die). In terms of gambling, these findings were significant as 
they demonstrated how an individual may transform the functions of a particular 
stimulus in a game, such as an image on a slot-machine, despite there being no 
history of reinforcement of that image on that slot-machine paying out.
Dixon, Nastally, Jackson, and Habib (2009) used an equivalence paradigm to 
alter the effect of the near-miss. In the first phase of the experiment, participants 
were presented with images containing outcomes of a slot-machine, that is, a win 
(Cl), a near-miss (C2), or a total loss (C3), and asked to rate how close each outcome 
was to a win. In the next part of the experiment, participants were trained three, three 
member equivalence classes (A1-B1-C1, A2-B2-C2, A3-B3-C3). Stimuli A l, A2, 
and A3 were abstract images, stimuli B l, B2, and B3 consisted of the words “win”, 
“loss”, and “almost” respectively. Stimuli Cl, C2, and C3 were the win, near-miss 
and loss images from the first phase. Finally, participants were presented with the 
slot-machine rating phase again.
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It was predicted that due to the stimuli participating in equivalence relations 
that the word “almost” (B3) would take on some of the functions of the total loss 
(C3) and that and the word “loss” (B2) would take on some functions of the near- 
miss slot image (C2). Al was expected to remain unchanged given the equivalence 
relation with the winning slot-machine (Cl). It was found that 10 out of 16 
participants rated the total loss closer to win than the near miss stimuli. Dixon et al. 
(2009) suggest that this study demonstrates that the near-miss is a not a personality 
trait or a faulty cognition, but it is a verbal event that can be manipulated and altered.
The first experiment to demonstrate a transformation of discriminative 
functions of a slot-machine in accordance with equivalence relations was conducted 
by Dymond, McCann, Griffiths, Cox, and Crocker (in press). Participants were 
trained and tested on two equivalence relations represented by A1-B1-C1 and A2- 
B2-C2. On completion of this training and testing, participants were then 
simultaneously presented with a slot-machine labelled Bl which paid out on 20% of 
trials, and a slot-machine labelled B2, which paid out on 80% of trials. Finally, 
participants were concurrently presented with slot-machines Cl and C2. In 
Experiment 1, slot-machines Cl and C2 were under extinction, in Experiment 2 slot- 
machines Cl and C2 were under conditions of non-reinforcement (participants could 
not see whether they had won or lost), whereas in Experiment 3 slot-machines Cl 
and C2 both paid out at a rate of 0.5 (matched probability). It was found that in all 
three experiments, participants showed a statistically significant higher preference 
for slot-machine C2 over slot-machine Cl, due to C2 participating in an equivalence 
relation with B2 (the high payout slot). These findings demonstrated that derived 
equivalence relations and transformation of discriminative functions may influence 
responding on slot-machines such that gamblers can show preferences for slot- 
machines despite having never played them before or experiencing a win on that 
particular slot-machine. Given these findings, it is possible that a relational frame 
theory account of gambling may be able to explain real world gambling. It is critical 
therefore, that empirical analyses are undertaken which further investigate the 
transformation of gambling relevant stimulus functions in accordance with derived 
relations.
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Summary.
Behaviour-analytic research has suggested that whilst schedules of 
reinforcement are integral to gambling behaviour (Dixon et al., 2006), participants do 
not always show a preference for the slot-machine with the highest payback 
percentage (e.g., Weatherly et al., 2009), and the structural characteristics may 
override these schedules of reinforcement (Hoon et al., 2007, 2008; Zlomke &
Dixon, 2006). These findings suggest that an account of gambling behaviour based 
solely on the schedules of reinforcement of a slot-machine may be incomplete 
(Weatherly & Dixon, 2007). This lead to the suggestion that verbal behaviour may be 
able to account for instances of gambling behaviour that are not readily explained by 
contingencies of reinforcement (Dixon & Delaney, 2006), therefore research is 
required which involves investigating the role that verbal behaviour has to play in the 
development and maintenance of problem gambling.
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Chapter 2
Altering Preferences for Concurrently Available Slot-Machines: Non- 
Arbitrary Contextual Control in Gambling Choice
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The structural characteristics of slot-machines or electronic gaming machines 
have been implicated in the persistence and maintenance of problem gambling 
(Griffiths, 1990). The term “structural characteristic” encompasses many features 
including lights, colours, sounds, and bill payment options. Adding or removing 
some of these features has been shown to be associated with the level of enjoyment 
in slot-machine play (Loba, Stewart, Klein, & Blackburn, 2001; Sharpe et al., 2005). 
Loba et al. (2001) reported that video lottery terminals that had fast reels and 
produced sounds were played for longer periods of time than those that had slower 
reels and no sound.
Behaviour-analytic gambling research has conducted preliminary analyses 
into the effects of structural characteristics of electronic gambling machines, 
specifically how colour may influence slot-machine choice. Zlomke and Dixon 
(2006) and Hoon et al. (2007, 2008) conducted studies in which participants were 
presented with two concurrently available slot-machines that were identical in 
schedule and magnitude of reinforcement and differing only in colour (one slot- 
machine was yellow and the other was blue). The slot-machines paid out according 
to a random ratio 0.5 schedule. Magnitude of reinforcement was held constant such 
that one credit was required to play a slot-machine, therefore one credit lost on a 
losing spin, and one credit was won for a winning spin. It was found that participants 
showed no particular preference for either slot-machine, allocating approximately 
equal responding to both machines. Participants were then given a non-arbitrary 
relational training task in which the colour yellow was established as a contextual 
cue for more-than and the colour blue was established as a contextual cue for less- 
than. Following this training, participants were given a further 50 slot-machine trials 
to play, under identical conditions as before. It was found that participants allocated 
increased responding to the yellow slot-machine, despite both slot-machines being 
identical in payout probability (Hoon et al., 2007, 2008; Zlomke & Dixon, 2006).
Researchers have attempted to replicate the findings of Zlomke and Dixon 
(see Fredheim, Otterson, & Amtzen, 2008; Hoon et al., 2007, 2008; Johnson & 
Dixon, 2009; Nastally, Dixon, & Jackson, 2010). Fredheim et al* (2008) used an 
identical procedure to Zlomke and Dixon (2006) in non-problem gamblers yet found 
that unlike Zlomke and Dixon study only four out of twelve participants showed an
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increased preference for the more-than slot-machine at post-test. In a second 
experiment, the authors altered the way in which instructions were used so that 
individuals who had not reached criterion responding for non-arbitrary training and 
testing within one hour had the instructions repeated to them. Secondly, a brief 
interview was conducted following the experiment to identify whether participants 
had attended to the contextual cue (the Colour Group) or simply responded to the 
comparison stimuli independent of the contextual cue (the Number Group). When 
analysing the results, participants were then assigned to either the Colour Group or 
the Number Group depending on the findings of the interview. It was found that in 
the Colour Group, eight out of twelve participants showed increased preference for 
the more-than (yellow) slot-machine at post-test whereas in the Number Group only 
two participants out of six showed increased preference towards the more-than slot- 
machine at post-test (Fredheim et al., 2008).
The original non-arbitrary relational training procedure used by the Zlomke 
and Dixon (2006) has potential limitations, which may explain the finding of 
Fredheim et al. (2008). Specifically, during relational training, participants were 
presented with the contextual cue (a yellow or blue coloured screen) followed by 
three comparison stimuli. For example, the screen appeared yellow and then $1, $5, 
and $10 notes are presented. In this case, there are in fact two correct responses as 
both $5 and $10 are more than $1. This method has been criticised as, firstly, it 
presents an ambiguous situation due to there being two correct answers, and 
secondly, it may lead to the more-than cue being established as a cue for ‘opposite’ 
(Hoon et al., 2007, 2008). It is possible that these factors may explain why Fredheim 
et al. (2008) only saw the effect in a minority of participants in their first experiment 
because if the training task is ambiguous then the contextual cues will not be clearly 
established and, hence, may influence post-test performance.
In order to resolve the problems created by presenting three comparison 
stimuli, Hoon et al. (2007, 2008) employed a training task in which only two 
comparison stimuli were presented ensuring only one correct response per trial. 
During baseline, participants did not show a particular preference for either slot- 
machine, however, following the non-arbitrary relational training and testing phase, 
participants showed an increased preference for the yellow ‘more-than’ slot-machine. 
The results of the aforementioned studies are important as they demonstrate that a 
preference for structural characteristic such as colour, may override the direct payout
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contingencies of a slot-machine. The slot-machines in these studies were 
programmed to pay out on a schedule of 0.5, yet following non-arbitrary training the 
majority of participants made choices regarding which slot-machine they wanted to 
play based on the structural characteristic of the slot-machine despite the fact that 
each machine paid out on an identical schedule.
While there are merits to the research already conducted on the influence of 
contextual cues in slot-machine gambling, there are some methodological limitations 
with the research designs that have been used. First, most notably, the pre-test/post­
test design, which has been used in all of the previous research on this topic, does not 
remove all threats to internal validity because it may be subject to test/re-test 
sensitivity. Second, in previous experiments, all participants received an identical 
number of baseline exposures (50 trials) to the slot-machine pre-test phase. Any 
resulting changes in slot-machine preferences may not have appeared stable because 
of the spontaneous change following a certain number of trials. Within single case 
research, there are a number of alternatives to the pre-test/post-test designs used by 
Hoon et al. (2007, 2008) and Zlomke and Dixon (2006) that may overcome some of 
the limitations just described.
The non-concurrent multiple baseline design offers an alternative to this 
design and aims to provide a robust demonstration of functional control (Harvey, 
May, & Kennedy, 2004; Kennedy, 2005; Watson & Workman, 1981). In a multiple 
baseline design, participants receive differing lengths of baseline trials before the 
intervention is implemented. In this case, functional control is demonstrated when 
changes in behaviour are seen only once the intervention is applied and not for any 
other reason. Consider this example; one participant is given ten baseline trials, 
another participant is given twenty baseline trials and a third participant is given 
thirty baseline trials before an intervention is implemented. If, following 
intervention, a change in the target behaviour is seen in the direction that was 
predicted, then assuming this change is consistent and stable, the data will have 
verified the prediction. If the same effect in behaviour change is seen in all three 
participants, then this exemplifies replication. Therefore, if a change in behaviour has 
been observed in accordance with the prediction, and this prediction has been 
verified and replicated, then it can be said that the experimenter has functional 
control over the behaviour, as the intervention is the cause of any changes in 
behaviour.
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Another form of single case design is a reversal design. In a simple reversal 
design baseline levels of responding are recorded and once stability is achieved, 
treatment is implemented. These baseline data can then act as a comparison condition 
to the treatment condition (Chambless & Hollon, 1998) to see if the behaviour has 
changed as predicted. Once treatment has been employed and the level and trend of 
behaviour during this condition has been recorded, visual analysis of the graphed 
data should reveal that patterns of behaviour during the treatment phase were 
different to the patterns of behaviour seen during baseline. Then, once stability has 
been achieved in the treatment condition, treatment is withdrawn (or reversed) and 
behaviour should return to a similar pattern as seen during baseline. Finally, 
treatment is implemented once more, and assuming treatment is effective, behaviour 
will be recorded in this final phase will be similar to that of the first treatment phase, 
thus replicating the effects of treatment. If this occurs then a demonstration of 
functional control can be said to have taken place as a change in behaviour was seen 
once the intervention was in place, whereas removal of the treatment intervention 
resulted in behaviour returning to baseline responding. Therefore, the behaviour 
changes as a function of the treatment intervention. Whilst the reversal design can be 
a very effective method of assessing the effectiveness of an intervention, some 
interventions do not lend themselves to such a design as they result in irreversible 
behaviour changes. In such instances, a non-concurrent multiple baseline design 
would be more appropriate.
To date, only one published experiment has used a (non-concurrent) multiple 
baseline design (Dixon & Holton, 2009) and only one experiment has used a reversal 
procedure as part of a pre-test/post-test design (Nastally et al., 2010). In their study 
on delay discounting, Dixon and Holton (2009) presented participants with 
hypothetical choices involving differing amounts of money with differing lengths of 
delay before receiving the money. On each trial the contextual cues, colour pink or 
colour purple, were simultaneously presented. Participants then completed a non- 
arbitrary training procedure that was similar to that of Zlomke and Dixon (2006) 
except that the two contextual cues (colour pink and colour purple) were trained as 
‘better than’ and ‘worse than’. In the final phase, participants were re-presented with 
the delay discounting task only this time the contextual cues had acquired functions 
of ‘better than’ or ‘worse than’, such that participants showed less frequent 
discounting (Dixon & Holton, 2009).
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Nastally et al. (2010) adopted the same procedure as described in Hoon et al. 
(2008) using problem gamblers, except that a second non-arbitrary training phase 
was presented in which the contextual cue that had initially been trained as the more- 
then cue, became the contextual cue for less-than. It was found that participants’ 
preferences for the slot-machines reversed following the second non-arbitrary phase 
such that preference was now shown for the slot-machine the same colour as the cue 
trained as more-than in the second phase.
To overcome the limitations of the pre-test/post-test design used in previous 
studies, the present experiments sought to replicate and extend the findings of Hoon 
et al., (2007, 2008) using a non-concurrent multiple baseline design. In Experiment 
1, the contextual cues were counterbalanced across subjects. In Experiment 2, the 
non-arbitrary training task was only implemented once responding became stable. In 
Experiment 3, a reversal design was incorporated to examine whether preferences 
could be shifted and reversed.
Experiment 1 
Method
Participants
Three participants (2 males, 1 female), aged 20 to 22 years (M= 21; SD = 1), 
attending Swansea University were recruited through personal contacts. Participants 
completed the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur & Blume, 1987), the 
most widely used instrument to assess gambling experience. A score on the SOGS of 
3-4 indicates potential problem gambling, and a score of five or above indicates 
probable pathological gambling (Lesieur & Blume, 1987). P2 scored zero on the 
SOGS, while PI and P3 both scored three (M = 2, SD = 1.41).
Apparatus
The experiment took place in a small room containing a desk, a desktop 
computer with 16-inch display, full sized keyboard and a two-button click mouse. 
Stimulus presentation and the recording of responses were controlled by the 
computer and were programmed in Visual Basic®.
Design
A non-concurrent multiple baseline across participants design was used and 
the contextual cues were counterbalanced so that two participants were trained that
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yellow was the more-than cue and blue the less-than cue, and one participant was 
trained that blue was the more-than cue and yellow the less-than cue.
Procedure
There were three phases to the experiment; slot-machine baseline trials, the 
non-arbitrary relational training intervention and slot-machine trials post­
intervention.
Slot-machine Task: Baseline
The slot-machine task was employed to obtain data on participants’ baseline 
choices towards two concurrently available slot-machines that were identical in 
schedule and magnitude of reinforcement and differed only in background colour, 
one being predominantly yellow and the other being predominantly blue. Participants 
were presented with the following on-screen instructions:
On the following screen you will see a button in the middle o f the screen.
When you click on the button with your mouse two slot-machines will be 
revealed. Click your mouse on the slot-machine you would like to play and 
earn as many points as possible.
On clicking the button on the screen, participants were presented with a grey 
screen which revealed a red button in the centre of the screen containing the 
instructions Click here. Clicking the red button presented participants with a screen 
containing a blue rectangular box named Slot-machine 1, and a yellow rectangular 
box named Slot-machine 2. These boxes were randomly positioned on opposite sides 
of the screen throughout trials to control for position bias. To play a slot-machine, 
participants clicked the Spin button on the left hand side of the screen. All 
participants started with 100 credits and only one credit could be bet at a time. On 
clicking the spin button the reels spun for three seconds and sound effects were heard 
which were similar to those of actual casino slot-machines. A winning spin consisted 
of three identical symbols on the pay offline, and resulted in one credit being 
awarded in the Total Credits box at the top left of the screen. A losing spin consisted 
of two matching symbols or no matching symbols and one credit was subtracted 
from the Total Credits box. After playing a slot-machine, participants were taken 
back to the initial grey screen with ‘ Click here’ button and a new phase began.
Each participant was presented with a different number of baseline trials, pre­
determined by the experimenter: PI received 40 baseline slot-machine trials, P2 
received 80 baseline trials and P3 received 120 baseline trials.
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Non-Arbitrary Relational Training
This phase trained the background colour yellow as a contextual cue for 
more-than and established background colour blue as a contextual cue fore less-than. 
For PI and P2 the colour yellow was trained as the contextual cue for more-than and 
blue was the cue for less-than. This was counterbalanced for P3 so that blue was 
trained as the more-than cue and yellow was trained as the less-than cue.
During non-arbitrary training the background screen would appear either 
yellow or blue, then after approximately three seconds, two stimuli would appear on 
screen, one stimulus on the left and the other on the right (see Figure 2.1). The 
stimuli presented differed along a physical dimension. Participants were required to 
select an image by clicking on the image with a mouse. On selecting the correct 
stimulus, the word ‘ Correct’ was displayed on the screen for one second and a chime 
sound effect was heard, whereas following an incorrect respond the word 4 Wrong ’ 
was presented and a buzzer sound effect was heard. One point was awarded for each 
correct response, which was displayed at the top centre of the screen. The computer 
programme automatically proceeded to the next trial. There were 48 trials in the 
training phase and participants had to respond correctly across 43 trials in order to 
progress to the test phase. If criterion was not met, they were exposed to the training 
phase again.
Participants were trained with four different sets of stimuli in the relational 
training phase. These were pound notes (£5, £20, £50), dice (1, 4, 6), poker chips 
($5, $25, $500), and letter grades (A+, C+, D-). Participants were tested with the four 
sets of stimuli from training and four additional sets which included coins (lp, 20p, 
£1), playing cards (4 of spades, 9 of spades, king), jackpots (5 million, 10 million, 20 
million) and positions (1st, 8th 10th). It should be noted however that although this 
phase was a non-arbitrary training task, due to the nature of the stimuli (bank notes, 
playing cards etc) this phase was partly reliant upon the participant having a history 
of arbitrary relational responding to the stimuli.
PI and P2 learned to select the image that represented ‘more-than’ when the 
background colour was yellow and the image that represented ‘less-than’ when the 
background colour was blue. The reverse was true for P3 in the counterbalanced 
condition.
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Chapter 2
Figure 2 .1. An example o f a less-than (left panel) and a more-than trial (right 
panel) where blue is trained as the less-than cue and yellow is trained as the 
more-than cue. In the presence o f the less-than contextual cue, the image 
portraying the lesser quantity is reinforced (indicated with an arrow). In the 
presence o f the more-than contextual cue, the image portraying the greater 
quantity is reinforced (indicated with an arrow).
Non-Arbitrary Relational Testing
The purpose o f this phase was to test whether the more-than and less-than 
relations established during training would be applied to four novel sets o f stimuli. 
The novel stimulus sets consisted o f coins (lp , 20p, £1), playing cards (4 o f  spades, 9 
o f spades, king o f spades), jackpots (5 million, 10 million, 20 million) and positions 
(1st, 8th 10th). Participants were required to respond correctly across all 48 trials. If a 
participant failed the test phase, they were re-exposed to the training phase. The 
format o f the test phase was identical to the training phase except that no feedback 
was given.
Slot-machine Task: Post-Intervention
This phase was to investigate whether the non-arbitrary relational training 
task would increase responding to a particular slot-machine. PI received 120 post­
intervention slot-machine trials, P2 received 80 slot-machine trials and P3 received 
40 slot-machine trials. This ensured that all participants completed a total o f 160 slot- 
machine trials throughout the whole experiment.
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Results and Discussion
All participants completed the non-arbitrary relational training and testing. 
Criterion for the training phase required that participants obtain a score of at least 43 
in order to progress to the test phase. Participants were required to get all 48 trials 
correct in the test phase to complete the task.
Table 2.1.
Number of correct trials during non-arbitrary relational training and testing in 
Experiment 1. _______________________________________
Participant Non-arbitrary 
Relational 
Training (/48)
Non-arbitrary 
Relational 
Testing (/48)
1 23 -
27 -
27 -
23 -
26 -
24 -
42 -
48 48
2 26 -
38 -
48 48
3 36 -
39 -
48 48
Mean 33.93 (9.86) 48 (0)
Standard deviation given in parentheses.
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Table 2.1 shows that PI required the highest number of training phases in 
order to progress to the test phase, whereas P2 and P3 only required three exposures 
to training. All participants passed the relational test after only one exposure.
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Figure 2.2. Participants’ response allocation to the more-than slot-machine in 
Experiment 1.
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Figure 2.2 depicts the number of responses allocated towards the more-than 
slot-machine (that is, the slot-machine that was the same colour as the more-than 
contextual cue) during baseline and post-intervention. All participants showed stable 
levels of responding during baseline, suggesting no particular preference for either 
coloured slot-machine. Following the relational training and testing intervention, two 
of the three participants (PI & P2) showed an increase in the number of responses 
allocated to the more-than slot-machine. This increase remained stable for the 
remainder of the post-intervention phase. The participant (P3), who received the 
shortest post-intervention phase, showed a smaller increase in response allocation to 
the more than slot-machine. Overall, the percentage difference in responding 
allocated towards the more-than slot-machine from baseline to post-intervention was 
32.5% for PI, 30% for P2, and 5% for P3. The findings of Experiment 1 support 
those of Hoon et al. (2007, 2008) and Zlomke and Dixon (2006) that preferences for 
concurrently available slot-machines may be altered in accordance with contextual 
cues.
Although there was a clear shift in slot-machine preferences for PI and P2, 
this effect was less evident for P3, who had received the lowest number of post­
intervention trials. Thus, a limitation of Experiment 1 was that the participant who 
received the shortest exposure to the post-intervention trials also produced unstable 
responding. Accordingly, this made it difficult to assess the effects of the relational 
training intervention on slot-machine preferences. If more trials had been given 
following the intervention then this may have resulted in stable responding towards 
one slot-machine allowing any slot-machine preference to be assessed. In order to 
overcome this limitation, the number of baseline trials should be determined on the 
basis of visual analysis (level and trend) and the intervention should be employed 
only once responding is stable. The same stability criteria could then be adopted 
during the post-intervention phase.
Experiment 2 was conducted to explore this issue in participants who met a 
SOGS classification of problem gambler. Problem gamblers were recruited in an 
attempt to increase the validity of the study and to test the extent to which contextual 
factors may influence actual gamblers. Additionally, in Experiment 2, the colour of 
the least preferred slot-machine during baseline was targeted as the contextual cue 
for more-than in the non-arbitrary training task in order to rule out any resulting shift 
in preferences towards the more-than slot-machine occurring on the basis of pre-
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existing colour preferences. Nastally etal. (2010) used a similar procedure to train 
the colour of the least preferred slot-machine during baseline as the more-than 
contextual cue.
Experiment 2 
Method
Participants
Three male participants aged 20 to 24 years (M= 22.67; SD = 2.31) were 
recruited through a campus-wide e-mail advertising the study. Only participants with 
a minimum SOGS score of 3 were recruited. Participants SOGS scores were 7, 6 and 
3 (M = 5.33, SD = 1.70).
Procedure
The procedure of Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1 with the 
following exceptions. Firstly, participants were not given a pre-determined number 
of baseline trials. Instead, baseline slot preferences were monitored every 30 trials 
and once responding appeared stable the non-arbitrary relational training task was 
given. Responding was said to be stable when there was no indication of an upward 
or downward trend, and data points fell within a small range of values (Cooper et al.,
2007). Secondly, whereas in Experiment 1 the contextual cues had been 
counterbalanced across participants, in Experiment 2, the colour of the least preferred 
slot-machine during baseline was targeted as the more-than contextual cue in the 
relational training intervention. Following the relational training intervention, 
participants were re-presented with the concurrent slot-machine task. In the same 
way as the baseline task, responses were monitored every 30 trials and the 
experiment only ended once responses appeared stable. Finally, only individuals with 
a minimum SOGS score of 3, indicating a potential problem gambler, were recruited.
Results and Discussion
All participants completed the non-arbitrary relational training and testing 
phase (see Table 2.2). P5 required the fewest number of exposures to the training 
task before progressing to the test phase. P4 required eight exposures before reaching 
criterion responding. All participants passed the non-arbitrary test after only one 
exposure to the task.
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Table 2.2
Number of correct trials during non-arbitrary relational training and testing in 
Experiment 2. _________________________________________
Participant Non-arbitrary 
Relational 
Training (/48)
Non-arbitrary 
Relational 
Test (/48)
4 42 -
48 48
5 26 -
44 47
6 37 -
48 46
48 48
Mean 41.86 (8.09) 47.25 (0.96)
Standard deviation given in parentheses.
Figure 2.3 shows that participants’ preferences for concurrently available 
slot-machines were altered, such that participants allocated most responding to the 
slot-machine that was the same colour as the more-than contextual cue. The extent of 
this increase in preference varied across participants, with responding by P6 showing 
the greatest post-intervention increase. Post-intervention responses from P4 were 
initially variable but increased in level and trend by the fifth block of trials where an 
increase in preference is seen towards the more-than slot-machine. Responses then 
stabilised whilst showing a fairly clear preference for the more-than slot-machine. 
The results for P5 are perhaps not as clear. For two of P5’s post-intervention blocks 
of trials, he made an increased number of responses to the more-than slot-machine, 
and for one block of trials P5 shows equal responding to each slot-machine. 
Unfortunately, P5 terminated his participation before additional post-intervention 
trials could be administered. P6 required the highest number of baseline trials before 
the intervention was implemented, and then showed the most marked increase 
towards the more-than slot-machine during the final phase. Overall, the findings of 
Experiment 2 demonstrated that problem gamblers’ preferences for one of two 
concurrently available slot-machines can be altered in accordance with a relational
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training intervention that targets the colour of the least preferred slot-machine, and 
rules out competing explanations in terms of pre-existing colour preferences.
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Figure 2.3. Participants’ response allocation to the more-than slot-machine in 
Experiment 2.
In Experiment 3, an additional measure was incorporated: given that the 
presence of a non-arbitrary relational training task can alter participants’ preferences
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for concurrently available slot-machines, if the original task were then reversed and 
the contextual cue originally established as the more-than cue was now trained as the 
less-than cue, it would be expected that preferences for the slot-machines would shift 
accordingly. Therefore, Experiment 3 was a further modification of Experiment 2 
with the addition of a reversal design.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 employed a reversal design in which, following initial baseline, 
intervention and post-intervention trials, the colour previously established as the 
more-than cue was trained as the less-than cue and vice versa in a second training 
intervention.
Method
Participants
In Experiment 3, there were two male participants aged 25 and 27 (M = 26; 
SD = 1). Only individuals with a minimum SOGS score of 3 were recruited. One 
participant scored 6 on the SOGS (P7) and the other scored 5 (P8) indicating that 
both participants were potential pathological gamblers (M= 5.5, SD = 0.5). 
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 3 was identical for that of Experiment 2 with 
the exception of additional non-arbitrary training tasks that reversed the contextual 
cues. P7 was given 2 reversals (therefore, 3 training tasks in total) whereas P8 was 
only given one reversal. As in Experiment 2, the least preferred slot-machine was 
targeted as the more-than contextual cue for the first non-arbitrary training 
intervention, and this was only implemented once responding appeared stable. The * 
second (and third, in the case of P7) training intervention was also only implemented 
once stability had been achieved.
Results and Discussion
Both participants completed the non-arbitrary relational training and testing 
phase (see Table 2.3). In the first non-arbitrary training task P7 completed the 
training phase after just one exposure to the task (i.e., 48 trials). P8 required 2 
exposures to the training task to the first non-arbitrary training task.
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Table 2.3
Number of correct trials during the non-arbitrary relational training and testing in 
Experiment 3.________________ _____________________________________
Participant
Non-
arbitrary
training
(/48)
Non-
arbitrary
testing
(/48)
Reversal
1
Non-
arbitrary
training
(/48)
Reversal
1
Non-
arbitrary
testing
(/48)
Reversal
2
Non-
arbitrary
training
(/48)
Reversal
2
Non-
arbitrary
testing
(/48)
7 45 47 43 47 43 48
8 35 - 43 48 - -
48 47 43 48 n/a n/a
Mean 42.67 47 43 47.5 - -
(6.81) (0) . (0) (0.71) - -
Standard deviation in parentheses.
Figure 2.4 shows participants’ preferences towards the more-than slot- 
machine. During baseline, both participants showed no clear preferences for either 
slot-machine and responding stabilized after 60 trials. Following the first relational 
training intervention, both participants’ preferences for the more-than slot-machine 
increased as predicted. Following the second relational training intervention, P7 
showed equal response allocation to the more-than slot-machine, whilst responding 
by P8 approximated to that of the earlier post-intervention phase. P7 then received a 
third relational training intervention and subsequently showed a decreased preference 
for the more-than slot-machine. This is perhaps due to the interaction of the direct 
contingencies of the slot-machines. From the data of P7 it appears that as more trials 
are undertaken, the effect of the contextual cue weakens and the payout probability 
exerts more control. In a similar way, P8 initially shows a slight increase for the 
more-than slot-machine following the first intervention, then following the second 
intervention shows a fairly equal preference for more than and the less than slot- 
machine.
59
K^nupitzr a
o«/>cTOlE
ff
ja
E
Post-int 1 Post-int 2 Post-int 3Baseline
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2 P7
1
0
10
-------------19
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
P81
O
lO 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150
Trials
Figure 2.4. Participants’ response allocation to the more than slot-machine in 
Experiments.
Overall, the findings of Experiment 3 demonstrated that problem gamblers’ 
preferences for one or two concurrently available slot-machines may be repeatedly 
altered in accordance with a relational training intervention when that intervention 
was evaluated using a reversal design. The findings from both participants, however, 
illustrate that the level of altered preferences decreases as the intervention is 
repeated. This suggests that the effects of the intervention targeting the background 
colours interacted with the concurrent, matched schedule of programmed 
reinforcement, leading to diminished control by the background colours.
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General Discussion
The current experiments aimed to replicate the findings of Hoon et al. (2007,
2008) and extend them by using a design that allowed for a better demonstration of 
experimental control. In Experiment 1, a clear shift was seen in PI and P2 who 
allocated the majority of trials to the more-than slot-machine following the non- 
arbitrary intervention. The effect was less clear in P3. Unfortunately, as P3 was given 
the shortest number of post-intervention trials, this did not allow for his responding 
to become stable and, therefore, preference cannot clearly be determined from his 
data. This participant also received the highest number of baseline trials and had 
therefore most experience of the direct contingencies of the slot-machines prior to 
non-arbitrary training. For this reason, it is possible that the payout probabilities may 
have exerted more control than the contextual cue. In Experiment 2, the number of 
baseline and post-intervention trials given to each participant were not 
predetermined, but instead responses were monitored until responding appeared 
stable. All three participants showed an increase in response allocation towards the 
more-than slot-machine following the intervention. Experiment 3 incorporated a 
reversal design and the results were particularly interesting as the data seem to show 
that with extended exposure to the contingencies of reinforcement and additional 
non-arbitrary training tasks, the control exerted by the non-arbitrary training 
intervention begins to diminish and the schedules of reinforcement appear to 
influence responding.
Across Experiments 1-3, every participant, except P3, showed an increase in 
preferences towards the more-than slot-machine in the first ten trials following the 
first intervention. This increased response allocation was not, however, always 
maintained during all post-intervention trials. The findings of the present 
experiments, particularly Experiment 3 are perhaps not quite as clear as the initial 
studies by Zlomke and Dixon (2006) and Hoon et al. (2007,2008). The finding that 
participants do not always show a consistent preference for the more-than slot- 
machine following relational training is likely due to the payout probability of each 
slot-machine: With the probability of the slot-machines being 0.5, it is highly 
plausible that a participant may experience a string of losses on what has been 
trained as the ‘more-than’ slot-machine resulting in switching over to the slot- 
machine that was the same colour as the less-than cue. A contextual cue can be 
trained to represent ‘more-than’, however when that cue is paired with a random
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ratio schedule such as that of a slot-machine, the direct contingencies of the schedule 
of reinforcement of that machine are also going to influence responding and may 
conflict with the individual’s understanding of the properties of the contextual cue. 
Whilst it has long been understood that contingency-shaped behaviour and the 
schedules of reinforcement are an important factor in gambling behaviour (Skinner, 
1974) the extent to which contextual cues may interact with or override direct 
contingencies of reinforcement are not clearly understood.
The interaction between the contextual cues and the contingencies of the slot- 
machine highlight the need for this sort of research to present slot-machine tasks 
following intervention under extinction (or, more accurately, non-reinforcement).
Had participants only been able to play the slot-machines but not actually experience 
any wins or losses, then the contextual cue may have continued to control behaviour. 
Although presenting trials under extinction may overcome some of the limitations of 
the present experiment, the reality is that in a casino environment it is always 
possible that an individual will experience winning trials of varying size on an 
electronic gaming machine, therefore presenting solely extinction trials will not 
completely imitate gambling.
One alternative to presenting slot-machines under extinction would be to 
alter the payout probability of the slot-machine. The payout probability of the slot- 
machines in the present experiments was 0.5 and five credits were awarded for a 
winning spin, which is fairly generous compared to those of casino slot-machines 
(Parke & Griffiths, 2006). It would be interesting to see to what extent the 
contextual cues exert control when the payout probability was set to 0.3 as wins 
would occur less frequently therefore the contextual cue may function as a more 
salient rule and continue to exert control over behaviour.
Perhaps the findings of current experiments give rise to the question; is this is 
as far as non-arbitrary research on gambling can take us? Electronic gaming 
machines are rarely, if ever, controlled solely by the formal properties of the stimuli 
and the nature of stimulus functions are beyond such formal characteristics. The 
present findings indicate that factors other than just schedules of reinforcement may 
govern preferences for slot machines. Whilst this is an important contribution to our 
understanding of slot machine gambling behaviour, explanations of non-arbitrary 
contextual control of gambling may fall short as they are unable to explain how an 
individual with no prior history with a particular contextual cue can show
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preferences for a particular slot machine. Future research requires a verbal account of 
gambling behaviour and the role of transformation of functions in the acquisition and 
persistence of problems with gambling.
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Chapter 3
Chapter 3
Transformation of Discriminative Slot-Machine Functions via Equivalence 
Relations: The Role of Accurate and Inaccurate Instructions
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There are many situations in which an individual is presented with a choice 
between concurrent schedules. The generalised matching law was proposed to 
analyse how organisms respond given such a choice. According to Rachlin (1971) 
the generalised version of the matching law states “organisms divide their time 
between alternatives in proportion to the value of the reinforcement consequent on 
the choice” (Rachlin, 1971, p. 249).
The casino environment is a situation in which a gambler is presented with 
concurrent schedules of reinforcement as choosing to play one slot-machine results 
in not being able to respond to the other slot-machines available (Dixon et al., 2006). 
Dixon et al. (2006) applied the matching law to evaluate participants’ preferences for 
concurrently available computer simulated slot-machines. One slot-machine paid out 
on a VR-10 and the other paid out on a VR-50. It was found that 83% of participants 
allocated greatest responding to the VR-10 slot-machine, therefore the matching law 
could account for the 83% of participants’ responding. These findings were broadly 
consistent with Savastino and Fantino (1994) who found that humans were able to 
maximise reinforcement on concurrent schedules. However, Haw (2008) failed to 
replicate these findings reporting that reinforcement did not affect slot-machine 
selection, but did affect when an individual changed machines. This suggests that 
humans are not always able to maximise reinforcement.
Although the matching law can account for non-human responding to 
concurrent schedules in which reinforcement is maximised, there is research to 
suggest that humans do not always emit responding that maximises reinforcement on 
concurrent schedules (Hayes et al., 1989; Madden & Perone, 1999). This lead to the 
proposal that language may be a key factor in human schedule performance and 
resulted in research being conducted into the effects of instructions on concurrent 
schedules. Hayes et al. (1986) investigated the effects of instructions on responding 
to concurrent schedules. Participants were required to respond to multiple schedules, 
a FR-18 and a DRL-6 sec schedule, by pressing a button for a chance to win 
monetary reinforcement. It was reported that when given inaccurate instructions, 
participants’ responding varied greatly and few points were won. In the accurate rule 
condition, however, participants earned more points and showed schedule sensitive 
responding.
Findings such as these (see Hayes, 1989, for a book length review), have 
suggested that rule-governed behaviour may override direct contingencies of
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reinforcement such that humans respond in accordance with externally stated rules or 
self-stated rules and not the schedule in place (Hayes et al., 1989). The term “rule- 
governed behaviour” was first coined by Skinner (1966) and described how rules or 
instructions may influence behaviour without being shaped by contingencies of 
reinforcement (Tomeke, Luciano, & Valdivia, 2008). The literature on rule-governed 
behaviour has demonstrated that instructions may even override contingencies of 
reinforcement (Galizio, 1979) and these instructions continue to exert control despite 
being at odds with the schedules in operation.
Gambling and rule-governed behaviour
An experiment by Weatherly and Meier (2008) investigated the effects of the 
presence or absence of accurate rules on gambling persistence. Participants were 
given 100 tokens to play a slot-machine and told to try and win as many tokens as 
possible. This phase of the experiment ended if either the participant ran out of 
tokens, the participant quit or if 15 minutes elapsed. In a later session participants 
were allocated to one of three groups. The first group were given instructions 
regarding the random ratio (RR) nature of slot-machines in which every spin is 
independent of the last, the second group were given information about the payback 
percentages of slot-machines and advised against playing slot-machines for a long 
period of time, whereas group three were given both sets of instructions. Significant 
decreases in the number of gambling trials played and the number of credits bet were 
seen across all groups. However the presentation of these rules did not eradicate 
gambling (Weatherly & Meier, 2008). It was concluded that gambling is partly rule- 
governed and that providing accurate information about gambling may help to reduce 
gambling behaviour (Weatherly & Meier, 2008).
Dixon, Hayes, and Aban (2000) conducted an experiment into the effects of 
accurate and inaccurate rules on persistence when playing roulette. In the first phase, 
participants were exposed to a game of roulette in which the outcomes were 
determined randomly and were not given any instructions regarding the 
contingencies of the game. In the second phase, participants played another roulette 
game that paid out on 20% of trials, 80% of trials, or the random schedule as before, 
and presented with accurate, inaccurate or no additional rules. The accurate rules 
consisted of statements such as “roulette is a losing game, you should quit as soon as 
possible” (Dixon et al., 2000, p. 693) and instructions to bet only a few chips.
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Inaccurate rules consisted of being told that roulette is a winning game and to bet 
large numbers. Finally, participants were presented with a further roulette game in 
which the payback probability was 0.2. There was an option to end play at any time.
It was found that participants who received inaccurate rules placed larger bets and 
gambled for longer than those who received accurate rules. Furthermore, 
participants’ gambling was determined by the rule given, whether accurate or 
inaccurate, despite the contingencies of reinforcement being contrary to the rule 
(Dixon et al., 2000).
The studies by Weatherly and Meier (2008) and Dixon et al. (2000) suggested 
that the presence of accurate and inaccurate rules can influence gambling behaviour. 
These findings support the assertion of Porter and Ghezzi (2006) that merely 
analysing the contingencies of reinforcement is not enough to explain gambling 
behaviour, they state; “what is needed is a rigorous analysis of how verbal behaviour 
is affected by the prevailing contingencies, this in the context of examining the 
various rules that pathological gamblers routinely bring to and/or derived from the 
contingencies and then follow as gaming strategies” (Porter & Ghezzi, 2006, p. 26).
The aforementioned studies suggest that contingencies of reinforcement alone 
may not wholly account for gambling behaviour, as humans do not always show 
schedule sensitive responding when gambling (Weatherly et al., 2009), and rules 
may interact with these schedules or even override the contingencies (Dixon, 2000; 
Weatherly & Meier, 2008). The studies described each involved presenting different 
types of instructions, some accurate and some inaccurate, and then determining the 
relative effects on slot-machine choice and persistence in gambling. For the analysis 
of gambling behaviour to continue to proceed, what is now needed is a functional 
analysis of role of instructions and rules in overriding and otherwise counteracting 
the direct contingency control exerted by underlying schedules of reinforcement. To 
this extent, the literature on rule-governed behaviour and gambling may be 
incomplete. As Hayes et al. (1989) have suggested, in work of this kind “instructions 
were treated as an object, not a term that referred to a functional relation between 
environmental stimulation and the action of the organism” (Hayes et al., 1989, p. 
193). This is problematic as behaviour analytic explanations of different categories 
of stimuli have always been explained in terms of the functional relation between the 
stimuli and the behaviour it occasions (Hayes & Hayes, 1992), yet instructional 
control was not specified in this way. In other words, exactly how these instructions
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came to exert control were not addressed. Furthermore, if instructions are treated as 
an object in the same way as any other stimulus that becomes discriminative for a 
certain behaviour, then this implies that all instructions must be directly learned 
(Hayes & Hayes, 1992) and that instructions will only be followed when they are 
accurate and will not be followed when they are inaccurate (Galizio, 1979). In terms 
of gambling behaviour, it is likely that the gambler will not have been presented with 
any rules, whether accurate or inaccurate, about the chances of a win on a particular 
game. In the absence of a functional analysis of the role played by externally- 
delivered rules in the analysis of gambling behaviour, researchers are left clutching 
for explanations of how, for instance, a gambler can play a slot-machine for the first 
time in the absence of any externally delivered rules or instructions, yet may hold 
certain beliefs or self-rules about how ‘lucky’ that slot-machine is. Therefore a 
traditional account of rule-governed behaviour may be unable to account for an 
individual’s gambling in a novel environment.
From self-rules to derived relational responding
Gamblers may form their own self-rules that influence the way they gamble 
on slot-machines. According to Zlomke and Dixon (2006), self-rules may form when 
novel stimuli acquire certain functions through differential reinforcement, and these 
functions are then applied to other objects within the environment. In studies by 
Zlomke and Dixon (2006) and Hoon et al. (2007, 2008) participants showed a 
preference for one particular slot-machine based on the structural property, namely 
colour, of that slot-machine despite a second slot-machine being concurrently 
available that was identical in payout probability.
Whilst these findings are a valuable addition to the gambling literature, there 
are instances of gambling behaviour that cannot be accounted for by instructional 
control, structural characteristics, and schedules of reinforcement. Consider, for 
instance, the gambler who insists on always playing the same slot-machine even 
though that individual has never experienced a win of that particular machine, and 
despite there being many other slot-machines available to play (Dixon & Delaney, 
2006). It is possible that derived relational responding and the transformation of 
functions may account for such behaviour. For example, if a gambler was told “the 
lucky sevens slot-machine always pays out”, it is likely that this individual will 
choose to play the lucky sevens slot-machine, assuming the rule-giver is considered a
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credible source in the eyes of the gambler. Suppose now, that in the gambler’s 
learning history “lucky sevens” participated in a derived same or similar relation 
with “magic charms”. Given the choice between a magic charms slot-machine and 
another slot-machine, the gambler may choose to play the magic charms slot- 
machine due to the functions of the rule delivered about the lucky sevens slot- 
machine, as they both participate in a derived relation.
To date, only a handful of empirical gambling studies have sought to 
demonstrate a transformation of discriminative functions in gambling scenarios. The 
first study to demonstrate transformation of function in slot-machine gambling was 
conducted by Dymond et al. (in press) who demonstrated that gambling relevant 
functions may be transformed in accordance with derived relations and influence 
responding on slot-machines that have never been played before. This finding 
provided empirical support to the suggestion that gambling behaviour is not 
controlled purely by schedules of reinforcement and suggests that it is not just the 
presence or absence of inaccurate rules that influence gambling behaviour. It has 
already been discussed that the matching law may not be able to account for the way 
in which people gamble (e.g. Dixon et al., 2006; Weatherly et al., 2009) and that 
accurate or inaccurate instructions may also be influential (Dixon, 2000; Weatherly 
& Meier, 2008). However, research of this kind is limited because it does not allow 
for a functional account of the way in which instructions control behaviour (Hayes et 
al., 1989).
Experiment 4
Research is needed, and functional explanations proffered, of the ways in 
which verbal rules may influence gambling behaviour. It is possible that paradigms 
involved in research on equivalence relations may be useful in this regard, 
particularly due to the way in which they have defined verbal rules. In effect, rule 
following may be dependent on derived stimulus relations (Hayes & Hayes, 1992). 
Derived relations, such as equivalence relations, may be crucial to the understanding 
of verbal events such as rules, as verbal events are considered as members of 
relational classes which participate in a network of arbitrary relations with other 
events in the environment (Hayes et al., 1989). In other words “verbal stimuli are 
those that participate in derived stimulus relations and that have their functions 
based, in part, on the transfer of functions” (Dymond & Rehfeldt, 2000, p.240).
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Dymond et al. (2011) showed that the discriminative functions of a slot-machine can 
transform in accordance with equivalence relations, but given that rules also 
participate in derived relations, this opens up the question as to whether the 
transformation of discriminative slot-machine functions may be influenced by 
accurate and inaccurate rules.
Only one published study has demonstrated a transformation of 
discriminative function through equivalence relations in computer simulated slot- 
machines (Dymond et al., in press). Investigating whether transformation of function 
occurs in gambling scenarios may help explain why individuals develop preferences 
for one slot-machine over another, despite having never experienced a win on that 
slot-machine (Dixon & Delaney, 2006). Experiment 4 was designed to examine the 
effects of accurate and inaccurate rules and the role of transformation of function on 
slot-machine choice.
In Experiment 4, participants were trained on two, three member equivalence 
classes of nonsense words represented by A1-B1-C1 and A2-B2-C2 through 
arbitrary relational training and testing. Following this, two slot-machines labelled 
B1 and B2 were presented sequentially. These slot-machines were identical in 
schedule and magnitude of reinforcement. Finally, participants were presented with 
slot-machines Cl and C2 under extinction. There were three conditions in this phase 
in which participants were given different instructions regarding how to play the slot- 
machines. Participants in the Minimal condition were given minimal instructions in 
which they were told to try and win as many points as possible, participants in the 
Specified condition were told that slot-machine Cl paid out more, and participants in 
the Unspecified condition were told that one slot-machine paid out more than the 
other but were not told which one. It was predicted that participants in the Minimal 
condition would show equal responding to slot-machines Cl and C2 due to a 
transformation of the discriminative equal payout functions of B1 and B2, where Cl 
and C2 participate in an equivalence relation with B1 and B2, respectively. It was 
predicted that in the Specified condition the verbal rule would exert control over 
behaviour; therefore participants would show an increased preference for slot- 
machine Cl. Finally, in the Unspecified condition it was predicted that participants 
would show a preference for one slot-machine over the other, but which slot-machine 
this was, would vary between participants. In summary, it was expected that a 
transformation of discriminative function in accordance with the equivalence
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relations would occur in the Minimal condition, but that where additional verbal 
rules were given, the verbal rule would control responding.
Method
Participants
Thirteen participants, six males and seven females, aged between 18 and 34 
(M= 23, SD=4.63) were recruited from Swansea University. Participants were 
administered the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur & Blume, 1987). 
Participants were not excluded on the basis of SOGS score as in Chapter 2, due to 
ethical and practical implications of recruiting only problem gamblers. The mean 
SOGS score was 0 (SD = 0). Participants were awarded £7 on completion of the 
experiment.
Apparatus
The experiment took place in a small room containing a desk, a desktop 
computer with 16-inch display, full sized keyboard and a two-button click mouse. 
Stimulus presentation and the recording of responses were controlled by the 
computer, which was programmed in Visual Basic®. Six nonsense words were used 
during equivalence training and testing. These were MEL, PAF, LEK, HUV, JOM, 
and ZID. They will be referred to using alphanumerics.
Procedure
Phase 1: Equivalence training
The purpose of this phase was to train conditional discriminations for six 
nonsense words. At the start of training participants received the following 
instructions:
In a moment some words will appear on the screen. Look at the words at the 
top o f the screen then look at the two words at the bottom o f the screen on the 
left and the right. Choose one o f the two words at the bottom o f the screen by 
clicking on it. Sometimes the computer will give you feedback, and at other 
times it will not. However, you can get all o f the tasks without feedback 
correct by carefully attending to the tasks with feedback.
Clicking a box at the bottom of the screen started the task.
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Participants were presented with a grey screen in which a nonsense word 
appeared at the top centre of the screen and remained for approximately three 
seconds. This nonsense word then disappeared and two additional nonsense words 
appeared onscreen with one in the bottom left hand comer and the other in the 
bottom right hand comer. These words remained onscreen until participants made a 
response. To select a nonsense word, the participant was required to click on the 
word with the mouse. Making a correct selection resulted in the word ‘Correct’ being 
displayed onscreen for three seconds, whereas an incorrect selection resulted in the 
word ‘Wrong’ being displayed for three seconds. After this, a new trial began. 
Nonsense words Al or A2 were always presented at the top of the screen during 
training followed by the B1 and B2 stimuli, or Cl and C2 stimuli, which were 
presented at the bottom of the screen. For example, given the sample stimulus Al, 
and the comparison stimuli B1 and B2, selecting B1 was reinforced. When presented 
with A1-B1-B2 the correct response was B2; given A2-B1-B2 the correct response 
was B2; given A1-C1-C2, the correct response was C2; given A2-B2-C2 the correct 
response was C2. Trials were presented in a pseudorandom order throughout 
training. Participants were required to respond across eight consecutive correct trials 
in order to progress to equivalence testing.
Phase 2: Equivalence testing
The purpose of the test phase was to test for equivalence relations in the 
absence of feedback. Participants were tested for symmetry and equivalence trials. 
The symmetry trials consisted of B-A trials and C-A trials, whereas equivalence 
trials consisted of B-C trials and C-B trials. In a B-C trial, the B stimulus would 
appear at the top of the screen as the sample with the C stimuli at the bottom of the 
screen as comparisons, whereas in a C-B trial, the C stimulus would appear at the top 
of the screen as the sample stimulus with the B stimuli as comparisons. The trials in 
this phase consisted of B l-Cl, B2-C2, Cl-Bl, and C2-B2. It was predicted that given 
B1 as the sample stimulus with Cl and C2 as comparisons, Cl would be selected; 
given B2 with Cl and C2, C2 would be selected; given Cl with B1 and B2, B2 
would be selected; and finally where C2 was the sample with B1 and B2, B2 would 
be selected. Each task was presented 4 times generating a total of 16 trials. 
Participants were required to respond correctly to all 16 trials. If a participant 
responded incorrectly to at least one trial, they were re-exposed to Phase 1. The 
program ran until participants met criterion for both Phase 1 and Phase 2.
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Phase 3: Training of discriminative slot-machine functions.
The purpose of Phase 3 was to train discriminative functions for two slot- 
machines labelled with two of the nonsense words, nonsense word B1 and nonsense 
word B2. Both slot-machines paid out at a rate of 0.5 (i.e., 50% of trials) and each 
slot-machine was presented 25 times, generating 50 trials. Participants were 
presented with the following instructions:
In the first part o f the experiment you will be given two slot-machines to play. 
One slot-machine is called ZID [B1J and the other is called MEL [B2J. The 
computer will present the slot-machines one at a time for you to play. To play 
the machine, click the ‘Bet 1 ’ button and then click the ‘Spin ’ button. Your 
aim is to win as many points as possible. Good luck!
The slot-machines were identical in appearance, predominantly grey 
containing three reels. Each slot-machine appeared on screen sequentially until each 
had been played 20 times. To play a slot-machine, participants were required to click 
on the ‘Bet 1 ’ button, which automatically deducted one credit from the ‘Total 
Credits’ box and made the ‘Spin’ button available. Clicking Spin called the three 
reels to spin for approximately five seconds before stopping. If three matching 
symbols appeared on the payoff line then the participant was awarded five credits in 
the Total Credits box. If less than three symbols were matching then participant lost a 
credit therefore one credit was removed from the “Total Credits” box. All 
participants started with 100 credits and it programmed so that all ended with 200 
credits.
At the end of this phase, participants were presented with a Likert scale and 
instructed to rate how likely they thought it was that a win could occur on each slot- 
machine. The scale ranged from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely). Participants rated 
each slot-machine by clicking on the number on the scale with the right button of the 
mouse on the scale that corresponded to each slot-machine.
In an attempt to more closely simulate actual gambling, participants were told 
they could win money to take home with them depending on how much they won on 
the slot-machines. In fact, all outcomes were fixed and participants received the same 
amount (£7) at the end of the study.
Phase 4: Test for transformation of discriminative function.
The purpose of Phase 4 was to test whether the delivery of minimal or 
inaccurate rules would influence slot-machine preference. There were three
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conditions: Minimal instructions, Specified instructions, and Unspecified 
instructions. In the Minimal condition, participants were given minimal instructions 
that merely asked them to “try and win as many points as possible”. In the Specified 
condition, participants were also asked to win as many points as possible but were 
told that “slot-machine [Cl] paid out most often”. In the Unspecified condition, 
participants were told that one machine “paid out more than the other”, but were not 
told which one. The instructions for each condition were as follows:
Minimal condition:
You will now be presented with two slot-machines to play. Your task is to win 
as many points as possible. You won’t always be able to see how many points 
you win or lose, but the computer is recording your score.
Specified condition:
You will now be presented with two slot-machines to play. Please try and win 
as many points as possible. You won’t always be able to see how many points 
you win or lose, but the computer is recording your score. Most people work 
out that slot-machine C2 pays out the most. Your task is to earn as many 
points as possible.
Unspecified condition:
You will now be presented with two slot-machines to play. Please try and win 
as many points as possible. You won’t always be able to see how many points 
you win or lose, but the computer is recording your score. Most people work 
out quickly which slot-machine pays out the most. Your task is to earn as 
many points as possible.
Following these instructions, participants were concurrently presented with 
slot-machines labelled with nonsense words Cl and C2. This phase was conducted in 
the absence of feedback. Participants could not actually play the slot-machine; only 
select which slot-machine they wanted to play. To select a slot-machine required 
clicking on the chosen slot-machine. Having selected a slot-machine, the next trial 
was initiated with two more slot-machines being concurrently presented. This phase 
was in the absence of feedback. Tests for transformation of function are generally 
conducted under such conditions (Dymond et al., in press) as providing
74
K snuyitzr j
reinforcement for this phase would make it difficult to accurately assess participants’ 
preferences. For example, if this phase had not been conducted in the absence of 
reinforcement, and a participant had experienced a win for selecting slot-machine 
Cl, this participant would now be more likely to select slot-machine Cl on their next 
trial given that selecting this slot-machine has just been reinforced. In this instance, 
the reinforcement contingencies may have interfered with the participant’s 
preferences making it difficult to assess whether Phase 3 had influenced slot-machine 
choice or not. Preference for a particular slot-machine was defined as allocating at 
least 75% of responses to a particular machine.
As in Phase 3, participants were presented with a Likert scale and instructed 
to rate how likely they thought it was that a win could occur on each slot-machine. 
The scale ranged from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely). Participants rated each 
slot-machine by clicking on the number on the scale with the right button of the 
mouse on the scale that corresponded to each slot-machine.
Results
Table 3.1 shows that all participants except for P5 passed equivalence 
training and testing, therefore the data from P5 was not presented as they did not 
progress to the slot-machine phases of the experiment. PI, P2, P3, P7, and P9 met 
criterion for training and testing after only one exposure to the task. The mean 
number of trials required to meet criterion for equivalence training was 14.83, 
whereas the mean number of cycles to complete equivalence training and testing was 
2.17.
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Table 3.1.
Number of trials required to meet criterion responding during equivalence training 
and testing (Phase 1 & 2) in Experiment 4.________________________________
Condition Participant Equivalence training Equivalence testing
Minimal PI 25 16/16
P2 13 16/16
P3 8 16/16
P4 13 8/16
8 5/16
8 15/16
8 16/16
Specified P6 60 5/16
23 15/16
8 16/16
P7 16 16/16
P8 27 14/16
8 16/16
P9 . 14 16/16
Unspecified P10 20 15/16
8 16/16
P ll 32 9/16
8 15/16
8 16/16
P12 22 11/16
10 15/16
8 15/16
8 15/16
8 16/16
P13 20 6/16
34 15/16
Mean 14.83 (11.04) 11.06 (4.15)
Standard deviation given in parentheses.
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Figure 3.1. Participants’ response allocation (choices o f either C l or C2) during 
Phase 4 o f the Minimal condition in Experiment 4.
Figure 3.1 shows that all participants showed a preference for one particular 
slot-machine by allocating at least 75% o f responses to one slot-machine, however 
the slot-machine that was the most preferred varied across participants. It had been 
predicted that participants’ preferences would transform in accordance with the 
matched probabilities o f slot-machine B1 and B2 which both paid out on 50% o f 
trials and show approximately equal responding to slot-machines C l and C2. It is 
important to note however, that participants’ responding is generally quite consistent. 
Harrison and Green (1990) reported that when participants were presented with 
matching to sample tasks but not given any feedback, participant responding tended 
to be fairly consistent, that is, they consistently selected the same comparison 
stimulus in the presence o f a particular sample stimulus. It seems that such consistent 
patterns on behaviour were in control o f responding in the present experiment.
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Figure 3.2. Participants’ mean response allocation (choices o f either C l or C2) 
during Phase 4 o f the Minimal condition.
Figure 3.2 shows the mean choice across all participants in the Minimal 
condition. There was a preference for slot-machine C l with a mean o f 5.25, whereas 
the mean for slot-machine C2 was 2.75.
Table 3.2.
Participants’ slot-machine ratings to slot-machines B1 and B2 following Phase 3, and
Cl and C2 following Phase 4 o f the Minimal Condition.
Slot-machine
Participant Slot-machine Slot-machine Slot-machine Slot-machine
B1 B2 Cl C2
PI 2 4 2 4
P2 3 3 4 4
P3 4 3 4 3
P4 2 3 4 3
Mean 2.75 3.25 3.5 3.5
SD 0.96 0.50 1.00 0.58
1 = very unlikely, 2 = unlikely, 3 = neutral, 4 = likely, 5 = very likely
When examining the ratings data in Table 3.2 it is apparent that participants’ 
preferences in Phase 4 were generally consistent with the ratings given to slot- 
machine B1 and B2 following Phase 3. For example, PI rated slot-machine B1 as 
unlikely to pay out and slot-machine B2 as likely to pay out. Then, during Phase 4,
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PI allocated all responding to slot-machine C2. P3 rated slot-machine B1 as likely to 
payout and B2 as neutral, and then went on to select slot-machine C l on seven out o f 
eight trials.
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Figure 3.3. Participants’ response allocation (choices of either C l or C2) during 
Phase 4 o f the Specified Condition where slot-machine Cl was specified as the high 
payout slot-machine.
In the Specified condition, participants were instructed that slot-machine C l 
paid out more than slot-machine C2. Figure 3.3 shows that three out o f four 
participants allocated more responses to slot-machine C l over slot-machine C2, 
however only P8 and P9 met the 75% criterion for preference. The difference in 
preference between slot-machine C l and C2 for P7 was only very small. P6 showed 
a slight increase in preference to slot-machine C2. This is interesting as P6 had rated 
slot-machine B1 as likely to pay out and slot-machine B2 as unlikely (see Table 3.3 
for ratings data), and was then instructed that slot-machine C l paid out more, 
therefore it would be expected that a preference would be shown for slot-machine
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C l . Although P7 had rated slot-machine B2 as likely to pay out and B1 as unlikely, 
when instructed that C l paid out more, they then allocated more responses to slot- 
machine C l.
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Figure 3.4. Participants* mean response allocation (choices o f either C l or C2) 
during Phase 4 o f the Specified condition where slot-machine C l was specified as 
the high payout slot-machine.
Figure 3.4 shows that on average, participants showed a preference for slot- 
machine Cl over slot-machine C2. The mean response allocation for slot-machine 
C l was 5.25 whereas the mean response allocation for slot-machine C2 was 2.75.
Table 3.3.
Participants’ slot-machine ratings to slot-machines B1 and B2 following Phase 3, and 
C l and C2 following Phase 4 o f the Specified condition.__________________________
Slot-machine
Participant Slot-machine Slot-machine Slot-machine Slot-machine
B1 B2 Cl C2
P6 4 2 4 4
P7 3 4 3 4
P8 5 4 4 3
P9 4 4 4 4
Mean 4 (0.82) 3.5(1.00) 3.75(0.50) 3.75 (0.50)
1 = very unlikely, 2 = unlikely, 3 = neutral, 4 = likely, 5 = very likely 
Standard deviation given in parentheses.
Unspecified condition
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In the unspecified condition, participants were informed at the start o f Phase 
4 that one slot-machine paid out more than the other, therefore it was predicted that 
participants would show increased preference for one slot-machine over the other but 
it could not be specified which slot-machine each participant would prefer. Figure 
3.5 shows that all participants allocated at least 75% o f responding to one slot- 
machine over the other. PI 1 and P13 selected slot-machine C2 across every trial.
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Figure 3.5. Participants’ response allocation (choices o f  either C l or C2) during 
Phase 4 o f the Unspecified condition where one slot-machine was instructed as 
paying out more.
Regarding the slot-machine ratings data in Table 3.4, PI 1 and P I 3 rated slot- 
machine B2 as very likely and likely to pay out, respectively. This was consistent 
with their strong preference for slot-machine C2 in Phase 4. P 12 rated all slot- 
machines as neutral although allocated more responding to slot-machine C l. The 
ratings o f P10 were not consistent with slot-machine choice in that slot-machine B2 
was rated as unlikely to pay out, yet slot-machine C2 was the m ost preferred during 
Phase 4.
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Figure 3.6. Participants' mean response allocation (choices o f  either C l or C2) 
during Phase 4 o f the Unspecified condition, where participants were instructed that 
one slot-machine paid out more often.
Figure 3.6 shows that more responding was allocated to slot-machine C2 
across participants, with a mean response o f six for slot-machine C2 and a mean 
response o f two to slot-machine C l .
Table 3.4.
Participants' ratings to slot-machines B1 and B2 following Phase 3, and C l and C2 
following Phase 4 o f the Unspecified condition.________________________________
Slot-machine
Participant Slot-machine Slot-machine Slot-machine Slot-machine
B1 B2 C l C2
P10 4 2 2 2
P l l 4 5 0 5
P12 3 3 3 3
P13 3 4 0 5
Mean 3.5 (0.57) 3.5 (1.29) 1.25 (1.50) 3.75 (1.50)
1 = very unlikely, 2 = unlikely, 3 = neutral, 4 = likely, 5 = very likely 
Standard deviation given in parentheses.
Table 3.5 shows the sequence o f responses made by participants in all 
conditions. It is interesting that in the Specified condition, all participants initially 
selected slot-machine C l which had been instructed as the high payout slot-machine. 
The participants in the Minimal condition tended to allocate all responding to one 
slot-machine as did participants in the Specified condition.
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Table 3.5.
Sequence of responding to slot-machines Cl and C2 during Phase 4 for each 
participant across all conditions. Bold type indicates selection of the ‘high payout’ 
slot-machine.
Trial
Condition Participant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Minimal PI C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2
P2 C2 Cl Cl Cl C2 Cl Cl Cl
P3 C2 Cl Cl Cl Cl Cl Cl Cl
P4 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2
Specified P6 Cl C2 C2 C2 Cl C2 C2 Cl
P7 Cl Cl Cl C2 C2 C2 Cl Cl
P8 Cl Cl Cl C l C2 C l Cl C l
P9 Cl Cl Cl C2 Cl C2 Cl C l
Unspecified P10 C2 C2 C2 Cl C2 C2 Cl C2
P ll C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2
P12 Cl Cl Cl Cl Cl C2 Cl C2
P13 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2
Figure 3.7 shows the mean ratings for each slot-machine in each condition. 
There is little variation in the mean ratings across the three conditions, with the 
exception of the rating for Cl and C2 in the unspecified condition.
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Figure 3 .7. Mean ratings for slot-machines in all three conditions. Error bars indicate 
the standard mean error.
Discussion
Experiment 4 demonstrated that instructions may influence preferences for 
concurrently available slot-machines. It had been expected that participants in the 
Minimal condition would show equal responding to either slot-machine as 
participants had experienced the equal payouts o f slot-machines B1 and B1 which 
participated in derived relations with C l and C2. However, participants’ responding 
indicated a clear preference for one slot-machine. The generalised matching law 
predicts that organisms will divide their responses equally given equal reinforcement, 
and therefore these findings were not as predicted. It must be highlighted, however, 
that the preferred slot-machine did in fact differ between participants. In the 
Specified condition, the experimenter delivered rule exerted control over 
participants’ responding, with participants showing a preference for the slot-machine 
that had been specified as paying out the most. In the Unspecified condition, all 
participants showed a preference to one slot-machine over another, although which 
slot-machine was preferred varied.
For two out o f four participants, preference for slot-machines C l and C2 was 
consistent with ratings o f slot-machines B1 and B2. This suggests a transformation o f 
function in accordance with the equivalence relations between participants’ 
perception o f which slot-machine paid out more during Phase 3, and slot-machine
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choice in Phase 4. Here transformation was defined as participants showing response 
allocation to a slot-machine in Phase 4, that was consistent with the rating that had 
been given to the slot-machine that participated in a indirect relation in Phase 3. The 
findings of the present study are consistent with studies by Weatherly and Meier 
(2008) and Dixon et al. (2000) that experimenter delivered rules can influence 
gambling behaviour. The ratings data of the present experiment are consistent the 
findings of Weatherly et al. (2008) that humans are not always sensitive to the 
contingencies of a slot-machine, as many participants did not rate the slot-machines 
as paying out equally.
A limitation of Experiment 4 was that participants were only presented with 
eight slot-machine trials in the final phase of the experiment. It may have been that 
the extended exposure to slot-machines B1 and B2, followed by only eight trials of 
slot-machines Cl and C2, contributed to the unexpected results in the Control 
condition. Furthermore, in a real-life casino environment, gamblers may play slot- 
machines for extended periods of time until they choose to quit or run out of money. 
An additional limitation is that casino slot-machines are not under conditions of 
extinction therefore any rules that may have been derived by the gambler will also be 
interacting with the direct schedules of reinforcement of that particular slot-machine. 
Finally, there was no accurate rule condition in Experiment 4, as participants in the 
Minimal condition were merely instructed to try to win as many points as possible, 
but they were not informed about the payout probabilities of the slot-machines.
In Phase 4 of Experiment 5, participants were given either accurate or 
inaccurate rules about how to play the slot-machines in order to win as many points 
as possible.
Experiment 5 
Method
Participants
Fourteen participants, two males and twelve females, aged between 22 and 36 
(M=27.07, SD=5.37) were recruited from Swansea University. The mean SOGS 
score was 0.21 (SD = 0.58). Participants were awarded £7 on completion of the 
experiment.
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Procedure
Experiment 5 was identical to Experiment 4 except for the following 
important differences. First, in Phase 4, participants were presented with slot- 
machines Cl and C2 concurrently on screen and were able to play the slot-machines. 
The slot-machines were identical to those presented in Phase 3, except they were 
labelled Cl and C2, respectively. Second, having chosen to play one of the slot- 
machines (by clicking ‘Bet 1’ and ‘Spin’) both slot-machine Cl and C2 remained on 
the screen. Both machines were of identical 0.5 payout probability. Third, there were 
four conditions in Experiment 5 made from a combination of accurate and inaccurate 
rules and the presence or absence of instructions to quit: Accurate rule (no instruction 
to quit), Inaccurate rule (no instruction to quit), Accurate rule (and instruction to 
quit), and Inaccurate rule (and instruction to quit). The instructions were as follows: 
Accurate condition:
You will now choose between playing slot-machine Cl and slot-machine C2. 
These slot-machines have the same payout probability. Your aim is to win as 
many points as possible.
Inaccurate condition:
You will now choose between playing slot-machine Cl and slot-machine C2. 
Slot-machine Cl pays out more than slot-machine C2. Your aim is to win as 
many points as possible.
Control condition:
You will now choose between playing slot-machine Cl and slot-machine C2. 
Your aim is to win as many points as possible.
Half of the participants in the accurate and inaccurate condition also received the 
additional instruction stating, “You may quit at any time”. Participants could end the 
experiment by pressing the ‘Quit’ button that that was situated at the bottom right of 
the screen. The ‘Quit’ button was present onscreen throughout this phase for all 
participants, whether or not they had been instructed that they could quit. There was 
a maximum of 150 slot-machine trials during this phase.
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Results and Discussion
Table 3.6 shows that all participants in Experiment 5 completed equivalence 
training and testing. The mean number of equivalence training trials required was 
21.7 trials. PI4, P I6, P I7, P I8, P20, and P23 only required one exposure to training 
and testing, whereas P26 required five exposures. The mean number of cycles 
required to meet criterion for equivalence training and testing was 2.23.
Table 3.6.
Number of trials required to meet criterion responding during equivalence training 
and testing in Experiment 5.__________________________________________
Condition Participant Equivalence
Training
Equivalence
Testing
Accurate P14 11 16/16
P15 21 1/16
63 7/16
9 0/16
55 15/16
8 16/16
P16 11 16/16
Inaccurate P17 10 16/16
P18 55 16/16
P19 11 9/16
17 7/16
8 8/16
18 10/16
8 16/16
Accurate (+ quit) P20 13 16/16
P21 8 2/16
28 16/16
P22 16 14/16
8 16/16
P23 16 16/16
Inaccurate (+ quit) P24 28 12/16
8 16/16
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Condition (cont.d) Participant Equivalence
Training
Equivalence
Testing
Inaccurate (+ quit) P25 47 8/16
24 16/16
P26 8 9/16
68 10/16
8 12/16
21 14/16
8 16/16
Mean 21.17(17.67) 11.42(5.75)
Standard deviation given in parentheses.
Figure 3.8 shows that all three participants allocated their responses 
completely equally (50% to each slot-machine); however the sequence of responding 
varies greatly. P14 and PI 6 show unstable responding with the number of responses 
made to each slot-machine varying in each block of trials, whereas PI 5 shows fairly 
stable responding. Although participants were not instructed that they could quit at 
any time, PI5 and P I6 quit after 10 and 25 trials, respectively.
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Figure 3.8. Participants’ slot-machine choices to slot-machines C l and C2 during 
Phase 4 o f the Accurate Condition under matched probability. Figures in Panel A 
show the overall percentage o f allocation to each slot-machine, whereas figures in 
Panel B show the sequence o f responding given by the number o f  choices made to 
slot-machine C l . Figures in Panel B are shown in five or ten trial blocks, depending 
on how many trials were completed.
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Figure 3.9. Participants’ overall slot-machine choices during Phase 4 o f the 
Inaccurate Condition are shown in Panel A, and the sequence o f slot-machine choice 
to slot-machine C l are shown in Panel B.
Figure 3.9 shows that all participants showed a preference for slot-machine 
C l which was the slot-machine that they had been instructed as being o f higher 
payout, however the preference shown in P I 7 and P I 8 is only very slight. From 
Panel B, it is clear that P I 7 initially showed a preference for slot-machine C l, 
however this decreased with extended exposure suggesting that the control exerted 
by the inaccurate rule diminished with responding becoming sensitive to the 
schedule. A similar effect was seen in P18 although responding was fairly unstable.
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P19 initally showed a preference for slot-machine C l, then seemed to allocate more 
responses to C2, and in the final ten trials switched back to C l .
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Figure 3.10. Participants’ overall slot-machine choices during Phase 4 o f the 
Accurate Condition shown in Panel A, and sequence o f slot-machine choice to the 
most preferred slot-machine are shown in Panel B.
Figure 3.10 shows that all three participants showed a strong preference for 
one slot-machine over another, although there is no consistency between participants 
as to which slot-machine was the most preferred. All participants terminated 
responding within 16 trials.
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Figure 3.11. Participants’ overall slot-machine choices during Phase 4 o f the 
Inaccurate Condition are shown in Panel A, and sequence o f choice to the most 
preferred slot-machine are shown in Panel B.
Participants in this condition were told that one o f the slot-machines paid out 
more than the other. P23, P24,and P25 were told C l paid out more, whereas P26 was 
told that C2 paid out more. Figure 3.11 shows that all participants, with the exception 
o f P24 showed preference for the slot-machine that had been instructed as the high 
payout machine, although the choices made by P26 did not meet the 70% criterion. 
P26 however, terminated after only 5 trials so there is little data for this participant.
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The sequence o f responding in Panel B for P23 shows that preference for the high 
payout slot-machine decreased slightly across trials. P24 showed very stable 
responding, allocating all responses to slot-machine C2. P25 also showed very stable 
responding.
Control condition (no equivalence training)
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Figure 3.12. Participants’ overall slot-machine choices during Phase 4 o f the Control 
Condition, and sequence o f choice to the most preferred slot-machine.
Figure 3.12 shows that participants in the control condition showed relatively 
equal responding to each slot-machine, suggesting that participants were emitting 
schedule sensitive behaviour.
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Condition
Figure 3.13. Mean number o f trials undertaken in Phase 4 before terminating by 
participants in each o f the four conditions in Experiment 5. Error bars indicate 
standard mean error.
Figure 3.13 shows that participants who were not told that they could quit at 
any time, gambled for longer than those that did receive this instruction. Participants 
in the Accurate (+quit) condition completed the fewest number o f  trials before 
ending the experiment, whereas those who received inaccurate instructions and were 
not told that they could stop at any time were the most persistent gamblers.
Experiment 5 found that when participants are presented with accurate rules 
about the equal payout probability o f concurrently available slot-machines, 
participants will show approximately equal responding to each slot-machine. 
However, when inaccurate rules are presented, participants will initially allocate 
more responding to the slot-machine that has been instructed as paying out more. 
Additionally, as participants continue to gamble, thus experiencing the payout 
probabilities o f the slot-machines, responding becomes more equal. This suggests 
that although the experimenter-delivered rule initially controls behaviour, the 
instructional control gradually diminishes. It was also found that participants who 
were not instructed that they could quit at any time gambled for longer than those 
who could quit when they wanted.
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General Discussion
In Experiment 4, all of the participants in the Minimal instruction condition 
showed a preference for one slot-machine over the other. However, the preferred 
slot-machine differed across participants: in the Specified condition, three out of four 
participants preferred slot-machine Cl, which had been instructed as paying out 
more often, (suggesting that the experimenter-delivered rule exerted control over 
responding), whilst in the Unspecified condition, participants’ preferences were 
distributed equally across both slot-machines. In Experiment 5, participants in the 
Accurate (no quit) condition all showed equal responding. However, in the Accurate 
(+quit) condition in which participants were instructed they could quit at any time, a 
clear preference was observed for one slot-machine over the other. In the Inaccurate 
(no quit) condition, all three participants showed an increased preference for slot- 
machine Cl (instructed as being of high payout). Although the overall difference in 
preference was small, participants initially allocated greater responding to slot- 
machine Cl. This effect decreased as test trials continued, suggesting that the control 
of the rule diminished whilst the matched schedules of reinforcement began to exert 
control over responding. In the Inaccurate (+quit) condition, all participants except 
for one, showed a preference for the slot-machine that had been instructed as paying 
out more often.
It is interesting to note that participants in the Minimal condition of 
Experiment 4 did not allocate responding equally between the two slot-machines as 
would be expected given the concurrent choice of identical schedules (cf. Weatherly 
et al., 2009). It is difficult to say why this may have occurred. However, a possible 
factor may have been the extensive exposure to slot-machines B1 and B2 during 
Phase 3 (50 trials), followed by a short exposure (8 trials) to slot-machines Cl and 
C2, combined with the absence of feedback. It is also noteworthy that participants’ 
preferences for slot-machines Cl and C2 were consistent with their ratings of slot- 
machines B1 and B2. For example, PI rated slot-machine B1 as unlikely to pay out 
and slot-machine B2 as likely to pay out, and then went on to select slot-machine C2 
across all trials. This suggests that the discriminative payout functions of slot- 
machines B1 and B2 (as measured by ratings to each slot-machine), transformed in 
accordance with equivalence relations to Cl and C2, with participants showing 
preference for the slot-machine that participated in an equivalence relation with the 
instructed high payout machine.
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In the Specified condition of Experiment 4, three out of four participants 
showed preference for the slot-machine that had been instructed as paying out the 
most, which suggests that the experimenter-delivered rule exerted a degree of 
control. In the Unspecified condition, it was predicted that participants would show a 
preference for one slot-machine over the other, but exactly which slot-machine was 
preferred differed between participants. While all participants did in fact show a 
preference for a particular slot-machine, it is difficult to say with certainty whether 
this was a result of the rule delivered, as the participants in the Minimal group also 
emitted similar responding. The ratings data for PI 1 and PI3 may help shed light on 
this as these participants rated slot-machines B1 and B2 as very likely and likely to 
pay out, respectively, and then went on to allocate all responses to slot-machine C2. 
As in the control condition of Experiment 5, this suggests that a transformation of 
discriminative functions in accordance with equivalence had occurred, despite there 
being no actual differences in the payout probabilities of the slot-machines. P10, 
however, rated slot-machine B1 as likely to payout, and all other slot-machines as 
unlikely to pay out, but then showed most preference for C2, whereas P12 rated all 
slot-machines as neutral but allocated greater responding to slot-machine Cl.
In Experiment 5, participants in the Accurate (no quit) condition showed 
equal responding to each slot-machine as was predicted, yet in the Accurate (+quit) 
condition all three participants seemed to prefer one slot-machine over another. One 
possible explanation for participants allocating responding to one slot-machine more 
than the other is that given accurate rules detailing that the concurrent slot-machines 
were of equal payout probability, responding on just one slot-machine should, in 
theory, result in the same amount of reinforcement as the responding to the other 
slot-machine, therefore, it doesn’t matter which slot-machine a participant chooses to 
play. This finding is not consistent with predictions of the generalised matching law 
and is perhaps related to the type of schedule of reinforcement that was in place. 
Typically, interval schedules are employed in matching law research. This is because 
concurrent interval schedules are independent; therefore whilst an organism is 
responding on one of the interval schedules, the other schedule may elapse at any 
moment (Pierce & Epling, 1983). Given a ratio schedule however, where 
reinforcement can only be received for the schedule that is being responded to, 
preference will merely be seen for the schedule that results in the most reinforcement 
(Hermstein & Loveland, 1975). In the present.experiments, it was possible that a
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participant would receive the same amount of reinforcement by responding to just 
one slot-machine. There was, therefore, no great benefit to switching between the 
two slot-machines and nor was this possibility manipulated by the addition of 
variables known to influence matching or non-matching (e.g., changeover delays).
With regards to the generalised matching law, the present experiment found 
much variation in participants’ responding. In the Accurate (no quit) condition of 
Experiment 5, all participants responding to the slot-machines were equally 
distributed as predicted by the generalised matching law, however in the accurate 
(+quit) condition responding did not conform to the generalised matching law. Given 
that the only difference between these two conditions was whether participants were 
instructed that they could quit or not, there are no clear reasons as to why one group 
would show matching and the other would not. Participants in the Inaccurate 
conditions did not respond in accordance with the generalised matching law, which 
was likely due to the rule that had been delivered. The participants in the Control 
condition of Experiment 5 allocated relatively equal responding to either slot- 
machine. It is not possible to claim whether or not participants in Experiment 4 were 
responding in accordance with the matching law as the final slot-machine phase in 
which slot-machine choice was measured was under extinction, therefore participants 
were not contacting any reinforcement.
The findings that some participants did not respond in accordance with the 
schedule in place and sometimes rated a slot-machine as being more likely to payout 
despite the payout probabilities being identical, are in line with those of Weatherly et 
al. (2009). Weatherly and colleagues reported that participants were not sensitive to 
the payout contingencies of a slot-machine, even when one slot-machine paid out 
more than another. However, as Weatherly et al. (2009) report, it is difficult to claim 
with confidence that allocating exclusive responding to one slot-machine can be 
considered a preference, as that individual hasn’t experienced the contingencies of 
the other slot-machines. An additional problem with the present study was that all 
participants in the Accurate (+quit) condition terminated responding within 16 trials. 
It can only be speculated as to whether participants would have begun to show equal 
responding if extended exposure to the slot-machines had been implemented.
There is a large body of literature that suggests human behaviour is not 
always sensitive to schedules of reinforcement. Numerous ^ studies have reported that 
in comparison to non-humans, humans do not always maximise reinforcement on
97
schedules (e.g., Savastano & Fantino, 1994; Silberberg, Thomas, & Berendzen,
1991). Explanations for this difference in behaviour have looked to the procedural 
differences in experiments on non-humans and humans (Matthews, Shimoff, Catania, 
& Sagvolden, 1977). For example in a non-human experiment, reinforcement is often 
delivered in the form of a highly visual stimulus and a consumable, whereas the 
human participant may merely be delivered a point and no consumable is delivered 
(Matthews et al., 1997). A second key difference is the way in which responding is 
trained. A non-human’s behaviour will be shaped until the organism learns to 
respond in the appropriate way, whereas the human subject is often given verbal 
instructions. It has been reported that when humans are given minimal instructions 
regarding how to respond, increased sensitivity has been shown (Matthews et al., 
1977). In the case of the present study however, the ratings and slot-machine choice 
data of participants given minimal instructions in Experiment 4 suggest that 
participants could not accurately report the contingencies of the slot-machines.
Whilst there may be some merit to the above explanations in terms of 
explaining the lack of sensitivity shown by participants in the present study, when we 
turn again to consider actual gambling behaviour, these explanations still seem to fall 
short. Whilst the delivery of points in an experimental task may not be the optimum 
situation for inducing schedule sensitive behaviour, in a real-life gambling scenario, 
the reinforcement is in the form of a generalized conditioned reinforcer, money. 
Therefore, showing insensitive responding to the schedule of a slot-machine could 
result in losing large amounts of money. Assuming that money acts as a reinforcer 
for a gambler, the explanation that the type of reinforcer affects the degree of 
schedule sensitive behaviour does not seem to account for a gambler showing 
insensitive responding. A way of ensuring that a gambling experiment more closely 
resembles real-life gambling would be to require participants to gamble their own 
money, however ethical restrictions prevent this. First, there is the issue that the 
participant may lose his or her own money, but perhaps of greater concern is that 
those participants who have obtained high scores on gambling measures (for 
example, the SOGS) indicating pathological gambling, are being encouraged to 
engage in their pathology by gambling their own money (Weatherly & Phelps,
2006).
Considering now the effects of rules on participants’ responding on the slot- 
machines during Phase 4, some variability was found in Experiments 4 and 5 in the
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extent to which the experimenter-delivered rules were followed. It can only be 
speculated as to why this occurs as a thorough understanding of each participant’s 
behaviour would involve a complete account of their learning history with rule 
following (Tomeke et al., 2008). According to Tomeke et al. (2008, p. 144) “RFT 
holds that rules alter behaviour through the appropriate transformation of functions 
that result from the contact with the elements included in the rule”. This assumes that 
the individual has to be able to respond in accordance with derived relations in order 
to understand the rule. Hayes et al. (1989) gives the example of presenting a rule in 
which someone is told that when they hear the bell ring they must get the cake out of 
the oven. In this example, the words bell, cake, get and oven participate in same
t
relations with the sound of an actual bell, actual cakes, going to get something and an
| actual oven. The present study assumed that giving the instruction “slot-machine Cl
\
| pays out the most” would participate in a same relation with the actual computerl
I simulated slot-machine and winning more points.
In conclusion, the present chapter supported previous suggestions that 
gambling behaviour may be influenced by accurate and inaccurate externally 
delivered rules by influencing slot machine choice and persistence in play. However, 
it was also found that with extended exposure to the contingencies of a slot machine, 
the control exerted by inaccurate rules sometimes seemed to diminish and responding 
that was in accordance with the schedule of reinforcement in place began to emerge. 
This suggests that in a casino environment, if a fellow patron delivers an inaccurate 
rule to a gambler which overstates the payout probability of a slot machine, although
| the gambler may initially showed increased responding to that particular slot
I machine even if it is to his detriment, with prolonged exposure to the schedule of
j reinforcement in place, the individual may then begin to show schedule sensitive
responding such that the rule that had been delivered no longer exerts control over 
behaviour.
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Chapter 4
Emergent Slot-Machine Choice: A Transformation of Discriminative Functions 
in Accordance with Same and Opposite Relational Frames
^nupier h
Behaviour-analytic research on the effects of structural characteristics of slot- 
machines on gambling behaviour has found that participants’ preferences for a 
particular machine can be altered with a non-arbitrary relational training intervention 
(Hoon et al., 2007, 2008; Zlomke & Dixon, 2006). The simulated slot-machine 
studies by Zlomke and Dixon (2006) and Hoon et al. (2007, 2008) demonstrated that 
gambling behaviour may not be controlled solely by directly experienced 
contingencies of reinforcement. If participants’ behaviour had been governed purely 
by the schedule of reinforcement, then an equal preference for both slot-machines 
would have been observed at post-test because both paid out on 50% of trials.
Although the studies by Zlomke and Dixon (2006) and Hoon et al. (2008) 
provided preliminary insight into how gambling may not be controlled solely by 
schedules of reinforcement alone, these experiments do not supplement a strictly 
verbal account of gambling as defined by RFT (Hayes et al., 2001), for the following 
two reasons. First, for an event to be considered a verbal event in terms of RFT, 
responding must be arbitrarily applicable. The training tasks in both of these 
experiments consisted of non-arbitrary relational responding, which refers to 
responding to stimuli that differ along a physical dimension, for example, the size or 
physical quantity of an object. Non-humans should, in principle, be able to complete 
such tasks (see Reese, 1968) as the organism receives reinforcement for selecting the 
larger or smaller stimulus, therefore becoming a learned operant (Hayes et al., 2001). 
From this, the organism is then able to respond to the relation between the stimuli as 
Hayes et al. (2001) elaborate:
“If selecting only the larger of two stimulus objects is reinforced over a series 
of trials with varying objects, there is no reason to be surprised if an organism 
begins to respond to the relation between the stimuli rather than their absolute 
characteristics.” (p. 25)
Whilst the organism may now be responding to a relation, this is still 
specified by the physical properties of the stimuli (Hayes et al., 2001). However, a 
verbal event in accordance with RFT consists of responding to relations between 
stimuli that are not specified by the physical characteristics of those stimuli. This is 
termed arbitrary relational responding and is controlled by the context in which 
responding occurs so that the contextual cue determines the relation between stimuli
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or the function of a stimulus, and not physical characteristics of the stimuli (Hayes et 
al., 2001). Berens and Hayes (2004) argue that if humans are more advanced in 
symbolic language than non-humans then it should be very difficult, if not 
impossible, to train non-humans to respond accurately to arbitrary relational tasks. A 
few studies have claimed, equivocally, to establish symmetry and arbitrary relational 
responding in non-humans (see Jitsumori et al., 2002; Schusterman & Kastak, 1993), 
but the evidence base suggests that non-humans cannot respond to relational stimuli 
other than non-arbitrary stimuli as the training procedures used in these studies were 
generally those used for establishing relational operants (Berens & Hayes, 2004; 
Hayes, 1989). For these reasons, a non-arbitrary model of gambling cannot be 
considered a verbal account of gambling and experiments that aim to provide such an 
account must include the arbitrarily applicable nature of verbal behaviour.
The second reason why the Zlomke and Dixon (2006) and Hoon et al. (2008) 
studies are not true verbal experiments is that an integral component of the RFT 
account of verbal behaviour is that of derived relational responding. In the 
aforementioned studies, participants were directly trained that the colour yellow was 
a contextual cue for more-than and colour blue was a contextual cue for less-than. 
This training intervention is not dissimilar to non-human literature on identity 
matching to sample and oddity from sample, in which animals are trained to select 
the comparison stimulus that is the same (identity) in the presence of one sample 
stimulus, or the stimulus that is different (oddity) in the presence of another stimulus, 
through differential reinforcement (Cumming & Berryman, 1965). Eckerman (1970) 
trained pigeons using differential reinforcement to select the correct line (horizontal 
or vertical) depending on which colour stimulus was presented. No component of the 
tasks presented by Eckerman (1970) required the subject to derive relations between 
the stimuli. Subjects were merely responding, in the absence of feedback, with the 
more-than/less-than relations that had been directly trained. This was also true of the 
Zlomke and Dixon (2008) and Hoon et al. (2008) papers. Thus, for a more complete 
account of gambling behaviour, the fundamental components of RFT must be 
incorporated into empirical studies.
There are currently a few empirical studies in the behaviour-analytic 
literature which have incorporated the defining features of RFT and demonstrated 
transformation of discriminative functions in simulated gambling tasks. The 
transformation of discriminative functions in accordance with equivalence relations
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has also been demonstrated in the gambling literature. Dixon et al. (2009) employed 
an equivalence paradigm to alter the effect of the near-miss in slot-machine 
gamblers. Following a task in which an image of a near-miss on a slot-machine 
participated in a derived same relation with the word “loss”, participants rated the 
near-miss as being closer to loss. Similarly, where an image of a loss on a slot- 
machine participated in a derived same relation as the word “almost” participants 
rated the loss image as closer to a win. Dixon et al. (2009) concluded that the near- 
miss is a verbal event that can be manipulated and altered (Dixon et al., 2009).
Dymond et al. (in press) demonstrated that the discriminative functions of a 
slot-machine may transform in accordance with equivalence relations in computer 
simulated slot-machines. Participants were first trained two, three-member 
equivalence relations (A1-B2-C1- and A2-B2-C2). Next, participants were 
simultaneously presented with slot-machine B1 which paid out on 20% of trials and 
slot-machine B2 which paid out on 80% of trials. Participants were then concurrently 
presented with slot-machines Cl and C2 and required to select which slot-machine 
they wanted to play. It was found that participants selected slot-machine C2 
significantly more than slot-machine C l. This experiment demonstrated that 
gamblers may show preferences for particular slot-machines having never 
experienced the payout probability of that slot-machine.
The aforementioned gambling studies were conducted using equivalence 
relations. In RFT, relations other than sameness or equivalence can be studied, for 
example, opposite (Dymond & Barnes, 1996), more-than and less-than (Whelan et 
al., 2006), and before/after relations (Bames-Holmes, Hayes, Dymond, & O’Hora, 
2001). Furthermore, the RFT literature has demonstrated that transformation of 
function in accordance with relations other than sameness or equivalence can occur 
such as self-discriminative response functions through relations of more-than and 
less-than (Dymond & Barnes, 1995), eliciting functions through relations of more- 
than and less-than (Dougher et al., 2007), and consequential functions in accordance 
with same and opposite relations (Whelan & Bames-Holmes, 2004). For instance, 
Dymond, Whelan, and Smeets (2005) showed contextual control over the 
transformation of discriminative functions in accordance with same and opposite 
relations. Participants were first trained to hand wave in the presence of B1 and clap 
in the presence of B2. They were then trained that Al was the same as B1 and Cl, 
whereas Al was opposite B2 and C2. These trained relations led to the following,
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tested relations: Same Bl-Cl, Same B2-C2, Opposite B2-C1, and Opposite C2- 
B1 .When later presented with C l, participants hand waved (the response trained for 
Bl) in the presence of the Same contextual cue, and clapped (the response trained for 
B2) in the presence of the Opposite contextual cue. When presented with C2 and the 
Same cue, participants clapped (the response trained for B2), whereas they waved 
when C2 was presented with the Opposite cue.
Transformation o f discriminative function and slot-machine choice.
Currently, there are no gambling studies that have investigated relations other 
than sameness (equivalence). Given that relations other than same can be studied, a 
verbal account of gambling must examine these other relations and how functions of 
stimuli may transform in accordance with these different arbitrary relations. It is 
possible that relations such as same, opposite, more-than and less-than that have 
become indirectly related to stimuli within the casino environment, may be 
influencing a gamblers gaming choices, persistence in play and expenditure. In 
Chinese culture, for example, the colour red is considered lucky as it symbolises 
happiness, whereas the colour white represents death and bad omens (He, 2009). As 
a result of this red may then participate in a relation of opposition to white. For the 
Chinese gambler, any other stimuli that participate in a relation of same with the 
colour red or the colour white, may be considered lucky or unlucky respectively, 
despite the fact that these colours and related symbols have never been related to a 
big win or big loss in a casino.
Experiment 5 was designed to investigate the transformation of 
discriminative functions of slot-machine choice in accordance with the relational 
frames of same and opposite. The present study used a new procedure called the 
Relation Completion Procedure (RCP; Dymond & Whelan, 2010) to train same and 
opposite relations. The RCP has been shown to be marginally more effective than 
traditional matching to sample procedures as participants are more likely to pass 
arbitrary training and complete the tasks within fewer trials (Dymond & Whelan, 
2010). Given that the focus of the present study was to test for transformation of 
discriminative functions of a slot-machine, any procedure that facilitates successfully 
completing arbitrary training and testing was of great advantage.
Participants were trained and tested with a relational network of nonsense 
words which established same and opposite relations between the nonsense words.
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Next, two computer simulated slot-machines were simultaneously presented which 
were labelled with stimuli B1 and B2 from the network. Slot-machine B1 never paid 
out whilst slot-machine B2 paid out on 80% of trials. Participants were then 
concurrently presented with slot-machines Cl and C2 under extinction. It was 
predicted that participants would show greatest preference for slot-machine C2 due 
to stimulus C2 participating in a derived same relation with B2, where B2 had been 
trained as the high payout slot-machine.
Experiment 6 
Method
Participants
Eight participants, two males and four females, aged between 18 and 21 (M = 
19.37, SD 1.19), were recruited from Swansea University. Participants were 
administered the SOGS. The mean SOGS score was 0.5 (SD = 0.53). Participants 
were awarded course credit for their involvement in the study.
Apparatus
The experiment took place in a small room containing a desk, a desktop 
computer with 16-inch display, full sized keyboard and a two-button click mouse. 
Stimulus presentation and the recording of responses were controlled by the 
computer, which was programmed in Visual Basic. The two stimuli that were trained 
as contextual cues for Same (X) and Opposite ('y)o) were taken from the Wingdings 
font. Fourteen nonsense syllables were used during the arbitrary relational training 
and testing phases (CUG. ZID, MEL, JOM, PAF, LEP, LER, DAX, ROG, BEH, 
QAD, FIH, VIR, YEM); they will be referred to using alphanumerics.
Procedure
The procedure for Phases 1 and 2 were identical to those developed and 
reported by Dymond and Whelan (2010). Before starting the experiment, all 
participants were given a standardised information sheet and gave their written 
consent. Participants were then given the following instructions:
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. You will be presented with 
a series o f images or nonsense words on the top half o f the screen from left to 
right. Then you will be presented with 5 images or nonsense words on the 
bottom o f the screen. Your task is to observe the images or words that appear 
from left to right and drag one o f these images or words from the bottom to the
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blank, yellow square. Click and hold the mouse over the image or word to drag 
it to the blank square. To confirm your choice, click 'Finish Trial’. I f  you wish 
to make another choice, then click 'Start Again'. Sometimes you will receive 
feedback on your choices, but at other times you will not. Your aim is to get as 
many tasks correct as possible. It is always possible to get a task correct, even 
if  you are not given feedback.
Participants were then required to click a box at the bottom of the screen that began 
the first task.
Phase 1: Non-arbitrary relational training and testing.
The purpose of the first phase was to train the contextual cues for same and 
opposite. Participants were presented with a screen which consisted of a grey section 
at the bottom third of the screen whereas the top two thirds of the screen appeared 
blue. The sample stimulus appeared at the left of the blue section of the screen; 
followed one second later by the contextual cue to the right (therefore appeared 
central) and after a further one second, a third blank square appeared towards the 
right of the screen. One second later the three comparison stimuli appeared in the 
grey section of the screen below (see Figure 4.1). The positioning of the comparison 
stimuli were randomised on all trials.
To make a response, participants were required to select one of the 
comparison stimuli, then drag and drop it in the blank square in the blue section of 
the screen. This made two new buttons appear below the comparison stimuli, with 
the options ‘Finish Trial’ or ‘Start Again’. By clicking ‘Start Again” the stimuli were 
reset. Clicking the Finish Trial button ended the trial, therefore clearing the screen 
and presenting feedback. A correct response produced the word ‘Correct’ whereas an 
incorrect response produced the word ‘Incorrect’. Once feedback had been presented 
a new trial commenced.
The sample and comparison stimuli in Phase 1 consisted of shapes or objects 
that differed along a physical dimension. A total of six stimulus sets were used 
during training. Once a participant responded correctly across eight consecutive 
trials, they progressed to testing. The non-arbitrary relational test was identical in 
format to training except that no feedback was given following trials and six novel 
stimulus sets were employed. Eight consecutive correct responses were required to 
complete Phase 1 and progress to Phase 2. If this criterion was not met, participants 
were re-exposed to non-arbitrary training.
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Correct
Figure 4.1. Screen shots from a ‘sam e’ non-arbitrary training trial. The red arrow is 
for illustrative purposes only and indicates that a comparison stimulus has been 
selected from the bottom left o f the screen then moved and dropped in the blank 
square at the top right o f  the screen.
Phase 2: Arbitrary relational training and testing.
The purpose o f Phase 2 was to train and test a relational network o f nonsense 
words (see Figure 4.2) using the contextual cues o f same and opposite that had been 
trained during Phase 1. The format o f arbitrary relational training was identical to 
that o f the non-arbitrary training trials, except that the stimuli were arbitrary, that is, 
did not differ along a physical dimension. Therefore, an arbitrary sample stimulus 
would be presented, followed by the contextual cue for same or opposite, and then 
the blank square. Following this the three arbitrary comparison stimuli would be 
displayed at the bottom o f the screen. Participants were required to select one o f the 
comparison stimuli, drag and drop it in the blank square. On confirming their choice, 
feedback was given. For example, if  presented with the contextual cue for SAME 
with sample stimulus A l, and the comparison stimuli C l, C2 and N2, selecting 
comparison stimulus B1 was reinforced. There were eight training trials in total, 
with correct response shown in italics: SAME/A1 [7?7-B2-Nl], SAME/A1 [C7-C2- 
N2], OPPOSITE/A1 [B1-52-N1], OPPOSITE/A1 [C1-C2-N2], SAME/X1 [T7-B1- 
N3], SAME/X1 [72-C1-N3], OPPOSITE/X1 [T3-B2-N3], OPPOSITE/X1 [Y4-C2-
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N3]. During a block of training each trial was presented twice. A criterion of eight 
consecutive correct trials was required before a participant could progress to testing.
The purpose of the test phase was to identify whether participants could 
respond correctly to derived relations. The format of this part of the experiment was 
identical to that of arbitrary training except that no feedback was given. The 
following eight novel stimulus sets were presented during the test: SAME/BI [Cl- 
C2-N1], SAME/C 1 [B7-B2-N1], SAME/B2 [C1-C2-N1], SAME/C2 [B1-B2-N1], 
OPPOSITE/BI [C1-C2-N1], OPPOSITE/C2 [B7-B2-N1], OPPOSITE/B2 [C7-C2- 
Nl], and OPPOSITE/C1 [Bl-7?2-Nl]. Each trial was presented twice during one 
block of testing, generating 16 trials. A criterion of 14/16 correct was required in 
order to pass the test and complete this phase of the experiment. If criterion was not 
met, the participant was re-exposed to Phasel. Participants were required to reach 
criterion within four cycles of Phase 1 and Phase 2 in order to pass. If a participant 
did not pass within 4 cycles, the experiment terminated. If a participant did pass 
Phase 1 and 2, they progressed to Phase 3.
Given the arbitrary relations that had been trained, it was predicted that the 
following relations would be derived: (a) choose Cl given B1 in the presence of 
SAME; (b) choose B1 given Cl in the presence of SAME (Cl and B1 are both the 
same as A1 and therefore the same as each other); (c) choose C2 given B2 in the 
presence of SAME; (d) choose B2 given C2 in the presence of SAME (C2 and B2 
are both opposite to A1 and therefore the same as each other); (e) choose C2 given 
B1 in the presence of OPPOSITE; (f) choose B1 given C2 in the presence of 
OPPOSITE (C2 is opposite to Al, and B1 is the same as A l, and therefore C2 is 
opposite of Bl); (g) choose Cl given B2 in the presence of OPPOSITE; and choose 
B2 given Cl in the presence of OPPOSITE (Cl is the same as A l, and B2 is opposite 
to Al, and therefore Cl is opposite to B2).
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Figure 4.2. The relational network of nonsense words trained through non-arbitrary 
and arbitrary relational testing. The nonsense words are represented by 
alphanumerics (Al, Bl, B2, Cl, C2). A solid line indicates a trained relation, 
whereas a dashed line indicates a derived relation. ‘S’ and ‘O’ represent Same and 
Opposite, respectively.
Phase 3: Training of discriminative slot-machine functions.
The purpose of this phase was train two slot-machines labelled with a 
nonsense word from the relational network as a low or a high payout slot-machine 
respectively. Slot-machine Bl never paid out whereas slot-machine B2 paid out on 
80% of spins. The slot-machines were identical in appearance, predominantly grey 
containing three reels. Each slot-machine appeared on screen sequentially until each 
had been played 40 times. To play a slot-machine, participants were required to click 
on the ‘Bet 1’ button, which automatically deducted one credit from the ‘Total 
Credits’ box and made the ‘Spin’ button available. Clicking spin called the three 
reels to spin for approximately five seconds before stopping. If three matching 
symbols appeared on the payoff line then the participant was awarded five credits in 
the Total Credits box. If less than three symbols were matching then the participant 
lost a credit, therefore one credit was removed from the “Total Credits” box. All 
participants started with 100 credits and it programmed so that all ended with 144 
credits. Before the task participants were presented with the following instructions:
In the first part o f the experiment you will be given two slot-machines to play. 
One slot-machine is called ZID and the other is called MEL. The computer 
will present the slot-machines one at a time for you to play. To play the 
machine, click the ‘Bet 1 ’ button and then click the ‘Spin ’ button. Your aim is 
to win as many points as possible. Good luck!
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At the end of this phase, participants were presented with a Likert scale and 
instructed to rate how likely they thought it was that a win could occur on each slot- 
machine. The scale ranged from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely). Participants 
rated each slot-machine by clicking on the number on the scale with the right button 
of the mouse on the scale that corresponded to each slot-machine.
Phase 4: Transformation of discriminative slot-machine functions.
The purpose of this phase was to test for transformation of discriminative 
slot-machine functions in accordance with same and opposite when participants were 
presented with pairs of slot-machines labelled with indirectly related members of the 
relational network. At the start of this task, participants were presented with the 
following onscreen instructions:
You will now be presented with some more slot-machines named after the 
nonsense words you saw in the previous task. Please select which slot- 
machine you would like to play by clicking the ‘Spin ’ button on your chosen 
slot-machine. You will not be able to see how many points you win on each 
machine, but the computer is still recording your score. Your aim is to try to 
earn as many points as possible.
Participants were presented with two slot-machines onscreen at a time and 
selected the machine that they wanted to play by clicking on the “Click to spin” 
button on the chosen slot-machine with a mouse. However, the reels did not actually 
spin and credit was not awarded or lost. The slot-machines were identical in 
appearance except for the nonsense word of each slot-machine that was situated just 
above the reels. Each trial either consisted of slot-machines Bl and B2 being 
presented as well as slot-machines Cl and C2.
Due to a programming error, P1-P4 received 8 extinction trials, with Bl, B2 
Cl and C2 each presented twice. P5-P8 received 16 extinction trials, with Bl, B2, Cl 
and C2 each presented four times. At the end of this phase, participants were again 
presented with a five-point likert scale (1 = very unlikely, 5 = very likely).
It was predicted that when presented with slot-machines Bl and B2, slot- 
machine B2 would be the selected to be played more often than slot-machine Bl, as 
B2 was trained as a high payout probability slot-machine during Phase 3. When 
presented with Cl and C2 it was predicted that C2 would be chosen more often than 
slot-machine Cl. These predictions were made based on the relations that had been 
trained during the arbitrary training tasks: Al is the same as Bl, Al is opposite to
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B2, Al is the same as Cl, Al is opposite to C2, therefore giving rise to the derived 
relations that Bl is the same as Cl, Bl is opposite to C2, and B2 is the same as C2. 
As Phase 3 trained Bl as a low payout slot-machine and B2 as a high payout slot- 
machine, therefore it was predicted that these functions would transform in 
accordance with the relational network such that slot-machine Cl would be least 
preferred and slot-machine C2 would be most preferred.
Results and Discussion
Table 4.1.
Number of trials required to meet criterion for non-arbitrary and arbitrary training 
and testing in Phases 1 and 2 of Experiment 6 .____________________________
Participant Non-arbitrary 
training 
(trials to 
criterion)
Non-arbitrary 
testing 
(trials to 
criterion)
Arbitrary 
training 
(trials to 
criterion)
Arbitrary 
testing 
(trials to 
criterion)
PI* 24 8/8 73 8/16
8 8/8 20 8/16
8 8/8 24 8/16
8 8/8 24 -
P2* 9 8/8 247 4/16
8 7/8 - -
10 7/8 - -
8 8/8 9 13/16
P3* 10 8/8 98 7/16
8 8/8 66 12/16
9 8 30 9/16
8 8/8 - -
P4 21 6/8 - -
8 8/8 147 13/16
8 8/8 18 15/16
P5 15 8/8 145 7/16
13 8/8 . 73 9/16
15 8/8 20 6/16
9 8/8 8 8/16
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Participant Non-arbitrary Non-arbitrary Arbitrary Arbitrary
(1cont.d) training testing training testing
P6 15 8/8 81 3/1
8 8/8 8 6/16
8 8/8 8 8/16
P6 8 8/8 8 3/16
P7 27 8/8 83 8/16
8 8/8 37 7/16
8 8/8 59 6/16
8 7/8 - -
8 7/8 - -
8 8/8 9 8/16
P8 11 8/8 106 7/16
8 8/8 16 11/16
8 8/8 8 14/16
Mean 10.63 7.81 54.81 8.20
SD 4.94 0.47 57.83 3.24
* denotes participant that terminated
Of the eight participants, only two (P4 and P8) successfully completed both 
the non-arbitrary and the arbitrary relational training tasks. P5, P6 and P7 failed 
at the arbitrary phase of the experiment, whereas the remaining participants 
withdrew before all four exposures had been presented.
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Figure 4.3. P4 and P8’s slot-machine choices during the test for transformation o f 
functions in Phase 4 o f Experiment 6.
Figure 4.3 shows the slot-machine choices for P4 and P8 under extinction, 
where B 1 had been trained as the slot-machine under extinction (payout o f zero) and 
B2 is trained as a high payout slot-machine (0.8). The results o f P4 do not indicate 
that a transformation o f  function had occurred with equal preference being shown for 
Bl and C2, and B2 and C l. As slot-machine C2 participated in a same relation with 
B2, it would be expected that slot-machine C2 would be more preferred than C l . P8 
showed the most preference for B2 and least preference for slot-machine B 1, which 
would be as expected due to the payout contigencies o f slot-machine B2 that were 
experienced in Phase 3 o f the experiment. Equal preference was seen for slot- 
machines Cl and C2 which was not in line with predictions.
Table 4.2.
Participants’ slot-machine ratings during Phase 3 and Phase 4 o f Experiment 6 where
1 = very unlikely, 2 = unlikely, 3 = neutral, 4 = likely, 5 == very likely.
Phase 3 Phase 4
Bl B2 Bl B2 Cl C2
P4 2 5 2 3 4 2
P8 1 5 3 4 2 4
Mean 1.5 5.0 2.5 3.5 3.0 3.0
SD 0.71 0.00 0.71 0.71 1.41 1.41
Table 4.2 shows the ratings data made by participants towards each slot- 
machine. The slot-machine ratings when under extinction are most noteworthy, as 
consistency with actual slot-machine choice was expected. The ratings from P4 are 
consistent with slot-machine choice as slot-machines B l and C2 were rated as
unlikely to payout and were also the least preferred slot-machines. Ratings for P8 are 
generally consistent except that slot-machine C2 was rated as likely to pay out, yet 
P8 only selected this slot-machine on four trials.
The findings of Experiment 6 were ambiguous in terms of a demonstration of 
transformation of discriminative function. Two further experiments were designed to 
try and overcome some of the shortcomings of Experiment 6 . In the previous 
experiment, participants were presented with slot-machines Bl, B2, Cl and C2, in 
the absence of feedback, during the test for transformation of functions. In the 
present experiment, only slot-machines Cl and C2 were presented. Presenting only 
the derived stimuli, Cl and C2, is consistent with previous tests for transformation of 
function (see Dymond et al., 2007).
Experiment 7 
Method
Participants
Seven participants, 3 males and 4 females, aged between 20 and 25 (.M 
=21.74, SD = 1.98), answered an e-mail requesting volunteers for a psychology 
study. All participants were students at Swansea University. The mean SOGS score 
was 0.43 (SD =0.53).
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 7 was identical to that of Experiment 6 except 
that during the extinction phase, only slot-machines Cl and C2 were presented. This 
concurrent choice was presented a total of eight times. It was predicted that 
participants would show increased preference for slot-machine C2 when presented 
under extinction due to the stimulus C2 participating in a relation of same to B2, 
when stimulus B2 had been trained as a high probability slot-machine.
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Results and Discussion
Table 4.3.
Number of trials required to meet criterion for non-arbitrary and arbitrary training 
and testing in Phases 1 and 2 of Experiment 7.____________________________
Participant Non-arbitrary 
training 
(trials to 
criterion)
Non-arbitrary 
testing 
(trials to 
criterion)
Arbitrary 
training 
(trials to 
criterion)
Arbitrary 
testing 
(trials to 
criterion)
9 12 7/8 - -
24 7/8 - -
8 8/8 75 5/16
8 8/8 19 14/16
10 12 8/8 19 14/16
11 13 8/8 120 5/16
8 8/8 46 9/16
8 8/8 8 5/16
8 8/8 8 8/16
12* 15 7/8 - -
15 8/8 42 9/16
8 8/8 123 9/16
18 8 8 11/16
8 - - -
13 10 7/8 - -
8 8/8 53 14/16
14 9 8/8 55 9/16
8 8/8 18 2/16
9 8/8 21 3/16
8 8/8 8 8/16
15 28 8/8 100 16/16
Mean 11.67 7.80 48.50 8.81
SD 5.63 0.41 39.83 4.18
* denotes participant that terminated
All participants passed the non-arbitrary relational training and testing. PI 1 
and P14 did not meet criterion responding for the arbitrary relational test therefore 
did not proceed to the slot-machine phases of the experiment. Participants required a 
mean number of 48.5 arbitrary training trials to meet criterion responding and 
progress to the test phase. P12 terminated his participation after three exposures to 
the arbitrary training and testing task.
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Figure 4.4. Participants’ slot-machine choices during the test for transformation o f 
functions in Phase 4 o f Experiment 7.
All participants who passed Phase 1 and 2 and progressed to the slot-machine 
phases o f the experiment showed most preference for slot-machine C2 when 
concurrently presented with slot-machines C l and C2 under extinction. All four 
participants chose to play slot-machine C2 on every trial, and did not select slot- 
machine C l at all. This suggests that participants’ preferences had transformed in 
accordance with the network trained during arbitrary relational training and testing. 
Slot-machine C l was not selected on a single trial by any o f  the participants due to 
stimulus C l participating in derived relation o f  same with stimuls B l, where B l had 
been paired with a low probability slot-machine.
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Table 4.4.
Participants’ slot-machine ratings during Phase 3 and Phase 4 of Experiment 7, 
where 1 = very unlikely, 2 = unlikely, 3 = neutral, 4 = likely, 5 = very likely.
Phase 3
Bl B2 Cl
Phase 4
C2
P9 1 4 2 3
P10 1 4 1 4
P13 1 4 1 4
P15 2 4 2 2
Mean 1.25 4 1.5 3.25
SD 0.5 0.0 0.58 0.96
The ratings data for P I0 and P13 as shown in Table 4.4 are highly consistent 
with those participants’ slot-machine choices. P9 rated slot-machine C2 as neutral 
even though they selected slot-machine C2 across all trials and never selected slot- 
machine Cl. The ratings for P I5 are inconsistent with their slot-machine choices as 
both slot-machines were rated as unlikely to pay out despite a clear preference being 
shown for slot-machine C2 over slot-machine Cl when playing the slot-machines.
It has been shown that transformation of consequential functions in 
accordance with the relations of same and opposite can be varied. Dymond, Roche, 
Forsyth, Whelan, and Rhoden (2008) trained an avoidance response in the presence 
stimulus Bl, which resulted in derived avoidance in the presence of Cl (via two 
combinatorially entailed same relations). Then, in a second experiment, this response 
was attached to stimulus B2, resulting in derived avoidance in the presence of C2 
(via two combinatorially entailed opposite relations). Experiment 7 of the present 
thesis demonstrated transformation of discriminative function via two 
combinatorially entailed opposite relations. Experiment 8 was designed to show that 
transformation of function can occur via two combinatorially entailed same relations 
by training slot-machine Bl as the high probability slot-machine and slot-machine 
B2 as the slot-machine under non reinforcement. This change should result in a shift 
in slot-machine preference so that slot-machine Cl becomes the most preferred slot- 
machine when concurrently presented with slot-machine C2 under extinction 
conditions.
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Experiment 8 
Method
Participants
Seven female participants aged between 21 and 35 (M =27.57, SD = 4.83) 
answered an e-mail requesting volunteers for a psychology study. All participants 
were students at Swansea University. All participants had a SOGS score of 0. 
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 8 was identical to that of Experiment 7 except 
that during Phase 3 in which the slot-machine functions are trained, Bl was trained 
as the high probability slot-machine and B2 was trained as the slot-machine under 
extinction. This was to see whether increased preference would be shown for slot- 
machine Cl during transformation of function test, due to the derived same relation 
between B1 and C1.
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Results and Discussion
Table 4.5.
Number of trials required to meet criterion for non-arbitrary and arbitrary training 
and testing for Phases 1 and 2 of Experiment 8.___________________________
Participant Non-arbitrary 
training 
(trials to 
criterion)
Non-arbitrary 
testing 
(trials to 
criterion)
Arbitrary 
training 
(trials to 
criterion)
Arbitrary 
testing 
(trials to 
criterion)
16 31 8/8 127 2/16
8 8/8 16 5/16
8 8/8 18 9/16
8 . 7/8 - -
8 7/8 - -
8 8/8 10 12/16
17 10 8/8 26 16/16
18 9 8/8 36 12/16
12 8/8 9 14/16
19 8 8/8 42 9/16
8 8/8 23 5/16
8 8/8 19 2/16
8 8/8 8 5/16
20* 14 8/8 39 8/16
8 8/8 12 3/16
8 8/8 12 4/16
8 8/8 - -
21 11 8/8 6 9/16
8 8/8 10 10/16
8 8/8 8 16/16
22 13 8/8 92 3/16
8 8/8 57 3/16
8 8/8 14 16/16
Mean 10.00 7.91 29.20 8.15
SD 5.03 0.29 31.16 4.90
* denotes participant who terminated his/her participation.
In Experiment 8, all participants successfully passed the non-arbitrary 
relational training and testing and progressed to the arbitrary relational tasks. P I6 and 
PI9 failed to meet criterion for the arbitrary test and did not proceed to the slot- 
machine tasks, and P20 terminated the experiment early. P I7 required only one
119
c  napter 4
exposure to arbitrary training and testing, P I 8 required two exposures and P21 and 
P22 both required three exposures. Four participants progressed to the slot-machine 
tasks.
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Figure 4.5. Participants’ slot-machine choices during the test for transformation o f 
functions in Phase 4 of Experiment 8.
Figure 4.5 shows that three out o f four participants showed a strong 
preference for slot-machine Cl over slot-machine C2 when presented under 
extinction due to the same relation between Bl and C l, where stimulus B l was 
trained as a high payout slot-machine. P I7 and P I8 never selected slot-machine C2 
and P 21 selected slot-machine C2 only once. It is interesting that P22 showed a high 
preference for slot-machine C2 given that stimulus C2 participates in a derived 
relation o f same as B2 which had been subsequently trained as a low payout slot- 
machine.
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Table 4.6.
Participants’ slot-machine ratings during Phase 3 and Phase 4 of Experiment 8, 
where 1 = very unlikely, 2 = unlikely, 3 = neutral, 4 = likely, 5 = very likely.
Phase 3
Bl B2 Cl
Phase 4
C2
P17 5 1 5 1
P18 5 1 5 1
P21 5 1 5 1
P22 2 2 2 5
Mean 4.25 1.25 4.25 2.0
SD 1.5 0.5 1.5 2.0
The ratings of the slot-machines for Experiment 8 are highly consistent with 
actual slot-machine choices during the extinction phase with P I7, P I8 and P21 rating 
slot-machine Cl as very likely to pay out and slot-machine C2 as unlikely to pay out. 
P22 rated slot-machine C2 as very likely to pay out which was consistent with their 
high preference for slot-machine C2 under extinction.
General Discussion
The findings of Experiment 6 were unclear as only two participants passed 
the arbitrary relational test phase and progressed to the slot-machine phases. They 
showed relatively equal distribution of responding during the test for transformation 
of functions. Thus, no clear preference was demonstrated. The findings of 
Experiments 7 and 8 demonstrated that participants’ preferences for concurrently 
available slot-machines may transform in accordance with same and opposite 
relational frames. In Experiment 7, participants showed a preference for slot-machine 
C2, which participated in a relational frame of sameness with B2 (via two 
combinatorially entailed opposite relations) that had been directly trained high 
payout discriminative functions during slot-machine training. In Experiment 8 , 
participants showed a preference for slot-machine Cl, which participated in a 
relational frame of sameness with Bl, which had been trained with high payout 
discriminative functions during slot-machine training.
As noted, only two participants in Experiment 6 , P4 and P8, completed 
arbitrary training and testing and progressed to the slot-machine phases. Their slot-
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machine choice data do not suggest that transformation of function occurred. A 
possible explanation for the differences in predicted patterns of transformation in 
Experiments 6 , 7 and 8 may be changes made to the test for transformation of 
function. In Experiments 7 and 8, one exposure to concurrent presentations of slot- 
machines Cl and C2 were given, which was consistent with the procedures of 
Dymond et al. (2007), and all but one of the participants (P22) showed the predicted 
performance. In Experiment 6 however, participants were presented with slot- 
machines Bl and B2 concurrently, as well as slot-machines Cl and C2 during Phase 
4. Specifically P4 was presented with four trials of slot-machine Bl and B2, and four 
trials of slot-machine Cl and C2, whereas P8 received eight trials of each 
combination of slot-machines. It seems that presenting a short block of only slot- 
machines Cl and C2 during Experiments 7 and 8, lead to more reliable results.
During Phase 4, participants are required to select a slot-machine, but they do not 
actually get to play the slot-machine, i.e. the reels don’t spins and money cannot be 
won or lost. Perhaps this brief, simple exposure to only those two slot-machines was 
just enough to prevent extinction. It is not necessary to present slot-machines labelled 
Bl and B2 during Phase 4, as this only tests whether the discriminative functions of 
the slot-machines had been acquired and were maintained (in the presence of 
feedback). Any preferences seen for these slot-machines would not be due to a 
transformation of discriminative function as the function was directly trained with 
these slot-machines. The relative advantages and disadvantages of presenting the 
slot-machines used during discriminative function training can only be fully 
addressed through further empirical investigation.
Perhaps a ‘cleaner’ demonstration of transformation of function would have 
been seen in Experiment 6 with additional exposure to the arbitrary training tasks. 
Previous research has re-exposed participants to the arbitrary training and testing 
phases if criterion was not met during the test for transformation of functions. 
Usually, pre-determined mastery and exposure criteria are adopted, such that 
additional transformation test exposures, where necessary, are given until either the 
predicted performance emerges or the exposure criterion is met, whichever comes 
first (Barnes & Keenan, 1993; Dymond & Rehfeldt, 2000). It is possible, then, that a 
similar re-exposure criterion would have facilitated the predicted shift in preference 
for P22 in Experiment 8, as well as for the participants in Experiment 5. This issue 
warrants empirical attention.
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The present experiments provide further empirical support for the use of the 
RCP (Dymond & Whelan, 2010) to train relational networks of same and opposite. 
Dymond and Whelan (2010) reported that participants required nominally fewer 
arbitrary training and testing trials when participants were presented with RCP in 
comparison with the equivalent matching-to-sample task. In Experiment 7, four out 
of six participants passed arbitrary training and testing with one participant 
terminating before their final exposure, and one participant failing. In Experiment 8 , 
four out of seven participants met criterion for arbitrary training and testing with two 
failing and one terminating.
In Experiment 6 , however, only two participants passed the arbitrary training 
and testing tasks. Three participants terminated their participation and the remaining 
three participants failed. It is difficult to understand why only two participants were 
successful given that this was not seen in the subsequent experiments and was also 
not found in Dymond and Whelan (2010). A possible explanation comes from the 
manner in which participants were recruited (i.e., via the psychology undergraduate 
subject pool credit system). This system requires all psychology students to 
participate in departmental research to obtain “course credit”. Tasks in which 
complex arbitrary relations are trained and tested require concentration and meeting 
stringent criteria, yet a participant will receive credit regardless of how well they do 
on the task. Perhaps the low pass rate of Experiment 6 was as a result of such low 
motivation, as the participants that failed or terminated the experiment still received 
subject pool credit. It is noteworthy that the participants in Experiments 7 and 8 had 
responded to a campus advert requiring volunteers to help with a psychology study, 
and were not given any monetary reimbursement. Although it has been suggested 
that the non-contingent nature of course credit systems may result in low motivation 
to complete the task required (Critchfield, Schlund, & Ecott, 2000), it should be 
noted that Dymond and Whelan (2010) also awarded course credit or monetary 
reinforcement yet reported a higher pass rate.
One possible criticism of the present study is that an account based solely on 
equivalence relations is able to explain the data (e.g., Sidman, 1994, 2000; Tonneau, 
2004). This seems unlikely, firstly, due to the way in which non-arbitrary training 
established the contextual cues for same and opposite. In the non-arbitrary training, a 
sample stimulus was presented, followed by the contextual cue and finally the 
comparison stimuli. If the sample was a small tree, and the contextual cue presented
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was same, then the correct response would be to select the comparison stimulus that 
also depicted the small tree. Given a small tree and the contextual cue for opposite, 
the correct response would be to select the image depicting the largest tree.
Therefore, the same sample stimulus (small tree) participates in a same relation with 
the small tree and an opposite relation with the large tree. An equivalence relation 
cannot have been formed as the correct response to the sample stimulus differs 
depending on which relation is specified by the contextual cue.
The second reason why equivalence relations solely are unlikely to explain 
the current data is due to the combinations of stimuli that were presented during 
arbitrary training and testing. During arbitrary training, participants are essentially 
trained an equivalence, or same, relation between Al, Bl, and Cl. However, this is 
not the case for Al, B2, and C2, as stimulus Al is trained as opposite to B2 and C2. 
Then during arbitrary testing, stimuli Bl, B2, Cl, and C2 are all presented as sample 
stimuli with both contextual cues for same and opposite. For example, given B2 as 
the sample stimulus, followed by the contextual cue for same, and finally the 
comparison stimuli of Bl, Cl, and C2, selecting stimulus C2 would be the correct 
response. Now consider a trial in which B2 is the sample but the contextual cue for 
opposite is presented. In this case selecting Bl would be the correct response and C2 
would now be incorrect. An equivalence paradigm cannot account for this response, 
because in an equivalence relation, selecting B2 in the presence of C2 would always 
be the correct response, regardless of contextual cue. In the case of the present study, 
however, the correct response can only be occasioned due to the relation defined by 
the contextual cue. It is unlikely, therefore, that participants would pass both non- 
arbitrary relational testing and arbitrary training and testing without responding to the 
contextually controlled relations of same and opposite (Dymond et al., 2007;
Dymond & Barnes, 1996).
In terms of gambling research, the present study supplements the growing 
body of literature showing that gambling relevant stimuli may transform in 
accordance with derived relations (Dixon et al., 2009; Dymond et al., 2010, 2011). 
Dymond et al. (2011) found that participants showed a greater preference for a slot- 
machine that participated in a derived equivalence (same) relation with a slot- 
machine that had been trained as discriminative for a high payout slot-machine. The 
current findings extend those of Dymond et al. (2011) by demonstrating that
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discriminative slot-machine functions may transform in accordance with derived 
relations of opposite as well as sameness.
The data from the present chapter also provide empirical support to recent 
suggestions from within the broader behaviour analytic literature that verbal 
behaviour is a vital component for explaining gambling behaviour (Dixon & 
Delaney, 2006; Dymond & Roche, 2010; Weatherly & Dixon, 2007), and extends 
beyond a traditional behavioural account based solely on schedules of reinforcement. 
The data from this chapter suggest that preferences for concurrently available slot- 
machines may be influenced by characteristics or features of a slot-machine that are 
indirectly related to directly experienced payout probabilities. Participants did not 
experience the contingencies of the slot-machines labelled Cl or C2 yet showed a 
preference for one over the other. The structural characteristics of the slot-machines 
perhaps acquired ‘positive’ or ‘lucky’ functions due to that characteristic being 
indirectly related to another characteristic that had previously been established as 
having a high payout, therefore being perceived as ‘lucky’. If a symbol is considered 
lucky, then another symbol that participates in an opposite relation with that symbol 
may be considered unlucky and vice versa. Additionally, these findings provide 
empirical evidence to the suggestion that structural characteristics of slot-machines 
are influential in gambling (Griffiths, 1990).
In conclusion, the present experiments suggest that preferences for 
concurrently available slot-machines may transform in accordance with same and 
opposite relations, and provide empirical support for a contemporary approach to the 
role of verbal behaviour in gambling.
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Chapter 5
“This Slot-machine is Better Than that One”: Transformation of Discriminative 
Functions in Accordance with Derived Comparative Relations
126
K ^ n a p w r  j
Behaviour analysts interested in derived stimulus relations have utilised 
procedures from the transitive inference (TI) literature as a means of explaining 
human reasoning. Transitive inference is an important characteristic of human 
deductive reasoning (Vasconcelos, 2008), and explains how individuals can deduce 
one piece of information from other, related information. For example, if told that A 
is bigger than B, and B is bigger than C, an individual may deduce that A is bigger 
than C. Transitive inference procedures are comparable to the behaviour-analytic 
literature on derived stimulus relations in which participants are trained hierarchical 
relations such a s A < B < C < D < E  (see Munnelly, Dymond, & Hinton, 2010).
These hierarchical relations are often termed comparative relations in the behaviour 
analytic literature. Comparative relations consist of those that differ in size, such as a 
stimulus being greater-than another stimulus. These comparative relations may 
initially be non-arbitrary, that is, differ along a physical dimension, but comparative 
relations can also be trained for stimuli that do not differ in their physical properties. 
For example, given the choice between a nickel and a dime, a small child may prefer 
the nickel due to the physical size of the coin (Berens & Hayes, 2007). However, as 
the child learns the monetary value of nickels and dimes, the child may then show a 
preference for the dime (Berens & Hayes, 2007). The literature on derived stimulus 
relations has found that comparative relations can be derived (Dymond & Barnes, 
1995).
Derived comparative relations are relevant to gambling behaviour as they 
may explain how a gambler comes to behave in accordance with self-statements such 
as “this slot-machine pays out more” than another, in the absence of a direct history 
with either slot-machine (Dymond & Roche, 2010). Furthermore, as it has been 
suggested that the structural characteristics of slot-machines may influence how an 
individual gambles on a particular machine (Griffiths, 1990), it is possible that the 
characteristics of that slot-machine may participate in derived comparative relations 
with other stimuli in an individual’s learning history, which may in turn influence 
slot-machine choice. The present chapter sought to undertake the first such 
investigation of the transformation of discriminative slot-machine functions in 
accordance with derived comparative relations.
A recent study by Munnelly et al. (2010) trained participants with a relational 
network of comparative relations, represented here by the letters A-B-C-D-E. 
Stimulus A was trained as the least-ranking member of the network and stimulus E
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the highest-ranking member of the network. Participants were first trained and tested 
to establish two nonsense syllables as contextual cues for more-than and less-than. In 
the next phase, participants were trained with the relational network of nonsense 
words using these contextual cues. The first group of participants received arbitrary 
relational training using the more-than cue to train the network E > D > C > B > A .  
This was achieved by simultaneously presenting the more-than cue onscreen 
followed by two of the nonsense words. For example, given the more-than cue 
followed by A and B, selecting B was reinforced (B > A). Participants were 
presented with four training trials, E > D, D > C, C > B, and B > A. From this 
training, it was predicted that participants would derive that if B is greater than A, 
then A must be less than B (mutual entailment). During a test phase, participants 
were presented with the more-than and less-than cues and tested on mutually entailed 
and combinatorially entailed trials. The mutually entailed trials that were tested 
consisted of A < B, B < C, C < D, and D < E. Furthermore, if B is more than A, and 
C is more than B, then A must be less than C (combinatorial entailment). The 
combinatorially entailed trials consisted of A < C, B < D, C < E, C > A, D > B, E >
C, A < D, B < E, D > A, E > B. A second group of participants received training 
using the less-than contextual cue (A < B < C < D < E). Findings showed a high 
degree of accuracy across both groups in deriving comparative relations in a manner 
similar to that seen in TI studies (Munnelly et al., 2010).
Reilly, Whelan, and Bames-Holmes (2005) used a similar procedure to train a 
five term relational network ( A < B < C < D < E ) .  One group of participants were 
trained using the more-than cue with the following tasks: B > A, C > B, D > C, and E 
> D. A second group were trained using the less-than cue with the following tasks:
A < B, B < C, C < D, and D < E. A third group were trained with both the more-than 
and the less-than cue: A < B, B < C, and D > C, E > D. To test for differences 
between the groups as a function of the type of training structure used, Reilly et al. 
(2005) measured response latencies on all trials (trained, mutually entailed, and 
combinatorially entailed). It was found that response latencies were significantly 
lower for the group that received training with the more-than cue, and were also 
faster for trained and mutually entailed trials compared to combinatorially entailed 
trials (Reilly et al., 2005).
The studies by Reilly et al. (2005) and Munnelly et al. (2010) demonstrate 
that complex relational networks can be trained using contextual cues for more-than
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and less-than through non-arbitrary and arbitrary relational training. The findings of 
differences in response latencies by Reilly et al. (2005) suggest that when training 
such networks, participants may find training with the more-than cue both easier to 
acquire and subsequently derive.
Whelan, Bames-Holmes, and Dymond (2006) provided empirical evidence 
that when a function is attached to one member of a relational network, the functions 
of other members of the network may be transformed in accordance with the derived 
relation. Whelan et al. (2006) first trained and tested a seven-member network of 
nonsense words. Contextual cues for more-than and less-than were first established 
through non-arbitrary relational training and testing. These contextual cues were then 
employed in an arbitrary relational training and testing task in which participants 
were trained in the following discriminations: A < B, B < C, C < D, E > D, F > E, 
and G > F. All possible mutual and combinatorial entailment relations were then 
tested. On passing the derived relations test, in the next phase, participants were 
required to select a circle containing stimulus D that resulted in the delivery of points 
whereas selecting a circle containing novel stimulus X resulted in a loss of points. 
This training established consequential functions for D and X. Finally, 
transformation of functions was tested by means of a simultaneous discrimination 
task or a free operant task. During these tasks, participants were presented with 
circles containing the stimuli from the relational network, that is A, B, C, D, E, F and 
G. However, whereas in the previous phase selecting a circle resulted in presentation 
or loss of points, selecting a circle during the transformation of functions test resulted 
in that member of the network being presented. For example, given circle A and 
circle B, selecting circle B resulted in stimulus B being presented.
It was predicted that when presented with circles containing stimuli from the 
relational network, the circle containing the higher-ranking member of the network 
would be selected over the lower ranking members. Specifically (predicted 
preference marked in italics): A - B, A  - C, A - D, A - E, A - F, A - G, B - C, B - D, 
B - £ , B - F , B - G , C - D , C - £ , C - F , C - G , D - £ , D - F , D - G , E - F , E - G , F -  
G. It was found that participants’ preferences for the arbitrary stimuli were 
transformed in accordance with the relational network, such that preference was 
shown for the highest-ranking stimulus in the network. These findings are significant 
as they demonstrate how the consequential functions of a stimulus or an event may
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be transformed due to the relation of that stimulus with another event, in the absence 
of a direct contingency of reinforcement (Whelan et al., 2006).
Dougher et al. (2007) demonstrated a transformation of function in 
accordance with more-than and less-than relations. In a non-arbitrary training task, 
participants were presented with sample A, B, or C, and learned to select the 
smallest, middle sized or largest comparison, respectively, from three comparison 
stimuli. This training established sample A as a contextual cue for smallest, B as a 
contextual cue for middle sized and C as a cue for greatest. Sample A was then used 
in an arbitrary training task to establish four different coloured circles green (G), 
purple (P), blue, (Bl), and red (R), in the hierarchy G < P < B1 < R. For example, in 
the presence of sample stimulus A and the comparison stimuli G and P, selecting P 
would be the reinforced correct response. Participants were later trained a steady rate 
of keyboard pressing in the presence of Circle P. When presented with circles G and 
Bl in a test phase, participants pressed more slowly in the presence of circle G and 
more rapidly in the presence of circle P. This rate at which participants pressed the 
keyboard was transformed in accordance with the arbitrary relations of G < P < Bl < 
R (Dougher et al., 2007).
With regards to gambling, the transformation of discriminative functions may 
shed light on why an individual shows a preference for a particular slot-machine due 
to the particular physical characteristics of that machine, despite never having 
experienced winning on that machine. Weatherly and Dixon (2007) give the example 
of a gambler who says, “I have my lucky Red Sox shirt on”. The process by which 
this shirt becomes “lucky” can be explained by transformation of stimulus function, 
as Weatherly and Dixon (2007) describe:
“Upon entering the casino a novice gambler finds an empty chair at a slot- 
machine. The machine is of the variety ‘Red, White, and Blue’, in which 
large payoffs are made when three sets of bars line the payoff window. Over 
the course of one hour of play, this individual comes close to winning a 
number of times, and then, with one more spin of the reel, wins a large 
jackpot when three sets of red bars land on the win line. Obviously excited, 
this player informs his friend of what has occurred, who proclaims ‘Red must 
be your lucky colour’. The next day, recalling the phrase from the prior day, 
the gambler selects a red shirt to wear the next morning. Even upon seeing 
the shirt in the closet, an increased tendency to gamble is reported. Despite
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attempts to draw this person out of the casino, he repeatedly states ‘I will win. 
I am wearing my lucky shirt.’ While the red shirt has never been paired with 
winning, or perhaps even gambling, certain psychological functions have 
emerged between the red bars of the slot-machine, money won, the friend’s 
comment, and a shirt with the word Red Sox written on it.” (Weatherly & 
Dixon, 2007, p. 14.)
There are only a few demonstrations of transformation of function in the 
gambling literature, such as Dymond et al. (in press) who reported that the 
discriminative functions of slot-machines may transform in accordance with derived 
relations.
The present experiment was designed using similar training procedures as 
those of Munnelly et al. (2010) in which an arbitrary relational network of nonsense 
words A < I 3 < C < D < E  was trained and tested. Following arbitrary training and 
testing, discriminative functions of high or low payout percentages were established 
for two slot-machines labelled with a member of the relational network. One of the 
slot-machines was named with nonsense word C from the network and trained as a 
low payout slot-machine (paying out on 20% of trials). A second slot-machine was 
labelled with a novel stimulus X and paid out at a high rate of 80%. To test for a 
transformation of discriminative functions, pairs of slot-machines labelled A, B, C,
D, E, and X were presented concurrently (for example, slot-machine A and slot- 
machine B, slot-machine C and slot-machine E). The slot-machines were under 
conditions of non-reinforcement, as participants could not see how many points they 
had won or lost. It was predicted that participants would choose to play the slot- 
machines labelled with nonsense words that were ranked more highly in the network 
compared to the slot-machines labelled with members lower in the network.
Experiment 9A 
Method
Participants
Four participants, 2 males and 2 females, aged between 19 and 38 (M -  
25.25, SD = 8.62), were recruited from across Swansea University. The mean SOGS 
score was 4.5 (SD = 3.11). Participants were compensated with £5 at completion of 
the study.
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Apparatus
The experiment took place in a small room containing a desk, a desktop 
computer with 16-inch display, full sized keyboard and a two-button click mouse. 
Stimulus presentation and the recording of responses were controlled by the 
computer, which was programmed in Presentation (NeuroBehavioral Systems, CA) 
and Visual Basic.Net, respectively. During the experiment, participants were 
presented with five nonsense words in Phase 2 (VEK, JOM, BIH, CUG, and PAF), 
and an additional, novel nonsense word in Phase 3 (YUT).
Procedure
The experiment was divided into two main sequences: relational training and 
testing and slot-machine discriminative function training and testing, each consisting 
of two phases. See Figure 5.1 for a schematic overview.
Phase 1: Non-arbitrary relational training and testing. The purpose of 
this phase was to train and test non-arbitrary relational responding with stimuli 
differing in physical quantities. In non-arbitrary training, participants were first 
presented with the following onscreen instructions:
During this phase you will be presented with one cue in the middle o f the 
screen and two images beneath it in the centre o f the screen, one on the right 
and one on the left. Your task is to choose one o f the images. To select the 
image on the right, press the marked key on the right o f the keyboard. To 
select the image on the left, press the marked key on the left o f the keyboard. 
Please try to do so as quickly and as accurately as possible. Sometimes the 
computer will give you feedback, and at other times it will not. However, you 
can get all o f the tasks without feedback correct by carefully attending to the 
tasks with feedback. Remember, there is always a correct answer. The 
computer will tell you when this phase is finished. Please press the space bar 
to begin.
On each trial, either the more-than or less-than contextual cue appeared in 
the top middle of the screen followed by two images of differing physical quantities 
at the left and right bottom of the screen. The images used were (quantities of each 
object are in parentheses) beakers (1, 3, 6), tractors (1, 2, 3), ladybirds (2, 4, 8) and 
basketballs (1, 2, 8). For example, if presented with the more-than contextual cue 
followed by 1 basketball and 8 basketballs, selecting the 8 basketball image would 
result in the word ‘Correct’ being displayed on the screen for 3 s. Given the less-than
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contextual cue with 1 basketball and 8 basketballs, selecting 1 basketball would be 
the correct response. An incorrect response resulted in the word “Wrong” being 
displayed for 3 s. Responses were made by clicking on the ‘z’ key to select the image 
on the left or the *?’ to select the image on the right. These keys were marked with a 
sticker on the keyboard for ease of responding.
As each set of stimuli contained three images representing few, intermediate 
and most, this generated 3 trials when presented with both the less-than cue and the 
more-than cue (Few/Intermediate, Few/Most, Intermediate/Most). Given that there 
were four sets of stimuli and two contextual cues, this generated 24 trial types. 
Participants were required to make 10 consecutive correct responses in order to reach 
criterion responding and progress to the test phase.
The test phase was identical in appearance to the training phase, except that 
new stimuli sets were used and no feedback was presented. The images used were 
boats (1, 2, 3), apples (1, 4, 7), traffic lights (1, 3, 4) and turtles (2, 3,4). Participants 
were required to make 10 consecutive correct responses in order to progress to the 
next phase. If a participant failed to do so, they were re-exposed to training.
Phase 2: Arbitrary relational training and testing. The purpose of this 
phase was to train a relational network of nonsense words ( E > D > C > B > A )  using 
the contextual cues that had been established in Phase 1. Participants were presented 
with the contextual cue for more-than at the top of the screen and two comparisons. 
Participants learned to select the word that represented more-than by pressing the ‘z’ 
or *?’ key as before. Participants were required to respond within 3 seconds. If a 
response was not made within this time, the words “Too Slow” were presented 
onscreen. A correct choice resulted in the word “Correct” being displayed in the 
centre screen for approximately 3 seconds and an incorrect response resulted in the 
word “Wrong” being displayed onscreen for 3 seconds. Participants were presented 
with the following trials, B > A, C > B, D > C, E > D. All images were 
counterbalanced across trials and presented in a quasi-random order. Participants 
were required to make 12 consecutive correct responses to meet the training 
criterion.
On completing arbitrary relational training, participants were exposed to 
arbitrary relational testing to test for the emergence of mutually entailed and 
combinatorially entailed relations. The format was identical to the training phase 
except for two major differences. First, participants were not given feedback after
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any responses. Second, participants were also presented with mutually and 
combinatorially entailed trials when presented with the less-than contextual cue. The 
relations that had been trained consisted of B > A, C > B, D > C, E > D, therefore it 
was expected that this would give rise to the following mutually entailed relations A 
< B, B < C, C < D, D < E. Additionally, it would also be expected that ten further 
combinatorially entailed relations would be derived. These relations were A > C, B < 
D, C < E, C > A, D > B, E > C, A < D, B < E, D > A, E > B.
In this phase, there were 4 trained relations, 4 mutually entailed relations, and 
12 combinatorially entailed relations presented. During the arbitrary relational test, 
each of these 18 trials was presented once. Participants were required to meet a 
criterion of a minimum of 16 correct responses out of 18 during this phase. If 
participants failed to reach this criterion after one block, they were re-exposed to 
Phase 1 (Non-arbitrary training and testing) and Phase 2 (Arbitrary relational 
training and testing) a maximum of three further times.
Phase 3: Training discriminative slot-machine functions. The purpose of 
this phase was to establish discriminative functions for two different slot-machines 
labelled with members of the relational network. Participants were presented with the 
following onscreen instructions:
You will be given two slot-machines to play. One slot-machine is called BIH 
and the other is called YUT. The computer will present the slot-machines one 
at a time for you to play. To play the machine, click the ‘Bet 1 ’ button and 
then click the ‘Spin ’ button. Your aim is to win as many points as possible. 
Good luck!
In this phase, participants were exposed to two slot-machines of differing 
probabilities, slot-machine labelled C from the relational network and slot-machine 
labelled X (a novel nonsense word). The slot-machines were grey with three reels.
To play a slot-machine, participants were required to click on the ‘Bet 1’ button, 
which automatically deducted one credit from the ‘Total Credits’ box situated above 
the reels, and made the ‘Spin’ button available. Clicking ‘Spin’ caused the three reels 
to spin for approximately five seconds before stopping. If three matching symbols 
appeared on the payoff line then the participant was awarded five credits in the 
‘Total Credits’ box at the top of the screen. If less than three symbols matched, then 
no further credits were deducted as one credit had already been lost in order to play 
the slot-machine. Participants started with 100 credits and the slot-machines were
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programmed such that all participants experienced wins or losses on exactly the same 
trials and ended with 155 credits. Participants were presented with each slot-machine 
on screen one at a time until they had played each machine 40 times. The slot- 
machines were identical in appearance except that slot-machine C was labelled with 
the nonsense word BIH and had a payout probability of 0.2 (i.e., it ‘paid out’ on 8 out 
of 40 trials). Slot-machine X was labelled with a novel nonsense word and had a 
payout probability of 0.8 (i.e., it paid out on 34 out 40 trials).
Phase 4: Transformation of discriminative slot-machine functions. The 
purpose of this phase was test for transformation of discriminative slot-machine 
functions when participants were presented with pairs of slot-machines labelled with 
members of the relational network. At the start of this task, participants were 
presented with the following onscreen instructions:
You will now be presented with some more slot-machines named after the 
nonsense words you saw in the previous task. Please select which slot- 
machine you would like to play by clicking the ‘Spin ’ button on your chosen 
slot-machine. You will not be able to see how many points you win on each 
machine, but the computer is still recording your score. Your aim is to try to 
earn as many points as possible.
Participants were presented with two slot-machines onscreen at a time and 
selected the machine that they wanted to play by clicking on the on the chosen slot- 
machine with a mouse. However, the reels did not actually spin and credit was not 
awarded or lost. The slot-machines were identical in appearance except for the 
nonsense word of each slot-machine that was situated just above the reels. The 
nonsense words were from the relational training procedures (A = VEK, B = JOM, C 
= BIH, D = CUG, E = PAF), with the addition of nonsense word YUT (stimulus X) 
from the previous slot-machine phase.
Participants were presented with all possible combinations of slot-machine 
and each combination was presented four times. There were 60 trials in this phase. 
The side on which the slot-machines were presented was counterbalanced.
At the end of this phase, participants were presented with a Likert scale and 
instructed to rate how likely they thought it was that a win could occur on each slot- 
machine. The scale ranged from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely). Participants rated 
each slot-machine by clicking on the number on the scale with the right button of the 
mouse on the scale that corresponded to each slot-machine.
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Phase 3 trained the discriminative function of low probability/payout 
percentage for slot-machine C. Phase 4 was designed to see if this function would 
transform in accordance with the relational network from Phase 2, such that 
participants would show greater preferences for slot-machines D and E, as D and E 
had been trained in the previous task as ‘more-than’ C, compared to slot-machines A 
and B, which participated in a derived relation of ‘less-than’ C. Given the network E 
> D > C > B > A, where stimulus C was trained as a low probability slot-machine, 
the following preferences were predicted (preference marked in italics): A - B ,  A -  
C, A - A  A - E, A - X ,  B -  C, B - D, B - E ,  B -X ,  C - D, C - E ,  C -X , D - E ,  D -  
X, and E -X.
It was predicted that given when slot-machine X was an option, this slot- 
machine would always be selected as participants had experienced the high 
contingencies of this slot-machine. It was predicted that with the exception of 
concurrent presentations of slot-machines E and X, slot-machine E would be the 
preferred selection over any other slot-machine as stimulus E was trained as the 
greatest stimulus in the relational network during arbitrary relational training. It was 
predicted that when presented with slot-machine D and C, slot-machine D and B, or 
slot-machine D and A, slot-machine D would be the preferred choice as stimulus D 
was trained as a more-than C, B, and A. When presented with slot-machines C and 
B, or C and A, it was predicted that slot-machine C would be selected as C is greater 
than B and A. Finally, when presented with slot-machine B and slot-machine A it 
was predicted that slot-machine B would be selected as stimulus B was greater than 
A.
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Phase 1: Non-arbitrary relational training.
§§§ OC-O
X /
More Less More Less
Phase 2: Arbitrary relational training.
E > D > C > B > A
Trained More
A
More 
C /  B
More
C
More
e ' '  0
Tested Less
X
A B
Less
X
B C
Less
X
C D
Less
X
D E
Less
X
A C
Less
X
B D
Less
X
C E
More
X
C A
More
X
D B
More
X
E C
Less
X
A D
Less
X
B E
More
X
D A
CD
0)Os\
LU
Phase 3: Training of discriminative slot machine functions.
E > D > C > B > A  N ovel stim ulus X
t t
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Phase 4: Test for transformation of function -  all combination of slot machines tinder 
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predicted slot machine choice.
A B B C c D D E E X
A C B D C E D X
A D B E C X
A E B X
A X
Co
rooO
<v(A
coQ.
<11 
fic
A B C D E X
Slot machine
Figure 5.1. Schematic experimental overview. In Phase 1 participants receive 
reinforcement for selecting the correct comparison stimulus, the words ‘more’ and 
‘less’ are used for clarity. In Phase 2, the arbitrary symbols from Phase 1 are 
employed as contextual cue for more and less to train the relational network of 
nonsense words. In Phase 3 stimulus C is paired with a low payout slot-machine and 
novel stimulus X is paired as a high payout slot-machine. In Phase 4, the table 
represents all possible combinations of slot-machines that were presented, and the 
graphical figure displays predicted preference for each slot-machine.
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Results and Discussion
Table 5.1.
Number of trials required for participants to reach criterion during the non-arbitrary 
and arbitrary training and testing in Experiment 9A._________________________
Participant Non-arbitrary Non-arbitrary Arbitrary Arbitrary
relational relational relational relational
training testing training testing
PI 15 10 84 7/18
10 10 25 11/18
10 55 49 11/18
10 10 41 11/18
P2 12 22 47 9/18
10 13 20 16/18
P3 57 10 114 16/18
P4 25 10 115 16/18
Mean 18.63 17.5 61.88 12.13
SD 16.33 15.71 37.73 3.48
Table 5.1 above shows that all participants completed the non-arbitrary 
relational training and testing. Only PI failed to complete the arbitrary relational 
training tasks within four exposures to the task, therefore did not proceed to Phase 3 
of the experiment. P3 and P4 completed the experiment after only one exposure to 
each task. Figure 5.2 below shows each participant’s individual slot-machine choices 
during Phase 4 of the experiment. The slot-machine choices for P2 and P3 are in 
accordance with the relational network of nonsense words that was trained in the 
arbitrary relational training task with slot-machine A having never been selected and 
slot-machine E being the most preferred slot-machine regarding slot-machines from 
the relational network. Both P2 and P3 selected slot-machine E on 16 out of 20 trials. 
This means that the only occasions in which slot-machine E was not selected was 
when concurrently presented with slot-machine X. Given that participants had been 
exposed to the high payout contingencies of slot-machine X during Phase 3, it had 
been predicted that slot-machine X would be the most preferred slot-machine. P4 
however did not select slot-machine X at all during phase 4. The slot-machine 
choices for P4 show that slot-machine A was the least preferred of the slot-machines
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from the network. Slot-machines C, D and E were each selected 16 times during 
Phase 4 suggesting equal preference.
Figure 5.2 displays the mean response allocation across all participants. The 
general trend is that slot-machine A is the least preferred slot-machine and slot- 
machine E is the most preferred slot-machine, with a clear pattern o f preference 
which increases in accordance with the trained relational network demonstrating a 
transformation o f the discriminative slot-machine functions.
E > D > C > B > A
P2 P3
a lJ l  L u lll
B C D E X  A B C D E X
Slot machine Slot machine
P4
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Figure 5.2 . Participants’ response allocation to each slot-machine under extinction 
during Phase 4 o f Experiment 9 A.
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E > D > C > B > A
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Figure 5.3. Mean response allocation during Phase 4 o f Experiment 9A.
Experiment 9A demonstrated that preferences for concurrently available slot- 
machines can be determined by a transformation o f discriminative functions in 
accordance with an arbitrary relational network. However, during arbitrary relational 
testing participants were only presented with each trial once. Given that the criterion 
for the arbitrary test was 16/18, participants could still meet criterion even though 
they had not learned to respond correctly to two o f the relations. Additionally, if  the 
participant had responded to one or two correctly by chance, then potentially only 14 
o f the 18 relations had been learned yet the participant may have passed the test 
without having fully mastered the task. To eradicate this problem, a modification was 
made to the programme for Experiment 9B so that so that each trial was presented 
twice.
Experiment 9B 
Method
Participants
Six participants, 4 males and 2 females, aged between 20 and 26 (M  =22.83, 
SD = 2.23), were recruited from across Swansea University. The mean SOGS score 
was 2.33 (SD = 1.51). Participants were compensated with £5 at completion o f the 
study.
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Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 9B was identical to Experiment 9A, except for 
the following two important differences. Firstly, in the arbitrary training task, the 
three second period within which participants had to respond was removed. Now, the 
next trial commenced after the participant responded. Secondly, in the test phase of 
the arbitrary training task, participants had previously only been presented with 18 
trials in each test phase. This meant that each combination of test trial was only 
presented once. To overcome this issue, participants were presented with 36 test 
trials in Experiment 7B so that each trial was presented twice. During the arbitrary 
relational test, each of these 18 trials was presented twice in a block of 36 trials in a 
quasi-random order. Participants were required to meet a criterion of a minimum of 
30 correct responses out of 36 during this phase. If participants failed to reach this 
criterion after one block, they were re-exposed to Phase 1 (Non-arbitrary training 
and testing) and Phase 2 (Arbitrary relational training and testing) a maximum of 
three further times.
Results and Discussion
Table 5.2 shows the number of trials that each participant required in order to 
complete non-arbitrary and arbitrary relational training. In Experiment 9B, all 
participants except for P7 completed the non-arbitrary training task and progressed to 
the arbitrary training task. P5, P8 and P9 only required one exposure to each task to 
meet criterion. P6 and P10 completed all training and testing tasks within 2 
exposures.
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Table 5.2.
Number of trials required for participants to reach criterion during the non-arbitrary 
and arbitrary training and testing in Experiment 9B._________________________
Participant Non-arbitrary Non-arbitrary Arbitrary Arbitrary
training testing training testing
P5 27 10 96 35/36
P6 670 10 168 19/36
35 10 72 32/36
P7* 40 10 - -
P8 15 10 132 32/36
P9 64 10 24 36/36
P10 26 10 24 19/36
21 10 24 33/36
Mean 11.25 10. 77.14 29.86
SD 225.86 0 57.91 7.60
*denotes that participant who terminated the experiment
Figure 5.4 shows each participants’ individual preferences for all the slot- 
machines when presented under extincion. It shows participants preferences for the 
slot-machines increase in accordance with the relational network. This effect is 
particularly apparent in P8 and P9, with slot-machine A being the least preferred and 
slot-machine E being the most preferred slot-machine from the network. P5, P8 and 
P9 never selected slot-machine A when presented under extinction, whereas P10 
only chose to play slot-machine A three times. P8 was the only participant whose 
slot-machine choices were in accordance with prediction on 100% of trials. 
Responding for P5 and P9 were as predicted on 93% and 95% of trials, respectively. 
The data from P6 and P10 show greatest deviation from the prediction, with correct 
responses seen across 80% and 84% of trials, respectively.
All participants showed greatest preference for slot-machine X. This was 
originally predicted, as particpants had direct experience playing slot-machine X 40 
times with a payout percentage of 0.8 (Phase 3). The data from P6 show that 
(excluding X which did not feature in the network) slot-machine C was the most 
preferred. During slot-machine function training, slot-machine C was trained as the
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low probability slot-machine; therefore, it is surprising that a preference would be 
seen for this particular slot-machine
E > D > C > B > A
P5 P6
. 2  16- 2  16-
Slot machine
B C D E 
Slot machine
P8 P9
.2  16-
™ 14-
.2 16-
™ 14-
Slot machine Slot machine
P10
2  16-
™ 14-
Slot machine
Figure 5.4. Participants' response allocation to each slot-machine under extinction 
during Phase 4 o f Experiment 9B.
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The general trend o f Figure 5.4 is that slot-machine A was the least preferred 
slot-machine and slot-machine E the most preferred slot-machine (when only taking 
into account the slot-machine containing stimuli from the relational network). Figure 
5.5 shows the mean response allocation for all participants during the final slot- 
machine phase in Experiment 9B. The results are particularly interesting as there is a 
very clear pattern o f preferences which increase in accordance with the trained 
relational network, clearly demonstrating a transformation o f the discriminative slot- 
machine functions. Participants only had a direct history o f playing slot-machine C 
and slot-machine X, yet when presented with slot-machines E and D under 
extinction, a preference was seen for slot-machine E despite never actually playing 
that slot-machine.
A B C D E X 
S lo t m ach in e
Figure 5.5. Mean response allocation during Phase 4 o f Experiment 9B.
A further experiment was designed in which participants were trained in the 
same network o f nonsense words except that during arbitrary training the less-than 
contextual cue is used instead o f the more-than cue. This results in the network A <
B < C < D < E, where stimulus A is still trained as the least in the network and 
stimulus E is trained as the greatest. The purpose o f this was to test whether the same 
pattern of a derived transformation o f discriminative functions would occur when 
trained using the less-than network.
E > D > C > B > A
5 201
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Experiment 10 
Method
Participants
Six participants, 4 males and 2 females, aged between 20 and 21 (.M — 20.2, 
SD = 0.45), were recruited from across Swansea University. The mean SOGS score 
was 0.5 (SD = 0.84). Participants were compensated with £5 at completion of the 
study.
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 10 was identical to that of Experiment 9B 
except that during arbitrary relational training the less-than contextual cue was 
presented instead of the more-than contextual cue. For example, in the previous 
experiments, given the more-than cue and stimulus A and stimulus B, the correct 
response that was reinforced would be selecting stimulus B. In the present 
experiment, given stimulus A and stimulus B and the less-than contextual cue, the 
correct response would be to select stimulus A. The network that was trained was A 
< B < C < D < E .
Given the network A < B < C < D < E ,  where stimulus C was trained as a low 
probability slot-machine, the following preferences were predicted (preference 
marked in italics): A -  B, A -  C, A - Z), A -  E, A -X ,  B -  C, B -  D, B -  E, B -X ,  C 
- D , C - E , C - X ,  D - E , D - X ,  and E -X.
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Results and Discussion
Table 5.3.
Number of trials required for participants to reach criterion during the non-arbitrary
and arbitrary training and testing in Experiment 10.
Participant Non-arbitrary
relational
training
Non-arbitrary
relational
testing
Arbitrary
relational
training
Arbitrary
relational
testing
P ll 18 18 84 18/36
26 10 24 20/36
14 10 12 17/36
10 10 12 36/36
P12 24 10 108 26/36
10 10 36 35/36
P13* 105 10 48 23/36
10 10 72 19/36
10 11 - -
P14 18 10 72 22/36
10 10 36 35/36
P15 20 10 84 35/36
P16 16 10 168 17/36
10 15 48 8/36
10 10 12 30/36
P17 245 48 - -
32 48 - -
10 48 - -
10 48 - -
10 36 - -
P18 25 10 72 32/36
Mean
SD
30.62
53.27
19.14
15.47
59.2
42.42
24.93
8.54
*denotes that participant terminated the experiment
Table 5.3 above shows that all participants except for P I7 passed the non- 
arbitrary relational training and testing. For this reason, P I7 did not progress to the 
arbitrary training phase. PI 3 voluntarily terminated the experiment prior to her third 
exposure to the arbitrary training task. The remaining 6 participants successfully met
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criterion responding for Phase 2 within four exposures to the task and proceeded to 
the slot-machine phases o f the experiment.
A < B < < 2 < D < E
P11 P12
2 16-
R 14-
.2 16-
Slot machine
B C D E X 
Slot machine
P14 P15
B C D E 
Slot machine
.2 16-
B C D E X 
Slot machine
P16
2 0 - i
Slot machine
Figure 5.6. Participants’ response allocations to each slot-machine under extinction 
during Phase 4 o f Experiment 10.
147
^n u p ie r  j
The figure above shows participants’ slot-machine choices during test for 
transformation o f discriminative function. Only PI 5 responded correctly in 
accordance with the relational network with slot-machine A being the least preferred 
slot-machine and slot-machine E being the most preferred slot-machine from the 
relational network. It is interesting that PI 1, P I2, and P14 showed preferences for the 
slot-machines that were the opposite o f the relational network. It is difficult to 
explain such responding, however, it may relate to the way in which the network was 
trained. For example, when presented with the less-than contextual cue followed by 
stimulus A and stimulus B, the response that is reinforced is selection o f stimulus A, 
as A is less-than B. Therefore, when concurrently presented with slot-machine A and 
slot-machine B, the participant has a history o f positive reinforcement for selecting 
stimulus A (resulting in the word ‘Correct’ being presented having selected stimulus 
A over stimulus B), making it more likely that slot-machine A will be selected. If this 
is the case, this may have implications as to whether the less-than cue was 
functioning as a contextual cue for less-than.
A < B < C < D < E
C 1 0 -
C D 
S lo t  m ach in e
Figure 5 .7. Mean response allocation to each slot-machine across all participants 
during Phase 4 o f Experiment 10.
Figure 5.7 shows that all participants showed increased preferences for slot- 
machine A with a gradual decrease for the slot-machines in the middle o f the 
network, with slot-machine E being the least preferred slot-machine. These findings
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are the opposite of what was predicted and transformation of discriminative functions 
cannot be said to have occurred.
A key limitation of Experiments 9 A, 9B and 10 was the design of Phase 4 in 
which emergence of transformation of functions is tested. In the RFT literature, tests 
for transformation of function are typically subject to a mastery criterion, so that if 
the criterion is not met during the first exposure to the transformation task, further 
exposures to the arbitrary training tasks are presented. This often has the effect of 
making the demonstration of predicted transformations of functions more likely 
(Dymond & Rehfeldt, 2000). Experiment 11 was designed to replicate and extend 
Experiments 9A and 9B by including a mastery criterion for the transformation of 
functions phase.
Experiment 11 
Method
Participants
Seven participants, 2 males and 5 females, aged between 19 and 21 (M =
19.57, SD = 0.79), were recruited from across Swansea University. The mean SOGS 
score was 1.71(57) = 1.25). Participants were awarded course credit on completion of 
the study.
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 11 was identical to that of Experiment 9B 
except that during Phase 4, if participants did not respond in accordance with 
predictions to at least 18 out of 20 trials, they were re-exposed to the entire task 
starting with non-arbitrary relational training and testing (Phase 1), followed by 
arbitrary training and testing (Phase 2), the discriminative slot machine function 
training (Phase 3) and finally re-tested for transformation of function (Phase 4). 
Furthermore, if participants’ slot-machine choices were as predicted on 18 out of 20 
trials, the two incorrect could not be the same trial type; otherwise participants were 
returned to the start of the experiment. Participants were only exposed to the entire 
experiment (that is, Phases 1 to 4) a maximum of three times. An additional change 
to Phase 4 was that each combination of slot-machines was only presented twice, 
instead of four times as in the previous experiments.
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Results and Discussion
Table 5.4.
Number of trials required for participants to reach criterion during non-arbitrary and 
arbitrary training and testing of Experiment 11._____________________________
Participant Non-
arbitrary
relational
training
Non-arbitrary
relational
testing
Arbitrary
relational
training
Arbitrary
relational
testing
19 14 10 84 31/36
11 10 36 28/36
10 10 12 28/36
10 10 24 36/36
20 14 10 144 25/36
10 10 24 30/36
10 10 12 33/36
21 115 48 - -
12 23 48 20/36
30 10 12 25/36
14 10 72 31/36
22 24 17 36 19/36
10 10 36 30/36
23 24 17 36 19/36
10 10 36 30/36
24 80 10 36 20/36
10 10 24 18/36
10 20 12 34/36
10 10 12 36/36
10 10 12 35/36
25 10 19 204 21/36
10 20 24 17/36
10 10 36 18/36
10 10 12 31/36
10 11 12 35/36
10 10 12 35/36
Mean 23.94 15.44 ‘ 56.6 24.67
SD 29.96 9.90 54.21 5.98
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Table 5.4 shows that all participants successfully passed the non-arbitrary and 
arbitrary relational training and testing. Although P21 passed arbitrary training, they 
terminated after one exposure to slot-machine tasks. The table shows the number of 
trials required to complete non-arbitrary and arbitrary relational training and testing, 
including any additional exposures to these tasks following participants failing the 
test for transformation of function. However, the mean number of trials required to 
meet criterion were calculated using only the data from the participants initial 
exposure to the task, as during any further exposures to these tasks mastery criterion 
has already been achieved previously.
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Figure 5.8. Participants’ individual slot-machine response allocation during Phase 4 
o f Experiment 11. Participants requiring more than one exposure to Phase 4 are 
shown where necessary.
Figure 5.8 shows that P20, P22, P23 and P24 all showed slot-machine preferences in 
accordance with the relational network therefore demonstrating a transformation o f 
function. Whilst P25 did not meet criterion for a transformation o f function, slot- 
machine choices were close to that o f the relational network in that slot-machine A 
was the least preferred, with slot-machine C, D, and E being the most preferred. P25 
selected slot-machine X very rarely which is unusual compared to other participants,
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who often select this slot-machine the most due to the high payout contingencies o f 
this slot-machine that are presented in Phase 3.
E > D > C > B > A
L i i lA B C D E X 
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Figure 5.9. Mean response allocation during Phase 4 o f Experiment 11.
Four out o f six participants met criterion for transformation o f function, that 
is, four participants emitted responses in accordance with predictions. In 
Experiments 9A and 9B where no criterion was set, only one participant in each 
experiment responded in accordance with predictions. Perhaps if  a criterion had been 
set for Experiment 10 then more participants would have responded in accordance 
with prediction.
Experiment 12 was designed to test whether participants would respond in 
accordance with prediction having been trained using the less-than cue, when a 
criterion during test for transformation o f  function was included. Additionally, 
participants were trained the opposite network to Experiments 9A, 9B, and 10 so that 
stimulus A was now trained as the greatest member o f the network and slot-machine 
E was trained as the smallest member o f the network. As Whelan et al. (2006, p .325) 
state “[if] relational frames are instances o f operant behavior, it follows that altering 
the baseline relational training contingencies will lead, in appropriate contexts, to the 
derivation o f newly entailed relations and the transformation o f functions in 
accordance with these relations.” Therefore, whichever stimulus from the derived 
relation is established as having the highest payout probability in the network, it is
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predicted that transformation of function will occur in accordance with that particular 
network. Whelan et al. (2006) were able to reverse the pattern of transformation of 
function that occurred via the relational network that was originally trained so that 
the stimulus that was previously trained as the highest-ranking member of the 
stimulus became the lowest ranking member of the network.
Experiment 12 
Method
Participants
Fourteen participants, 3 males and 11 females, aged between 18 and 23 (M = 
19.8, SD = 1.52), were recruited from across Swansea University. The mean SOGS 
score was 0.75 (SD = 1.06). Participants were awarded course credit on completion 
of the study.
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 12 was identical to that of Experiment 11 
except for minor differences during arbitrary relational training. Firstly, participants 
were given training with a reversed relational network to that employed previously 
such that stimulus A was now the highest ranked member of the network and 
stimulus E was the lowest ranked member of the network. This was achieved by 
conducting arbitrary relational training using the less-than contextual cue: E < D < C 
< B < A. During arbitrary relational training, participants were presented with the 
less than cue and the following four relations: E < D, D < C, C < B, B < A, 
generating the network E < D < C < B < A .  Given this network, where stimulus C 
was trained as a low probability slot-machine, the following preferences were 
predicted (preference marked in italics): A -  B, A -  C, A - D, A -  E, A - X 9 B -  C, B -  
D , 5 - E , B - X ,  C- D ,  C - E , C - Z , D - E , D - Z , a n d E - X
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Results and Discussion
Table 5.5.
Number of trials required for participants to reach criterion during the non-arbitrary 
and arbitrary training and testing in Experiment 12.__________________________
Participant Non-arbitrary
training
Non-arbitrary
testing
Arbitrary
training
Arbitrary
testing
P26 19 10 120 21/36
11 16 36 15/36
16 10 24 24/36
10 10 60 34/36
P27 14 38 96 17/36
14 10 12 18/36
10 10 12 26/36
10 10 23 19/36
P28 19 10 60 30/36
10 10 12 32/36
10 10 12 32/36
P29 41 48 - -
333 10 48 15/36
13 13 36 18/36
10 39 36 22/36
14 48 - -
10 48 - -
10 39 12 26/36
P30 12 10 71 26/36
10 10 13 26/36
10 10 24 21/36
10 10 12 21/36
P31 26 10 60 20/36
10 12 24 19/36
20 13 72 26/36
16 10 12 19/36
P32 27 12 36 26/36
11 10 12 27/36
10 10 12 26/36
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Participant
(cont.d)
Non-arbitrary
training
Non-arbitrary
testing
Arbitrary
training
Arbitrary
testing
P32 (<cont.d) 10 17 24 18/36
P33 10 10 84 17/36
10 13 12 16/36
10 10 36 17/36
10 10 12 18/36
P34 134 48 - -
16 21 72 19/36
49 10 24 24/36
11 10 24 33/36
10 24 24 36/36
10 10 24 33/36
P35 87 10 96 19/36
44 10 24 20/36
P36 10 10 144 19/36
24 15 552 22/36
11 10 48 19/36
P37 10 10 51 17/36
10 10 54 17/36
22 10 120 28/36
20 26 36 31/36
P38 10 10 12 32/36
10 10 24 31/36
39 10 60 19/36
10 10 48 17/36
P39 10 10 30 32/36
10 10 36 30/36
10 10 48 31/36
Mean 24.16 15.54 51.27 23.54
SD 46.77 11.48 77.43 6.01
Table 5.5 above shows that only five participants, namely P26, P28, P34, 
P38, and P39, passed the non-arbitrary and arbitrary relational tasks. All of these
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participants, except for P28, required four exposures to the task in order to meet 
criterion responding. P28 completed these tasks within three exposures. The 
remaining eight participants failed to meet criterion responding with four exposures 
to the task therefore were not given the slot-machine tasks.
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Figure 5.10. Participants’ response allocation to each slot-machine under extinction 
during Phase 4 o f Experiment 12. Participants who required more than one exposure 
to Phase 4 are shown where appropriate.
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Figure 5.10 above shows between-participant variability in slot-machine 
choices during the test for transformation o f discriminative functions. Only P26 
demonstrated a transformation o f  discriminative function in accordance with 
predictions. Although P37 did not meet criterion for Phase 4, greatest preference was 
seen for slot-machine A (excluding slot-machine X), which was in line with 
predictions. P28, P34, P38 showed increased preference to slot-machine E (excluding 
slot-machine X), despite the fact that stimulus E was trained as ‘least’ in the 
relational network. P28 never selected the highest ranked stimulus, represented by 
slot-machine A, during any o f  their three exposures to this phase. These findings are 
consistent with the findings from Experiment 10 which also trained the relational 
network using the less-than contextual cue and found that participants’ preferences 
for slot-machines were the inverse o f the trained relational network.
From Figure 5.11, which shows the mean responses across all participants in 
Phase 4, it is clear that no clear preferences were seen for any o f the slot-machines 
containing stimuli from the relational network. As expected, slot-machine X, labelled 
with the novel stimulus, was the most preferred slot-machine o f  all the slot- 
machines.
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Figure 5.11. Mean response allocation during Phase 4 o f  Experiment 12.
Despite the addition o f a criterion during Phase 4, Experiment 12 did not 
demonstrate a transformation o f  discriminative functions when the relational network
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was trained using the less-than cue. Experiment 13 was designed to see if 
transformation of function is more readily demonstrated when participants are 
trained using the more-than cue as the experiments in which the more-than network 
had resulted in a clear transformation of function, whereas when trained with the 
less-than cue this had not occurred. Reilly et al. (2005) reported higher levels of 
accuracy when participants were trained with the more-than cue compared to the 
less-than cue, so perhaps this accuracy extends to tests of transformation. Participants 
in Experiment 11 were trained with the same network as Experiment 10, with 
stimulus A and stimulus E the greatest and smallest members of the network, 
respectively.
Experiment 13
Given the unexpected findings of Experiments 10 and 12, Experiment 13 
employed the same network as Experiment 12 using the more-than cue in arbitrary 
relational training. Through non-arbitrary and arbitrary relational training, 
participants were trained the network A > B > C > D > E ,  using the more-than 
contextual cue. Given the network A > B > C > D > E ,  where stimulus C was trained 
as a low probability slot-machine, the following preferences were predicted 
(preference marked in italics): A -  B, A -  C, A - D, A -  E, A - X, B -  C, B -  D, B -  E, 
B -X , C - D, C -  E, C -X , D -  E, D -X , and E -X .
Method
Participants
Four participants, three males and one female, aged between 21 and 36 (M=, 
31 SD = 7.26), were recruited from across Swansea University. The mean SOGS 
score was 0.25 (SD = 0.5). Participants were awarded course credit on completion of 
the study.
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 13 was identical to that of Experiment 11 in 
which nonsense word A was trained as the greatest stimulus in the network and 
nonsense word E was trained as the smallest member. However, participants were 
trained using the more-than cue thus generating the relational network A > B > C >
D > E. It was predicted that when all combinations of slot-machines were presented 
under extinction, slot-machine A would be the most preferred slot-machine from the
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network, and slot-machine E would be the least preferred. Specifically, the following 
preferences were predicted (preference marked in italics): A -  B, A -  C, A -  D, A -  E, 
A -X , B -C , B -D , B - E , B  -X ,  C - D ,  C - E , C  -X , D -  E, D - X ,  and E —X.
Results and Discussion
Table 5.6.
Number of trials required for participants to reach criterion during the non-arbitrary
and arbitrary training and testing in Experiment 13.
Participant Non-arbitrary
relational
training
Non-arbitrary
relational
testing
Arbitrary
relational
training
Arbitrary
relational
testing
P40 63 10 252 18/36
10 16 24 21/36
10 10 24 32/36
10 10 47 26/36
25 10 48 31/36
10 10 12 22/36
10 10 36 30/36
P41 15 10 36 34/36
P42 10 10 60 36/36
P43 46 10 60 24/36
10 10 36 27/36
10 10 18 29/36
14 10 12 18/36
Mean 20.89 10.67 58.00 26.56
SD 19.62 2.00 74.70 6.75
All four participants passed the non-arbitrary relational training and 
progressed to arbitrary training and testing. Only P43 failed to meet criterion 
responding for the arbitrary relational test therefore did not proceed to the slot- 
machine phases of the experiment (Phase 3 and 4).
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Figure 5.12. Participants’ response allocations during Phase 4 o f Experiment 13. 
Participants requiring more than one exposure to Phase 4 are shown where necessary.
Figure 5.12 shows that all participants slot-machine choices transformed in 
accordance with relational network where A > B > C > D > E .  Regarding slot- 
machines containing stimuli from the relational network, all participants chose to 
play slot-machine A most frequently than any other slot-machine. Slot-machine E 
was not selected by any participants. P40 required three exposures to the non- 
arbitrary and arbitrary training and testing before meeting criterion for 
transformation o f discriminative function, whereas P41 and P42 only required one 
exposure. These results are consistent with Experiment 9A and 9B and Experiment 
10 in which arbitrary relational training took place using the more-than cue and slot- 
machine choices transformed in accordance with the relational network.
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Figure 5.13. Mean response allocation to each slot-machine across all participants 
during Phase 4 o f Experiment 13.
General Discussion
The present chapter demonstrated that discriminative functions o f slot- 
machines may transform in accordance with derived comparative (more-than and 
less-than) relations. Experiments 9A, 9B, 11, and 13 demonstrated a clear increase in 
preferences for the slot-machines labelled with the highest ranking stimuli from the 
relational network. The slot-machine preferences o f participants in Experiments 10 
and 12 did not, however, demonstrate transformation o f  function, and the possible 
reasons for this will be discussed below.
Experiments 9A, 9B, 11, and 13, are consistent with the existing literature on 
the transformation o f functions through derived relations o f more-than and less-than 
(e.g., Dougher et al., 2007; Whelan et al. 2006). The present study is consistent with 
Dougher et al.’s (2007) findings on operant discrimination transformation (schedule 
performance) and adds to it the demonstration o f transformation involving selections 
of, and preferences for, concurrently presented slot-machines labelled with members 
o f the relational network. As such, the findings are the first to show a transformation 
o f gambling-relevant stimulus functions in accordance with derived comparative 
relations and thus support and extend RFT studies on gambling (e.g., Dymond et al., 
2011).
The findings may explain why individuals show preferences for slot- 
machines without having ever experienced a win on that machine (Dixon & Delaney,
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2006). Participants in the present experiments never actually experienced the payout 
contingencies of the slot-machines from the network, with the exception of slot- 
machine C, yet demonstrated particular preferences for these machines. These 
preferences can only be explained in terms of a transformation of discriminative 
function in accordance with derived relations.
The present study adds much needed empirical support to the proposal that 
verbal behaviour is integral to explaining gambling behaviour (Dixon & Delaney, 
2006; Dymond & Roche, 2010). Dymond et al. (2011) explain that the slot-machine 
preferences emitted by participants are “a derived outcome in much the same way as 
playing an unfamiliar slot-machine that is described as “hotter” than another: the 
behavioral processes that mediate this behavior are, according to contemporary 
behavior analytic accounts, identical” (Dymond et al., p.9). Furthermore, these 
findings highlight that accounts of gambling behaviour which do not extend beyond 
schedules of reinforcement, can only partially explain gambling behaviour (Dymond 
& Roche, 2010; Dymond et al., 2011), as structural characteristics of a slot may 
machine may participate in derived relations and influence gambling behaviour 
accordingly.
The present findings may question the cognitive accounts of gambling that 
individuals who gamble do so due to an inherent gambler’s fallacy or a cognitive 
distortion (Dixon et al., 2009). A cognitive explanation of the present experiment 
may suggest that it was a cognitive distortion which resulted in participants showing 
preferences for the slot-machines containing the higher-ranking stimuli (e.g. 
Joukhador, Blaszczynski, & Maccallum, 2004; Tonneatto et al., 1997), despite 
having never actually experiencing the contingencies of these slot-machines. 
However, what is most likely is that participants’ slot-machine choices in 
Experiments 9A, 9B, 11, and 13 came to be controlled by the contingencies arranged 
by the experimenter and were not due to unpredicted variables such as repeated 
exposure to the pairs of slot-machines. Experimental control was demonstrated in 
that participants who were trained on the network A > B > C > D > E ,  showed 
greatest preference for slot-machine A, whereas the participants who were trained on 
the network E > D > C > B > A  showed greatest preference for slot-machine E. In 
each case, there were no particularly salient or enticing features of stimuli A or E 
and, thus, the ranked preferences can only be accounted for in terms of a 
transformation of function in accordance with the relational network. If it is possible
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to bring such preferences under experimental control as was demonstrated in the 
current study, then it is feasible that other aspects of gambling behaviour may not be 
the result of cognitive distortions intrinsic to the gambler, but rather are a verbal 
event which can be manipulated (Dixon et al., 2009).
There are limitations to the present studies, as transformation of 
discriminative function in accordance with prediction was not seen in Experiments 
10 and 12. It is noteworthy that the experiments in which a transformation of 
function was not seen were the experiments in which participants received less-than 
training. Although no published findings have reported differences in transformation 
of functions in accordance with more-than and less-than relations, differences have 
been found in the training of these relations. Reilly et al. (2005) found higher levels 
of accuracy in participants who were given the more-than training compared to the 
less-than training. It is possible that this may have been a contributing factor to the 
transformation results in the less-than experiments. The mean number of exposures 
to complete non-arbitrary and arbitrary relational training and testing were slightly 
lower when trained with the more-than cue (2 and 1.33 for Experiments 9A and 9B, 
respectively) than when trained using the less-than cue (2.17 and 3.2 for Experiments 
10 and 12, respectively).
Future directions for research may include a replication of the present 
experiment in which the arbitrary test in which mutual and combinatorial entailed 
trials were presented is removed, and instead the slot-machine trials are presented 
immediately following the completion of the arbitrary training. This would help 
determine whether the arbitrary test is necessary to obtain a transformation of 
function. Another issue that warrants further empirical attention would be to 
implement a reversal design in which participants are initially trained on the network 
A > B > C > D > E, then following exposure to the slot-machines, participants are 
trained on the network E > D > C > B > A .  Participants should initially show a 
preference for slot-machines A and B, however following the second arbitrary 
training preference should now be shown for slot-machines E and D. Such an 
extension would allow for a more robust demonstration of experimental control 
(Whelan & Bames-Holmes, 2004).
In conclusion, preferences for concurrently available slot-machines may be 
transformed in accordance with derived comparative relations, indicating that verbal 
behaviour may influence the way in which individuals gamble. This suggests that an
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individual may choose to play a particular slot machine due to the presence of a 
particular structural characteristic, such as a familiar symbol or image, regardless of 
the contingencies of reinforcement of that slot machine. Given that structural 
characteristics of slot machines also encompass features such as sounds, bill payment 
options and the use of the near-miss, it is possible that properties of these 
characteristics may also participate in derived relations and the transformation of 
function and influence the way in which people play slot machines. This would 
require further empirical investigation.
^napier o
Chapter 6
Transformation of Discriminative Slot-Machine Functions: Altering Win, Loss
and “Near-Miss” Outcome Ratings
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The phenomenon of the ‘near-miss’ was first described by Langer (1975) and 
describes when two out of three matching symbols occur on the payout line of a slot- 
machine. Skinner (1953) proposed that near-misses may act as conditioned 
reinforcers, stating that “almost hitting the jackpot increases the probability that the 
individual will play the machine, although this reinforcement costs the owner of the 
device nothing” (Skinner, 1953, p. 397). This conditioned reinforcement effect is 
said to increase gambling persistence. In a game of skill, near-misses may be useful 
for a player by giving important feedback about the individual’s technique which 
enables improvement, and increases their chance of winning (Ghezzi, Wilson, & 
Porter, 2006; Griffiths, 1999). However, playing slot-machines involve no skill; 
therefore, a near-miss may give misleading information regarding the gambler’s 
chances of winning in future (Ghezzi et al., 2006).
Because near-misses consist of two out of three matching symbols, visually 
they appear closer to a win than no matching symbols. Indeed, gamblers do not 
always accurately attribute near-miss trials as losses (Griffiths, 1991). Dixon and 
Schreiber (2004) presented undergraduate participants with an actual casino slot- 
machine and analysed the verbalisations they emitted while gambling. It was found 
that all participants produced verbal statements indicating that they believed a near- 
miss was closer to a win, suggesting that participants viewed near-misses and total 
losses as distinct. Dixon and Schreiber (2004) reported that individuals perceived 
near-misses as ‘almost winning’. A limitation of their study’s findings was the 
reliance on self-report measures. There is, however, evidence that a difference in 
physiological responding occurs when gamblers are presented with a near-miss 
outcome compared to a total loss outcome. Griffiths (1993) reported that 
participants’ heart rate increased for both wins and near-misses when playing slot- 
machines, suggesting that the physiological effects of a near-miss more closely 
resembled those of a winning trial, and not of a losing trial. Clark, Crooks, Clarke, 
Aitken and Dunn (2011) provided further support for these findings by measuring 
both heart rate and electrodermal activity (EDA) as participants played simulated 
slot-machines. It was found that although near-misses were rated as being more 
unpleasant than a total loss trial, a near-miss was associated with increased heart rate 
and EDA, which was comparable to a winning trial (Clarke et al., 2011).
Qi, Ding, Song, and Yang (2011) compared ratings of wins, near-misses and 
losses, with electrophysiological activity by measuring event-related-potentials,
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specifically feedback related negativity (FRN) and the P300. Measures of the FRN 
are thought to reflect good/bad evaluations whereas the P300 is associated with 
motivation and assessing probability (Qi et ah, 2011). It was found that although 
participants reported that near-misses motivated them to gamble more whereas total 
losses did not, measures of FRN did not find any electrophysiological differences 
between near-miss and total loss trials. However, measures of the P300 amplitude 
indicated that near-misses were more similar to the amplitude observed following 
wins, with the amplitude on near-miss trials exceeding those of wins. A functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study by Habib and Dixon (2010) revealed that 
when pathological gamblers were presented with near-misses, activation near the 
substantia nigra and ventral tegmental areas was the same as during presentations of 
winning trials. However, when non-pathological gamblers were presented with a 
near-miss, activation was similar to that observed in losing trials. Additionally,
Chase and Clark (2010) reported greater dopaminergic activity in the midbrain on 
near-miss trials in gamblers.
When near-misses are programmed, individuals will gamble for longer 
periods of time, compared to those who are not presented with near-misses (Cote, 
Caron, Aubert, Desrochers, & Ladouceur, 2003; Reid, 1986). Cote et al. (2003) 
found that participants who were presented with a mixture of near-miss and loss 
trials gambled for longer than those who were just presented with losses. In the first 
phase of the experiment an experimental and a control group played a three reel 
video lottery terminal for 48 trials. Nine of these trials were wins, 12 were near- 
misses, and 27 were total losses. In the second phase, participants were presented 
with up to 240 additional trials and instructed that they could terminate whenever 
they wanted. In the control group all trials in this phase were total losses, whereas in 
the experimental group, near-misses had been randomly distributed across 25% of 
trials. It was found that even though neither group experienced a single winning trial 
in the second phase, the experimental group played for a mean of 72 trials whereas 
the control group played for a mean of 54 trials (Cote et al., 2003).
There may be an optimum number of near-misses for persistence in slot- 
machine play. Kassinove and S chare (2001) conducted an experiment in which the 
percentage of near-misses varied across groups. Participants were first required to 
play a slot-machine for at least 50 trials in which a near-miss was presented on 15%, 
30%, or 45% of trials depending on the experimental group. Next, participants
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played the slot-machine under extinction conditions in which no wins or near-misses 
were presented. It was found that the group which had contacted 30% near-misses 
during the previous phase played significantly more trials in the extinction condition 
than the participants in the 15% or 45% condition. Kassinove and Schare (2001) 
suggested that for the participants in the 15% group, the near-miss was not followed 
by a win frequently enough for the near-miss to be reinforcing, whereas for those in 
the 45% trial, the effect of the near-miss was effectively lost as a result of extinction.
Ghezzi et al., (2006) however, reported findings that challenged those of 
Kassinove and Schare (2001). In an initial forced exposure phase, participants were 
required to play a slot-machine in which winning spins were presented on 40% of 
trials, with the remaining 60% of trials resulting in a losing spin consisting of a 
combination of near-misses and losses. The number of forced exposure trials was 
varied such that participants played 25, 50, 75, or 100 trials. At the end of this phase, 
participants were presented with a choice phase in which they could continue playing 
the slot-machines for as long as they wished. The number of near-misses presented 
were then varied, so that a near-miss occurred on 0%, 33%, 66%, or 100% of trials. It 
was found that participants who were presented with 66% near-miss trials showed 
most persistence, that is, played the most trials during the choice phase. However, 
when the number of choice trials played was analysed in accordance with the number 
of forced exposure trials given, the group that had been presented with 66% near- 
miss trials were not always the group which showed most persistence. For example, 
those participants who had been presented with 100 forced exposure trials and 33% 
near-misses in the choice phase played for longer than those who had been presented 
with 66% near-misses. Ghezzi et al. (2006) concluded that more research was needed 
on the conditions under which the near-miss prolongs gambling.
Maclin et al. (2007) manipulated the percentage of near-misses and measured 
participants’, preferences for different slot-machines rather than persistence at 
gambling. Participants were concurrently presented onscreen with three computer- 
simulated slot-machines which were of identical payout probability with every fifth 
trial resulting in a win. Near-misses were either presented on 15%, 30% or 45% of 
trials. Participants could freely switch between the three slot-machines across 100 
trials. In a second, optional phase, participants were re-presented with the slot- 
machines but under extinction conditions, therefore every trial was a total loss trial. It 
was found that in the first phase participants on average, showed most preference for
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the slot-machine that resulted in 45% near-misses, with least preference being shown 
for the 30% slot-machine. The difference in preferences was fairly small (Maclin et 
al., 2007).
It has been suggested that the near-miss may, in fact, be a verbal event 
(Dixon & Schreiber, 2004) which can be manipulated and altered (Dixon et al,
2009). If the effects of the near-miss on gambling persistence and the other measures 
described function as verbal events, then it follows that the stimuli that make up a 
near-miss display may themselves participate in derived relations. Dixon et al. (2009) 
demonstrated that the stimuli associated with the near-miss may be altered in 
accordance with equivalence relations. Specifically, when an image depicting a near- 
miss on a slot-machine participated in a derived same relation with the word “loss”, 
participants subsequent ratings for the near-miss decreased (Dixon et al., 2009).
Experiment 14
The study by Dixon et al. (2009) indicated that it is possible to alter the 
ratings of how close the near-miss is to a win. This suggests that the effect of the 
near-miss is not due to an inherent or permanent trait within the gambler, but is a 
phenomenon that can be altered and even weakened (Dixon et al., 2009). If it can be 
shown that the near-miss participates in derived relations, then the discriminative 
functions of wins, near-misses and losses may come to be transformed in accordance 
with the specified derived relations. The present experiments were designed to 
extend the findings of Dixon et al. (2009) by examining whether the discriminative 
functions of different slot-machine outcomes can be transformed in accordance with 
the derived relations of same and opposite.
In Experiment 14, participants were trained and tested in same and opposite 
arbitrary relations (Al is same as Bl, Al is same as Cl, Al is opposite B2, Al is 
opposite C2). Next, participants played a simulated slot-machine in which the wins, 
total losses, and near-misses were made up of combinations of the Bl stimulus from 
arbitrary training and testing. In the final phase, participants were presented with 
images depicting slot-machine outcomes of wins, near-misses and losses that 
consisted of the Cl and C2 stimuli, and asked to rate how close each image was to a 
win. It was predicted that participants would rate the Cl near-miss image as being 
closer to a win than the C2 near-miss image.
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Method
Participants
Fifteen participants, six males and nine females, aged between 22 and 36 (M 
= 29, SD=4), were recruited from Swansea University. Participants were 
administered the SOGS (Lesieur & Blume, 1987), which provides a measure of 
gambling history with scores between 3 and 5 indicative of potential problem 
gambling and scores of 6 and above indicative of potential pathological gambling. 
The mean SOGS score was 0.2 (SD = 0.63).
Apparatus
The experiment took place in a small room containing a desk, a desktop 
computer with 24-inch display, full-sized keyboard and a two-button click mouse. 
Stimulus presentation and the recording of responses were controlled by the 
computer, which was programmed in Visual Basic. Two stimuli were trained as 
contextual cues for Same (X) and Opposite ($). One nonsense syllable and six 
images similar to images that appear on slot-machine reels were employed as the 
stimuli for arbitrary relational training and testing (CUG, cherry, plum, lemon, 
watermelon, bell, and the number seven). From here on they will be referred to using 
alphanumerics.
Procedure
There were two conditions in Experiment 14; an Experimental condition and 
a Control condition. Participants in the Experimental condition were presented all 
phases (phases 1 to 4). The Control condition was only presented with Phases 3 and 
4 (therefore not given non-arbitrary or arbitrary relational training). Phases 1 and 2 
used a modified version of the Relational Completion Procedure (RCP) as reported 
by Dymond and Whelan (2010) and were similar to Phases 1 and 2 of Chapter 4. 
Participants were given a standardised information sheet and written consent was 
obtained. To begin the task, participants were presented with the following 
instructions;
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. You will be presented with 
a series o f images or nonsense words on the top half o f the screen from left to 
right. Then you will be presented with 3 images at the bottom o f the screen. 
Your task is to observe the images or words that appear from left to right and 
drag one o f these images or words from the bottom to the blank, yellow square.
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Click and hold the mouse over the image or word to drag it to the blank 
square. To confirm your choice, click 'Finish Trial’. I f  you wish to make 
another choice, then click 'Start Again'. Sometimes you will receive feedback 
on your choices, but at other times you will not. Your aim is to get as many 
tasks correct as possible. It is always possible to get a task correct, even i f  you 
are not given feedback.
To begin the first task, participants clicked a button at the bottom of the instructions 
page.
Phase 1: Non-arbitrary relational training and testing.
The first phase trained the contextual cues for same and opposite. Participants 
were presented with a screen which consisted of a grey section at the bottom third of 
the screen whereas the top two thirds of the screen appeared blue. The sample 
stimulus appeared at the left of the blue section of the screen; followed one second 
later by the contextual cue to the right (therefore appeared central) and after a further 
one second a third blank square appeared towards the right of the screen. One second 
later the three comparison stimuli appeared in the grey section of the screen below. 
The positioning of the comparison stimuli was randomised on all trials.
To make a response, participants were required to select one of the 
comparison stimuli, then drag and drop it in the blank square in the blue section of 
the screen. This made two new buttons appear below the comparison stimuli, with 
the options ‘Finish Trial’ or ‘Start Again’. Clicking ‘Start Again” resulted in the 
comparison stimuli being reset. Clicking the ‘Finish Trial’ button ended the trial, 
therefore clearing the screen and presenting feedback. A correct response produced 
the word ‘Correct’ whereas an incorrect response produced the word ‘Incorrect’. 
Once feedback had been presented a new trial commenced.
The sample and comparison stimuli in Phase 1 consisted of shapes or objects 
that differed along a physical dimension. For example, one stimulus set consisted of 
a tall tree, a medium sized tree and a small tree. A total of six stimulus sets were used 
during training, presented pseudorandomly. Once a participant responded correctly 
across ten consecutive trials, they progressed to non-arbitrary testing.
The non-arbitrary relational test was identical in format to training except that 
no feedback was given following trials and six novel stimulus sets were employed. 
Ten consecutive correct responses were required to complete Phase 1 and progress to
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Phase 2. If this criterion was not met, participants were re-exposed to non-arbitrary 
training. This cycle continued until participants met criterion.
Phase 2: Arbitrary relational training and testing.
The purpose of Phase 2 was to train a relational network of images using the 
contextual cues of same and opposite that had been trained during Phase 1. The 
network was identical to that trained in Chapter 4, with the exception of the actual 
stimuli used. The format of arbitrary relational training was identical to that of the 
non-arbitrary training trials, except that the stimuli were arbitrary, that is, did not 
differ along a physical dimension. All the stimuli used were images that commonly 
appear on slot-machine reels (specifically, cherry, plum, lemon, watermelon, bell, 
and the number seven) except for stimulus Al which was a nonsense word (CUG). In 
arbitrary training, sample stimulus Al was presented, followed by the contextual cue 
for same or opposite, and then the blank square. Following this the three arbitrary 
comparison stimuli were displayed at the bottom of the screen. Participants were 
required to select one of the comparison stimuli, drag and drop it in the blank square. 
On confirming their choice, feedback was given. For example, if presented with the 
contextual cue for SAME with sample stimulus Al, and the comparison stimuli Bl, 
B2 and X2, selecting comparison stimulus Bl was reinforced. There were four 
training trials in total, with correct response shown in italics: SAME/A1 [Bl-B2-X1], 
SAME/A1 [C7-C2-X2], OPPOSITE/A1 [B1-52-X1], OPPOSITE/A1 [C1-C2-X2]. 
Training trials were presented in eight trial blocks so that each trial was presented 
twice per block. A criterion of ten consecutive correct trials was required before a 
participant could progress to testing.
The purpose of the test phase was to identify whether participants could 
respond correctly to derived relations. The format of this part of the experiment was 
identical to that of arbitrary training except that no feedback was given. The 
following eight novel trials were presented during the test (correct response 
italicised): SAME/BI [Cl-C2-X2], SAME/C1 [57-B2-X2], SAME/B2 [C1-C2-X1], 
SAME/C2 [B1-52-X1], OPPOSITE/BI [C1-C2-X1], OPPOSITE/C2 [57-B2-X1], 
OPPOSITE/B2 [C7-C2-X1], and OPPOSITE/C1 [B1-52-X1]. The test phase 
consisted of two blocks of eight trials, with each trial being presented once during a 
block of eight trials. This generated 16 trials as each trial was presented twice. A 
criterion of 14 consecutive correct was required in order to pass the test and complete 
this phase of the experiment. If participants did not meet this criterion or if 14 correct
173
responses were made but these were not consecutive then the participant was re­
exposed to Phase 1, the non-arbitrary training. This cycle continued until participants 
met criterion.
Phase 3: Slot-machine discriminative function training.
The purpose of this phase was to present participants with displays of wins, 
near-misses and losses on a computer simulated slot-machine in which a winning 
trial always consisted of the Bl stimulus (Bl, Bl, Bl), a near-miss consisted of the 
Bl and XI stimuli (Bl, Bl, XI, or XI, Bl, Bl), and a loss consisted of one Bl 
stimulus with the XI and X2 stimuli (XI, Bl, X2, or X2, Bl, XI). Participants were 
presented with a block of twelve slot-machine trials consisting of two winning trials, 
four near-miss trials (two of Bl, Bl, XI, and two of XI, Bl, Bl), and six losing trials 
(three of XI, Bl, X2, and three of X2, Bl, XI). The number of wins, near-misses and 
losses were determined by the literature of the near-miss which has suggested that 
the optimum number of near-misses for persistence in play is approximately 30% 
(Kassinove & Schare, 2001). Ten blocks of trials were presented generating a total of 
120 trials. Following each block of trials participants were presented onscreen with 
three images of the payout line of a slot-machine which depicted different outcomes; 
a win, a near-miss and a loss. The winning image consisted of Bl Bl Bl, the near- 
miss image consisted of Bl Bl XI, and the losing image consisted of XI Bl X2. 
Participants were required to rate how closely they thought each image was to a win. 
A likert scale was presented underneath each image with a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 
was not a win and 10 was a win. Upon rating each image, a button appeared which 
said ‘Next’ and clicking on this button took the participant to the next block of slot- 
machine trials.
All participants started with 100 credits. To play the slot-machine required 
pressing the Bet 1 button which deducted one point from the total credits box, and 
then pressing the Spin button. Participants were awarded five credits for a winning 
spin. It was predicted that participants in both the Experimental and Control 
condition would rate the win slot-machine outcome images as being a win (i.e. 10), 
the total loss images as a loss (i.e. 1 or 2), and the near-miss images as being closer 
to a win than the total loss images.
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SpinBet1
Figure 6.1. Graphical representation of the slot-machine training phase.
Phase 4: Slot-machine outcomes ratings test
The purpose of Phase 4 was to present participants with images of the payout 
line of a slot-machine depicting wins, near-misses, and losses using combinations of 
all the arbitrary stimuli that had been presented in the arbitrary test. These were a Cl 
win (Cl Cl Cl), C2 win (C2 C2 C2), Cl near-miss (Cl Cl XI and XI Cl Cl), C2 
near-miss (C2 C2 XI and XI C2 C2), Cl loss (XI Cl X2), and C2 loss (XI C2 X2). 
Participants were asked to rate how close each image was to a win using a likert 
scale (where 1 = not a win and 10 = a win). Each image was presented five times 
generating a total of 40 trials. Due to a programming error, the C2 near-miss trials 
were not presented for Participants 1 to 4.
In Phase 4, it was predicted that participants in the Experimental condition 
would rate the slot-machine outcome images containing a stimulus Cl as being 
closer to a win than displays containing the C2 stimulus (as stimulus C2 participated 
in a derived opposite relation with B l.) It was predicted that participants in the 
Control condition would give all winning outcomes equally and all losing outcomes 
equally, regardless of the stimuli presented in each outcome. It was predicted that the 
Cl Cl XI and C2 C2 XI near-miss outcomes would be rated equally, and that the 
the XI Cl Cl and XI C2 C2 outcomes would also be rated equally. Additionally, it 
was predicted that the near-miss outcomes in which the matching symbols appeared 
on the left hand side would be rated more highly than those in which the matching 
symbols were on the right hand side.
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C1 C 1 C 1
C1 C1 X1
X1 C 1 C1
X1 C1 X2
X1 C2 C2
C 2 C 2 X1
X1 C 2 X2
Figure 6.2. All the combinations of slot-machine outcomes presented during 
Experiment 14.
Results and Discussion
Experimental Condition
Table 6.1 shows that all participants met criterion responding for non- 
arbitrary and arbitrary relational training and testing. Five participants, namely PI, 
P2, P4, P9 and P10, met criterion responding with only one exposure to the task. The 
participant who required the most exposures to the task was P6 who passed on her 
seventh exposure. The mean number of trials required to meet criterion was 2.6 (SD 
=  2 .22).
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Table 6.1. Number of trials required to meet criterion responding in the non-arbitrary 
training and testing (Phase 1) and arbitrary training and testing (Phase 2) of 
Experiment 14.___________________________________
Participant Non-
arbitrary
training
Non-
arbitrary
test
Arbitrary
training
Arbitrary
test
PI 11 10 13 14
P2 11 10 14 14
P3 79 10 17 6
10 10 10 8
11 10 10 8
10 10 10 10
10 10 10 14
P4 11 10 14 14
P5 13 10 12 12
10 10 10 14
P6 61 13 34 5
10 10 15 8
11 15 10 12
10 11 10 4
19 10 10 12
10 10 10 14*
10 10 10 14
P7 40 13 19 6
11 15 - -
10 10 10 9
10 10 10 14*
10 10 10 14
P8 11 10 14 13
10 10 10 14
P9 46 10 24 14
P10 18 10 12 14
Mean
SD
18.19
17.86
10.65
1.52
13.12
5.59
11
3.46
* indicates that although the participant responded correctly across 14 trials, these correct 
trials were not consecutive therefore participants were re-exposed to the task.
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Figure 6.3 shows that participants rated the near-miss outcome more highly 
than the loss outcome with the mean rating o f 4.93. The winning outcome was rated 
very highly, with most participants rating it as a win (10), whereas the total loss 
stimuli were rated at a mean o f 2.03. A Kruskal-W allis revealed a statistically 
significant difference between the ratings for the win, near-miss and loss where j i  
(2) = 102,/? = 0.001. A Dunn's Multiple Comparison Test revealed a statistically 
significant difference between the wins versus near-miss, the wins versus total loss, 
and the near-miss versus total loss.
Win Near-miss Loss
S lo t  m a ch in e  o u tc o m e
Figure 6.3. Mean ratings towards the win (B1B1B1), near-miss (B1B1X1) and loss 
(X1B1X2) stimuli across all participants during Phase 3 o f Experiment 14 where 1 
represents not a win and 10 represents a win. Error bars indicate standard error mean.
For each individual participant’s mean ratings, see Appendix 11. When the 
C l win stimulus displays (C l C l C l) were compared with the C2 win stimulus 
displays (C2C2C2), ratings differed significantly, U =  427.5, p  < 0.05 (/? = 0.0001). 
The Cl C lX I near-miss and the C2C2X1 near-miss outcomes differed significantly, 
U=  328,/? < 0.05 (/? = 0.0001). Moreover, the X1C1C1 and X1C2C2 near-miss 
outcomes were also significantly different, U=  325, /? < 0.05 (p = 0.0001) and, 
finally, the total loss stimuli also differed significantly, U — 840,/? < 0.05 (/? = 
0.0009). The two types o f win were then compared with four types o f near-miss, and 
two types loss, therefore forming three groups o f win, near-miss and loss, and tested 
for a statistically significant difference between the three groups. The Kruskal-Wallis 
test revealed that there was a statistically significant difference, j i  (2) = 102.4,/? =
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0.0001 between the win ratings, the near-miss ratings and the total loss ratings. A 
D unn's Multiple Comparison Test indicated that significant differences existed 
between the win group versus near-miss group, the win group versus the loss group, 
and the near-miss group versus the loss group. This is consistent with the ratings data 
following slot-machine function training (Phase 3) that near-misses are rated more 
highly than total loss outcomes.
o>cV-iro
c(0<1)
S lo t  m a ch in e  o u tc o m e
Figure 6.4. Mean ratings o f the slot-machine outcomes for Phase 4 o f Experiment 
14. Error bars indicate standard error o f the mean.
Figure 6.4 shows that participants rated the C2 slot-machine win outcome 
significantly lower than the C l slot-machine win outcome. The C1C1X1 near-miss 
was on average, rated more closely to a win than the C2 win outcome. The XI C l C l 
near-miss was rated more highly than the C2C2X1 near-miss. This supports previous 
research that near-misses in which the matching symbols appear on the left and 
middle o f the reel tend to be rated more highly than when they matching symbols 
appear on the middle and right o f the reel (Maclin et al. 2007; Strickland & Grote, 
1967). Additionally, the C l losing outcome achieved a similar mean rating to the 
C2C2X1 near-miss outcome. These data can only be explained in terms o f a 
transformation o f function in accordance with same and opposite relations, where C l 
participated in a derived same relation with B l and a derived opposite relation with 
C2, and given that B l was the stimulus that appeared as a win during slot-machine 
function training.
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Control condition
Participants' mean slot-machine ratings following slot-machine function 
training are shown in Figure 6.5. The mean ratings made by participants were 
consistent with the experimental condition with participants in both conditions rating, 
on average, a near-miss trial as closer to a win. A Kruskal-Wallis revealed a 
statistically significant difference between the ratings for the win, near-miss and loss 
where yp (2) = 104.8 p  = 0.001. A Dunn's Multiple Comparison Test revealed a 
significant difference between the win group versus near-miss group, the win group 
versus the loss group, and the near-miss group versus the loss group.
Win Near-miss Loss
S lo t  m a ch in e  o u tc o m e
Figure 6.5. Mean ratings towards the win (B1B1B1), near-miss (BIB  1X1) and loss 
(X IB 1X2) stimuli across all participants during Phase 3 o f the Control condition o f 
Experiment 14 where 1 represents not a win and 10 represents a win. Error bars 
indicate standard error mean.
Figure 6.6 shows the mean ratings made to the slot-machine outcomes that 
were presented in Phase 4. As predicted, participants rated the win stimuli as a win 
(10), and the total losses were rated as losses. With regard to the near-miss stimuli, 
these were rated more highly than the losses, with the near-miss where the matching 
symbols appeared on the left on the reel (e.g., C l C l X I), being rated more highly 
than those in which the matching symbols appeared on the left o f the reel (e.g.,
XI C l C l). A Kruskal-Wallis was conducted which compared all wins, near-misses 
and losses as three groups, revealing a statistically significant difference, j i  (2) =
119.2,p  = 0.0001. A M ann-Whitney U test did not find any statistically significant 
differences between any o f the control outcomes. These findings suggest that in the
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Control condition participants’ ratings were based solely on the non-arbitrary 
properties of the win, near-miss and loss, whereas the ratings made by participants in 
the Experimental condition were as a result o f a transformation o f function o f the 
arbitrary relations trained during Phase 2. This suggests that a non-arbitrary stimulus, 
such as a winning outcome, may acquire functions o f an arbitrary stimulus where 
some o f the properties o f that stimulus participate in derived relations. These findings 
seem to suggest that even the properties o f a slot-machine reel may be influential in 
gambling and that gamblers may regard certain near-misses as being closer to a win 
depending on the matching images that occur on the near-miss trial.
10 
9 
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Slot machine outcome
Figure 6.6. Mean ratings to each o f the slot-machine outcomes for Phase 4 o f the 
Control Experiment. Error bars indicate standard error mean.
Experiment 15
In Experiment 15, the number o f near-misses presented was increased from 
four out o f 12 trials, to eight out o f twelve trials. Research suggests that when more 
than 45% of trials are near-misses, the effect o f the near-miss diminishes therefore 
participants are more likely to rate a near-miss trial as a loss than closer to a win 
(Kassinove & Schare, 2001). It was predicted that if  the effects o f the near-miss 
diminished due to an increased frequency o f such trials, then this would result in a 
smaller difference in ratings between the C l and C2 stimuli being observed in the 
test phase.
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Method
Participants
Seven participants, five males and two females, aged between 26 and 38 (M = 
31 ,SD  3.92), were recruited from Swansea University. The mean SOGS score was 
0.43 (SD = 0.79).
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 15 was identical to that of Experiment 14 
except that during Phase 3 Slot-machine Function Training, participants were 
presented with two winning trials, six near-miss trials (three BIB 1X1 and three 
X1B1B1) and four total loss trials. There was no control condition in Experiment 15.
Results and Discussion
Table 6.2 shows that all participants met criterion for non-arbitrary training 
and arbitrary training and testing therefore proceeded to the slot-machine phases of 
the experiment. Participants P11,P13,P14, and PI6 met criterion responding with 
only one exposure to each task. The mean number of exposures to the entire task 
required to meet criterion for arbitrary testing was 1.67 (1.21).
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Table 6.2. Number of trials required to meet criterion responding in the non-arbitrary 
training and testing (Phase 1) and arbitrary training and testing (Phase 2) of 
Experiment 15.________________________________________________________
Participant Non-arbitrary
training
Non-arbitrary
test
Arbitrary
training
Arbitrary test
P ll 27 11 13 14
P13 18 10 14 14
P14 11 10 14 14
P15 13 10 29 10
10 10 10 9
11 10 15 14*
10 10 10 14
P16 21 10 14 14
P17 11 10 10 14*
10 10 10 14
Mean
SD
14.20
5.87
10.10
0.32
13.90
5.69
13.10
0.60
* indicates that although the participant responded correctly across 14 trials, these 
correct trials were not consecutive therefore participants were re-exposed to the task.
Figure 6.7 shows that participants rated the B1 win stimuli as a win. The 
mean rating for the near-miss stimuli was 2.83, which was not much higher than the 
ratings for the total loss stimuli (1.77). A Kruskal-Wallace revealed a statistically 
significant difference between the ratings for the win, near-miss and loss; (2) =
151.3,/? = 0.0001. A Dunn’s Multiple Comparison Test revealed a statistically 
significant difference between the win group versus the near-miss group, and the win 
group versus the loss group, but not the near-miss group versus the loss group, 
suggesting that participants rated the near-miss as closer to a loss compared to 
participants in Experiment 14. It is noteworthy that the mean near-miss ratings in the 
Experimental and Control group of Experiment 14 who had been presented with the 
same number of near-miss, were 4.93 and 4.68, respectively. These findings are 
consistent with previous research that presenting a higher frequency of near-misses 
results in those stimuli being rated as closer to a loss (Kassinove & Schare, 2001).
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Figure 6 .7. Mean ratings towards the win (B1B1B1), near-miss (BIB  1X1) and loss 
(X IB 1X2) stimuli across all participants during Phase 3 o f Experiment 15 where 1 
represents not a win and 10 represents a win.
Figure 6.8 below shows that the C2 win stimuli are not rated as close to a win 
as the Cl win stimuli, and that the Cl C l XI  near-miss is given approximately the 
same rating as the C2 win stimuli. There is little difference in ratings between the 
C2C2X1, X1C1C1, and X1C2C2 stimuli or the total loss stimuli. In comparison with 
the mean ratings data from Experiment 14, participants rated all the near-miss stimuli 
as closer to a win in Experiment 14 compared to Experiment 15. A M ann-W hitney U 
test found a significant difference between the Cl win and C2 win outcomes, U  = 90, 
p  < 0.05 {p = 0.0001), as well as between the Cl C l XI and C2C2X1 near-miss, U -  
274.5, p  < 0.05 (p = 0.0061). However, no significant differences were found 
between ratings for the total loss stimuli, U = 442.5,/? < 0.86; or the XI C l C l near- 
miss and the X1C2C2 near-miss, U=  420.0,/? < 0.6. A Kruskal-W allis compared all 
the win, near-miss, and loss outcomes as three separate groups. A significant 
difference was found between the three groups, y i (2) = 92.85,/? = 0.0001. A D unn's 
Multiple Comparison Test revealed a significant difference between the win group 
versus near-miss group, the win group versus loss group, and the near-miss versus 
loss group.
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Slot machine outcome
Figure 6.8. Mean participant ratings to the slot-machine outcomes for Phase 4 o f 
Experiment 15.
Comparison o f  Experiments 14 and 15
A Mann-Whitney U test found significant differences between the XI C l C l 
ratings in Experiment 14 and 15 ,U =  529.5, p  < 0.05 (p = 0.0197) and for the 
X1C2C2 near-miss U — 340,/? < 0.05 (/? = 0.0286). A significant difference was also 
found between the Cl loss image, U  = 498.5,/? < 0.05 (/? = 0.0037) across 
experiments. No statistically significant differences were found between the C l wins, 
the C2 wins, the C l C l XI o r  C2C2X1 near-misses, or the C2 loss image across the 
two experiments. This demonstrates that increasing the number o f near-miss trials 
may influence ratings for trials in which the matching symbols occur on the right 
hand side o f the reel, such that these trials are rated as being closer to a win when 
more near-miss trials have been presented. This suggests that when the numbers o f 
near-misses are increased, the reinforcing effect o f a near-miss trial being “close to a 
win” is weakened.
A Kruskal-Wallace test was conducted between the experimental condition o f 
Experiment 14 and Experiment 15 collapsed groups, which compared wins, near- 
misses and losses. A significant difference was found between the three groups, y i  
(2) = 190,/? > 0.0001. A Dunn's Multiple Comparison test was conducted as a follow 
up and found that statistically significant differences existed between the win versus
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the near-miss column, the wins versus the losses, and the near-misses versus the 
losses. These findings show that across both experiments participants rated total loss 
outcomes significantly differently than near-miss outcomes, even though both of 
these outcomes are in fact a losing trial. There were also significant difference in 
ratings for the winning outcomes compared to the near-miss trials, suggesting that 
although participants may rate a near-miss trial as closer to a win than a loss, these 
outcomes do not completely share the same properties of a winning trial and are 
viewed differently.
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General Discussion
Experiment 14 and Experiment 15 both demonstrated that discriminative 
functions of slot-machine wins, near-misses and losses may be transformed in 
accordance with same and opposite relations. Slot-machine outcomes containing 
displays consisting of the Cl stimuli were rated as being significantly closer to a win 
than outcomes containing the C2 stimuli. The Control group rated the Cl and C2 win 
stimuli equally, and the Cl and C2 near-misses equally, further strengthening the 
conclusion that results of the Experimental group were at least partially the result of 
transformation of functions. It was also found that the near-miss ratings in 
Experiment 15, in which the proportion of near-miss trials was increased, were 
significantly lower (i.e., closer to a loss) than the near-miss ratings in Experiment 14.
What is interesting about these findings is that the B1 stimulus was not 
trained as ‘better-than’ the B2 stimulus during arbitrary training, it was merely 
trained as ‘opposite’, and although the B1 stimuli were the images on the slot- 
machine during a winning trial, it was also present on losing trials. In other words, 
although the B1 may have come to represent a win, it could also be said that the B1 
stimuli could represent a loss. However, when it came to rating the Cl slot-machine 
outcomes (where Cl participated in a derived same relation as Bl), the Cl winning 
slot-machine was always rated as a win, whereas the slot-machine outcomes 
depicting a C2 win (C2C2C2) only achieved a mean rating of 5.5. To the novice 
reader this finding may appear surprising as this was a winning trial. However, this 
demonstrates that transformation of discriminative function in accordance with the 
derived relations exerted control over these ratings despite the fact that three 
matching symbols on a slot-machine is, unambiguously, a win.
The present findings support those of Dixon et al. (2009) that the near-miss is 
a verbal event that can be altered, and extends these findings by demonstrating that 
wins and losses may also be altered in accordance with derived relations. The finding 
that even ratings of the win stimuli may be altered in accordance with derived 
relations came as a surprise, as three matching symbols on a three-reel slot-machine 
is non-arbitrarily always a win. It remains likely, therefore, that the relations 
specified by the contextual cues exerted more control over behaviour than the non- 
arbitrary property of three matching symbols on a slot-machine being equal to a win.
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The wording of the questions used to obtain ratings of wins, near-misses and 
losses in the present study differed somewhat to the study by Clark et al. (2011). 
Upon initiating a trial, therefore before the reels had started to spin, participants in 
the Clark et al. study were asked before a third of trials, “how do you rate your 
chances of winning?” Once the reels had stopped spinning, participants were then 
sometimes asked “how much do you want to continue to play”. The wording of these 
questions differed considerably from the questions in the present study in which 
participants were asked how close they thought they were to a win. Additionally, 
asking participants to rate their chances of winning is likely to be influenced by the 
preceding trials as Dixon and Schreiber (2004) reported that following a near-miss, 
response latencies before initiating the next trial are more similar to wins than 
compared with losses. It is possible then that following a losing trial, participants 
may rate their chances of winning as higher, compared to following a winning trial.
In the present study, the wording of the question only allowed for participants to rate 
the structural properties of a win, near-miss, or total loss therefore does not inform 
how the near-miss may affect persistence in gambling or encourage the gambler to 
initiate another trial.
The current study supports the findings of Kassinove and Schare (2001) that 
presenting 30% near-misses was the optimum frequency of near-misses for 
persistence in slot-machine play, as participants in Experiment 15 were presented 
with a higher frequency of near-misses and tended to rate them as closer to a loss 
than participants in Experiment 14. Although Kassinove and Schare (2001) measured 
persistence in gambling and did not obtain ratings, both sets of findings seem to 
suggest that the effects are diminished when near-misses are presented on at least 
45% of trials.
In summary, Experiments 14 and 15 found that discriminative functions of 
wins, near-miss and losses of a slot-machine may be transformed in accordance with 
same and opposite relations, such that participants rated near-miss and losing images 
as closer to a win where the stimuli in that image participated in a derived same 
relation with stimulus B1 which had been appeared on the winning line of a 
computer simulated slot-machine.
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Chapter 7 
General Discussion
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Summary o f findings
Chapter 2 (Experiments 1 to 3) replicated previous findings (Hoon et al.,
2008; Zlomke & Dixon, 2006) showing that preferences for concurrently available 
slot-machines may often be subject to control by factors other than direct-acting 
contingencies of reinforcement. It was found that participants showed increased 
preferences for the slot-machine that was the same colour as the contextual cue for 
more-than. However, such effects diminished with extended exposure to the slot- 
machines.
In Chapter 3, it was found that the presence of experimenter-delivered 
accurate and inaccurate instructions influenced preferences for concurrently available 
slot-machines. Experiment 4 showed that when given Minimal or Unspecified 
instructions, participants allocated the greater proportion of responding to the slot- 
machine that participated in a derived same relation with the machine that had been 
rated as being of higher payout. In the Specified group, participants allocated greater 
responding to the slot-machine that had been specified, or instructed, as paying out 
more often that the others. In Experiment 5, when given accurate rules regarding the 
payout percentages, participants distributed responding relatively equally. However, 
when given an inaccurate rule, participants allocated greater responding to the slot- 
machine instructed as paying out the most. Additionally, participants given 
inaccurate rules gambled for longer.
Chapter 4 demonstrated that participants’ preferences for concurrently 
available slot-machines were transformed in accordance with same and opposite 
relational frames. In Experiment 7, participants showed a preference for slot-machine 
C2, which participated in a derived relation of sameness with B2 (via two 
combinatorially entailed opposite relations), which had been established as 
discriminative for high payout functions. When slot-machine B1 was trained as the 
high payout slot-machine, participants showed a preference for slot-machine Cl, 
which participated in a relational frame of sameness with Bl.
In Chapter 5 it was found that discriminative functions of slot-machines may 
transform in accordance with derived comparative (more-than and less-than) 
relations. Experiments 9A, 9B, 11, and 13 demonstrated a clear increase in 
preferences for the slot-machines labelled with the highest ranking stimuli from the 
relational network, with slot-machines labelled with the lower ranking stimuli being 
least preferred. However, the slot-machine preferences of participants in Experiments
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10 and 12, in which the network was trained with the less-than cue, did not 
demonstrate clear evidence of transformation of functions.
Finally, Chapter 6 demonstrated that discriminative functions of slot-machine 
win, near-miss and loss outcomes may be transformed in accordance with same and 
opposite relations. In Experiment 14, it was found that participants rated images of a 
near-miss outcome as closer to a win when the near-miss consisted of stimuli that 
participated in a derived sameness relation with the stimulus that had been presented 
as a win. On those instances where the stimuli from the near-miss outcome 
participated in a derived opposite relation, participants rated them as closer to a loss. 
Experiment 15 found that when the proportion of near-miss trials was increased, 
ratings for the near-miss were significantly lower (i.e., closer to a loss) than the near- 
miss ratings in Experiment 14.
Implications for a greater understanding o f gambling behaviour
It has been suggested that verbal rules may supersede the contingencies of 
reinforcement in gambling and increase the likelihood of future gambling (Weatherly 
& Dixon, 2007). Chapters 2 and 3 provided empirical support for this suggestion 
showing that gambling behaviour is not solely maintained by contingencies of 
reinforcement. Chapter 2 demonstrated that gamblers may generate self-rules 
regarding the structural characteristics of a slot-machine which may in turn influence 
choice over concurrent slot-machines that are identical in payout probability. It is 
possible that inaccurate self-rules such as these may develop when an individual is 
gambling and may persist even when these rules are not reinforced (Hoon et al., 
2007). Chapter 3 showed that externally-delivered rules can influence preferences 
towards two slot-machines that are identical in payout probability, even when the 
rule does not accurately describe the schedule in place. Additionally, it was found 
that when inaccurate rules overstated the likelihood of a slot-machine paying out, 
participants gambled for longer periods of time compared to those who were told that 
the slot-machines were of equal payout probability. These findings are important 
because in a casino environment a gambler is presented with many verbal stimuli, 
whether from a fellow gambler stating how often they think a particular slot-machine 
pays out, or perhaps a sign in the casino claiming how “loose” the slot-machines are 
(Dixon & Delaney, 2006). This suggests that if a gambler encounters an inaccurate 
rule, whether a rule the individual has conceived themselves or an externally
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delivered rule, these rules may have a detrimental effect on the individual and 
encourage them to gamble for longer. It may also reinforce fallacies about the 
likelihood of a slot-machine paying out when, in fact, the odds are stacked against 
them.
An additional problem that a gambler may face is discerning how often a slot- 
machine pays out. It was found that, consistent with Weatherly et al. (2009) given a 
relatively brief exposure to a slot-machine, participants were not always sensitive to 
the payout probabilities of that machine. In Chapter 3, following slot-machine 
function training, some participants rated one slot-machine as being more likely to 
payout than the other, even though these slot-machines were identical in schedule 
and magnitude of reinforcement. This, in turn, influenced choices of the preferred 
slot-machine when presented concurrently. This finding suggests that inaccurate 
perceptions of payout percentages may also influence slot-machine choice, and these 
functions may then transform the discriminative functions of other, arbitrarily and 
indirectly related slot-machines. In terms of casino gambling, this may result in a 
gambler continuing to play a slot-machine even though it has a poor payback 
percentage. Casino slot-machines are often programmed on different payback 
percentages; therefore, if a gambler is not sensitive to the difference in payback, they 
may continue to gamble on a machine which is less likely to pay out and lose much 
money.
Although it was found that schedules of reinforcement may not exert 
exclusive influence over gambling behaviour, it is possible that an interaction may 
occur between the self-rule or the externally-delivered rule and the actual schedule in 
place. In Chapters 2 and 3, the participants that were presented with prolonged 
exposure to the slot-machines seemed to show responding that was initially in 
accordance with the rule (for example, when given the rule that Cl pays out, slot- 
machine Cl is selected most), however, as the trials continued, these preferences 
diminished such that responding that was more sensitive to the matched schedules in 
place began to prevail. It is possible then that although the decision to gamble and 
which machine to play may initially be influenced by verbal rules, the contingencies 
of reinforcement in place may begin to exert control over behaviour (Dymond & 
Roche, 2010).
Overall, these findings suggest that rules, whether generated by the gambler 
or an externally delivered source, may override the schedule of reinforcement in
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place, thus influencing slot-machine choice and persistence in play. Specifically, the 
structural characteristics of a slot-machine may encourage a particular individual to 
choose to play that slot-machine due to the characteristic of that machine being 
associated with something positive in that gambler’s learning history (Dixon & 
Delaney, 2006). As well as the structural characteristics of slot-machines influencing 
slot-machine choice, it was shown that externally delivered rules may promote 
gambling by superseding the contingencies of reinforcement of a particular game, 
even when the odds are against the gambler. This suggests that signs, adverts within 
the casino, or even a friend in the casino, may have a detrimental effect on the way in 
which an individual gambles which may encourage persistence. Clearly, gambling 
involves more than just responding to the contingencies of reinforcement that are in 
place and although there is truth in Skinner’s (1953) claim that the variable-ratio 
schedules (or indeed random-ratio schedules; Crossman, 1988) in effect make 
gambling behaviour resistant to extinction, it cannot account for the behaviour 
demonstrated in many of the present experiments.
Although it has been shown that rules may influence gambling behaviour, the 
findings of Chapter 2 do not contribute towards a verbal account of gambling, as 
defined by RFT. In Chapter 2, the non-arbitrary relations of more-than and less-than 
were directly trained, for example, in the presence of blue select the less-than 
stimulus. Therefore when presented with a yellow or blue slot-machine, by selecting 
the yellow (more-than) slot-machine, participants were merely responding to the 
contextual cues that have been trained. Furthermore, for an organism to be 
considered to be responding verbally as defined by RFT, behaviour should 
participate, at least in part, in arbitrary relations and transformation of function 
(Hayes et al., 2001). The experimental designs in Chapter 2 did not require 
responding to these defining features of verbal behaviour.
Dymond and Whelan (2007) called for gambling research to be conducted in 
which a functional definition of verbal behaviour is employed and suggested that 
research involving derived relational responding would allow for “an empirical 
investigation of the intriguing possibility that, for verbally able humans, all gambling 
is verbal activity” (Dymond & Whelan, 2007, p.20). Therefore, experiments which 
allow for the study of gambling in terms of derived relational responding and 
transformation of function are necessary as they may be able to explain “how verbal
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processes might interact with and overcome, the directly experienced contingencies 
of games of chance” (Dymond & Roche, 2010, p.41).
Chapters 4 and 5 suggest that gambling may well be a verbal activity as it 
was demonstrated that the discriminative functions of slot-machines may transform 
in accordance with the derived relations of same, opposite and comparative relations. 
When participants could freely choose between concurrently available slot-machines 
under conditions of non-reinforcement, it was found that participants showed 
preferences for a particular slot-machine even though they had no prior experience of 
playing that machine, and no experience of the payout probability of that slot- 
machine. Therefore, although participants were not contacting the contingencies of 
reinforcement, arbitrary characteristics of the slot-machines participated in a derived 
relation with a slot-machine that had paid out often, therefore the discriminative 
functions of high payout were transformed to the novel slot-machine.
It is possible that just thinking about the winning slot-machine which was 
indirectly related to the novel slot-machine may have been reinforcing, thus 
influencing slot-machine choice (Dymond et al., 2011). These findings may explain 
how an individual persistently plays a particular slot-machine in the absence of any 
or very little direct reinforcement on that slot-machine (Dymond et al., 2011) or why 
a gambler may choose to play one particular machine despite there being many other 
slot-machines available which are identical in payout probability, but differ in some 
structural characteristic (Dixon & Delaney, 2006). Perhaps then, slot-machines 
which contain familiar themes, images and symbols pose a greater threat to the 
gambler as they encourage the individual to play a particular machine even when the 
contingencies of reinforcement may be at their disadvantage.
The present findings show that contemporary approaches to verbal behaviour, 
such as RFT, may help explain why gamblers show preferences for particular slot- 
machines without any direct history with that particular gaming machine. In so 
doing, they demonstrate that arbitrary, unrelated features of a slot-machine may 
come to participate in derived relations with other stimuli within an individual’s 
learning history and influence gambling behaviour. The stimuli on the slot-machines 
were arbitrary stimuli that is, the stimuli were not physically similar in any way and 
were not symbolic for a slot-machine paying out, yet because participants had 
learned that these stimuli participated in derived relations from an earlier, unrelated 
task; participants came to show preferences for certain slot-machines. In the present
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experiments, there was no direct relation between the characteristic of a slot-machine 
and the chances of it paying out, and no feedback was given from these machines, 
yet preferences for slot-machines could be determined depending on which stimulus 
appeared on the slot-machine. These findings suggest that gambling behaviour may 
be influenced by remote contingencies that are completely unrelated to the actual 
gambling situation (Dymond & Roche, 2010) and reveals just how complex the role 
of verbal behaviour may be in gambling.
As well as arbitrary properties of a slot-machine transforming through 
derived relations, ratings for non-arbitrary properties of a slot-machine may also be 
altered in accordance with derived relations. The discovery that ratings for wins and 
losses could also be altered in accordance with derived relations was not expected as 
the properties of these stimuli were non-arbitrary, that is, three symbols on a three 
reel slot-machine payout line is always a win, and three different symbols on a slot- 
machine does not resemble a win or look ‘close’ to a win. It is possible that these 
unexpected ratings were in part due to way in which these trials were presented, that 
is, the slot-machine outcomes were presented as images. This meant that participants 
were not actually experiencing a slot-machine but were merely rating images. It 
would be interesting to examine whether presenting a slot-machine in which the reels 
spun before landing on the same combinations of outcome images, would result in 
the similar ratings for those outcomes as was seen in Chapter 6 .
In the mean time, however, these findings further support the notion that 
derived relational responding and transformation of function may result in gamblers 
making evaluations about slot-machines that are at odds with the non-arbitrary 
properties of a slot-machine. Given that participants rated slot-machine outcomes 
differently depending on the stimuli that appeared on the reel, it begs the question as 
to whether gamblers might show preferences for slot-machines due to the images that 
are on the reels of that machine. For example, say a gambler holds the belief that 
seven is his lucky number. Will he then only play the slot-machine that contains that 
particular number on the reel, and equate a near-miss in which the number 7 appears 
on two of the reels as closer to a win than a near-miss consisting of any other 
stimuli?
Given that the findings of the present studies demonstrate that slot-machine 
choice participates in derived relations and transformation of function, this indicates 
that gambling is at least in part, a verbal event. This conclusion may provide an
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alternative explanation to the cognitive account of gambling that an individual 
develops a problem with gambling due to an inherent personality trait and faulty 
cognitions. Griffiths (1994) and Wagemaar (1988) claimed that faulty cognitions 
may predispose an individual to pathological gambling. Whilst cognitive accounts of 
gambling have contributed much to literature on gambling behaviour, it is possible 
that derived relational responding and transformation of function may explain how 
such cognitions develop. On the surface, Chapters 4 and 5 could possibly be 
interpreted as having demonstrated some of the irrational thinking that gamblers 
apply when playing a gaming machine, as continually selecting one particular slot- 
machine over another because of an arbitrary property of that machine being 
indirectly related to other slot-machines, seems to indicate irrational behaviour. 
Similarly, rating a winning outcome on a slot-machine as close to a loss, due to a 
property of that win participating in derived arbitrary relations, may also be 
considered illogical. Although this behaviour does seem consistent with the irrational 
cognitions account, these cognitions had effectively been manipulated in the 
participant by the experimenter. A behaviour analytic interpretation of this therefore 
would suggest that these cognitions were not an inherent trait, but rather participants 
were responding verbally, that is responding in accordance with relational networks. 
Therefore, these irrational behaviours were under experimental control, could be 
directly observed and had been manipulated by the experimenter, and were not due 
to an enduring trait of the participant. Furthermore, if developing a problem with 
gambling is due to faulty, irrational cognitions, then it might be expected that only 
the participants that met criterion for pathological gambling would show irrational 
slot-machines machine choices or make illogical slot-machine ratings. However the 
majority of participants were not problem gamblers yet emitted behaviour which 
without prior knowledge of the relational networks that had been trained, could be 
regarded as irrational or illogical. The implications of this are that, if such responding 
is verbal behaviour, then such behaviour is not a permanent trait of an individual and 
can be changed (Dixon et al., 2010). Additionally, the causal role of irrational 
cognitions on developing a gambling problem is called into question.
Implications for relational frame theory
The present thesis indicates that the fundamental principles outlined in RFT 
can account for those instances of gambling behaviour which may not be explained
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by direct contingencies of reinforcement in a gambler’s learning history.
Furthermore, these findings suggest that RFT can provide a means of conducting 
laboratory gambling research which may be able to describe aspects of real-life 
gambling and add further support to the RFT literature that verbal behaviour is a 
defining feature of human behaviour. Although gambling behaviour has not been 
‘solved’ as such through RFT explanations, the studies presented indicate that 
empirical RFT research can provide a worthy analogue of gambling behaviour.
The results of Chapter 6 raised a few questions regarding the extent to which 
non-arbitrary properties of a stimulus may participate in derived relations. Although 
there is little published work on the transformation of function of non-arbitrary 
relations, there is some evidence that derived relations may interact with the non- 
arbitrary features of a stimulus. Stewart, Bames-Holmes, Roche, and Smeets (2002) 
demonstrated that non-arbitrary properties of colour could be ignored when the 
colour conflicted with equivalence relations. Stewart et al. (2002) reported that when 
the colour of the sample stimulus conflicted with the colour of the correct 
comparison stimulus, participants ability to respond correctly was hindered, 
compared to participants who were presented with trials in which there was no colour 
difference between samples and comparison stimuli. However, Stewart et al. (2002) 
demonstrated that although the non-arbitrary properties of stimuli may interfere with 
arbitrary relations, participants were still able to derive relations that were at odds 
with these properties. Stewart et al. (2002) suggested that there may be certain 
conditions under which arbitrary and non-arbitrary relations interact such that 
although non-arbitrary properties may hinder responding to derived arbitrary 
relations, the non-arbitrary relation can nevertheless be overridden. Stewart, Bames- 
Holmes, Hayes, and Lipkens (2001) point out that “when relational frames are 
applied nonarbitrarily, the source of control is mixed. The relevant history involves 
both arbitrary and nonarbitrary features of the environment” (p. 89). In Chapter 6 , 
the images of the slot-machine payout lines could be considered as having both 
arbitrary and non-arbitrary properties: that is, there was an arbitrary relation between 
the individual stimuli, for example B1 was opposite to C2, but also when these 
arbitrary stimuli were presented on the payout line of a slot-machine, the stimuli 
were being presented in a non-arbitrary form (for example, B1 B1 B1 presented 
together is in the form of a win). For some participants, their ratings were consistent 
with the non-arbitrary form, for example C2 C2 C2, would be rated as a win,
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whereas other participants’ ratings were consistent with the derived arbitrary relation 
between the stimuli such that C2 C2 C2 would be rated as closer to a loss. This was 
due to stimulus C2 participating in a derived opposite relation with Bl, therefore in 
such cases the physical form in which the stimuli were presented was perhaps de­
emphasised.
In summary, RFT accounts of gambling behaviour provide a useful means of 
conducting translational research on gambling behaviour (Dymond & Roche, 2010). 
The present studies showed how verbal behaviour impacts upon slot-machine choice 
and win estimations of a slot-machine, however what is needed now is research that 
examines the role of verbal behaviour on other aspects of gambling (e.g. roulette, 
betting on horses, lottery gambling).
Towards a verbal account o f gambling behaviour
Table 7.1 serves as a summary and a reminder of the experimental methods 
employed in Chapters 3 to 6 . The table details the three different arbitrary relational 
networks that were established (that is, equivalence, same/opposite and more- 
than/less-than), the function that was tested, and the way in which the dependent 
variable was measured for each experiment.
Table 7.1.
Overview of the relational networks, and contextual cues established in each chapter.
Chapter Relational network Q d1 Cftmc2 Dependent
variable
3 Equivalence
relations
Sameness Discriminative: 
e.g. “B2 pays 
out more”
Concurrent
slot-
machine
choice
4 Al same Bl 
Al same Cl 
Al opposite B2 
Al opposite C2
Same and 
opposite
Discriminative:
payout
probability
Concurrent
slot-
machine
choice
5 A < B < C < D < E Comparative
(more-
than/less-
than)
Discriminative:
payout
probability
Concurrent
slot-
machine
choice
6 Al same Bl 
Al same Cl 
Al opposite B2 
Al opposite C2
Same and 
opposite
Discriminative:
payout
probability
Ratings of 
slot- 
machine 
outcomes
1 Contextual cue that specifies a relation
2 Contextual cue that specifies a function
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Chapter 3 demonstrated that presenting a rule about a slot-machine could 
influence responding on a novel slot-machine (see Figure 7.1). The only way in 
which this can be explained is by considering how the experimenter delivered rules 
may participate in derived relations. Given the rule “Slot-machine C2 pays out
with the instruction that it pays out more. Therefore, given the choice between slot- 
machine Cl and C2, preference was seen for slot-machine C2 over slot-machine Cl. 
However, in the control condition in which no rule had been presented, equal 
responding to these slot-machines was seen. This was due to the discriminative 
payout functions of slot-machine Bl and B2 in the earlier task participating in 
derived relations with Cl and C2, respectively. Where the rules were inaccurate, 
participants initially followed these rules even though they did not describe the 
schedules in place; therefore responding was under the control of this rule and not a 
transformation of function of the equal payout probabilities of slot-machines Bl and 
B2. In the rule-governed behaviour literature, following a rule under the control of 
social reinforcement is termed pliance. Although pliance may initially have exerted 
control over behaviour, as participants were repeatedly exposed to the contingencies 
of reinforcement, behaviour was no longer under the control of the rule and 
responding became schedule sensitive.
Equivalence training and testing:
more”, the actual slot-machine labelled C2 participates in a mutually entailed relation
A2
Bl < > Cl 82 < - ------->C2
Rule: This slot machine pays out more
Slot machine task:
Choose which slot machine you would like to play'
Slot machine Cl Slot machine C2
r ..............
Slot machine C2 
must pay out 
more!
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Figure 7.1. Overview of the experimental procedure in Chapter 3. Solid lines 
indicate a trained relation whereas dashed lines indicate a derived relation.
In Chapters 4 and 5, participants showed preferences for slot-machines that 
not only did they have no prior experience of playing, but they were unable to 
decipher the payout probability of their preferred slot-machine. These findings can 
only be explained when we consider that the stimuli on the slot-machines had, in a 
prior task, participated in derived same and opposite relations (Chapter 4) or more- 
than and less-than relations (Chapter 5) with other stimuli. In Chapter 4, participants 
had derived that Bl was the same as Cl, Bl was opposite to C2, and B2 was the 
same as C2. Then, having played slot-machine Bl and slot-machine B2 and learned 
that “B2 always pays out”, when later presented with a choice between slot-machine 
Cl and C2, participants chose to exclusively play slot-machine C2 as stimulus C2 
participated in a derived same relation with B2. This shows how individuals relate 
events, even when they are not necessarily related, and that any functions that have 
become associated with that event such as “this slot-machine must pay out more” or 
“I will win on this slot-machine” transform to those seemingly unrelated stimuli.
See Chapter 4 for diagram of the relational network that was trained and tested.
Slot-machine tasks
Slot-machine Bl Slot-machine B2
0.2 payout probability 0.8 payout probability
"Choose which slot-machine you would like to play"
Slot-machine Cl Slot-machine C2
Slot-machine C2 
must payout 
more!
Figure 7.2. Overview of experimental procedure in Chapter 4.
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In Chapter 5 (see Figure 7.3), participants’ preferences for slot-machines 
were transformed in accordance with more-than and less-than relations. These 
findings were particularly interesting as they suggest that preferences for slot- 
machines may be relative. Having been trained a relational network in which A < B 
< C < D < E, slot-machine A will be the least preferred whereas slot-machine E will 
be the most preferred, however, given the choice between slot-machine B and C, 
slot-machine C will most likely be chosen, but given a choice between slot-machine 
C and slot-machine D, slot-machine C will not be chosen as slot-machine D is ranked 
more highly in the network. This suggests that in a casino environment, a gambler 
may rank their preference of the slot-machines available to him by the structural 
characteristics of those machines, and not due to the payout probabilities of the slot- 
machines available.
Arbitrary training and testing:
A < I J < C < D < E  X
0.2 payout probability 0.8 payout probability
Slot machine tasks:
"Choose which slot machine you would like to play"
Slot machineB Slot machine D
Slot machine D 
must pay out 
morel
Figure 7.3. Overview of experimental procedure in Chapter 5.
In Chapter 6 (see Figure 7.4), it was demonstrated that ratings for images of 
wins, near-misses and losses could be transformed in accordance with derived same 
and opposite relations to the extent to which the ratings made by participants 
conflicted with the non-arbitrary property of the slot-machine. As with Chapters 4 
and 5, participants were responding verbally to these images, that is, their behaviour 
could only be accounted by appealing to the derived relations that had been learned
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in the arbitrary training and testing task. These findings suggest that even the non- 
arbitrary property of a slot-machine may be overruled by the way in which those 
properties are related to other events within that individual’s learning history.
See Chapter 4 for diagram of the relational network that was trained and tested. 
Training of discriminative slot-machine function
Slot-machine ratings test
"How close do you think this is to a win?"
Slot-machines 
containing Cl must 
be closer to a win
Figure 7.4. Overview of the experimental procedure in Chapter 6 .
The present thesis has demonstrated that gambling behaviour may be under 
the control of derived relations and transformation of function, but how does this 
translate to real-world gambling? Consider the gambler who goes to a casino in Las 
Vegas. She is faced with many choices regarding which casino to enter. What factors 
influence this choice? Perhaps there is casino a called the “Goldengate casino”. For 
this individual the words “golden” or “gold” may participate in a frame of co­
ordination or ‘similar to’ the words “rich” or “money”. Perhaps even through 
derived relations, the name of this casino conjures evokes functions of being a 
gateway to money. Before even setting foot in the casino, the verbal behaviour of 
this individual is influencing her choice. Having entered the casino, a vast array of 
slot-machines will be available to her. How then, will she choose which slot-machine 
to play? Why choose one particular slot-machine over another? Perhaps given the 
choice between a slot-machine named “Enchanted” and another named “Lucky 
diamonds”, this individual will choose to play Enchanted due to the functions that
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are transformed from tales of enchantment she read as a child. What is key to 
explaining this behaviour, is the way in which the word “enchanted” or the features 
of the slot-machine that depict enchantment are related to other stimuli. It may be 
that such features are indirectly related to ‘magic’, luck, or fairy tales of happily ever 
after. The functions that these stimuli evoke are then transformed to the slot- 
machine, such that responding to that slot-machine is not under the control of the 
contingencies of reinforcement of that slot-machine or the probability of a win on 
that machine; rather, this individual is behaving verbally. Given that every 
individual’s learning history is unique to that individual, this means that the way in 
which the structural features of a slot-machine are related and the functions that 
transform accordingly are potentially different for every individual. This highlights 
the complexities of the behaviour involved in gambling.
Clinical implications
The present findings may have clinical implications for the way in which 
gamblers are both prevented from developing pathological gambling and in terms of 
finding an effective treatment for gamblers. The findings of Chapter 6 could have 
implications for harm minimisation strategies in programming slot-machines. Harm 
minimisation works on the assumption that moderate levels of gambling can and 
should be enjoyable (Sharpe, Walker, Coughlan, Enerson, & Blaszczynski 2005). 
However, designing slot-machines that remove some properties of the slot-machine 
that lead to greatest persistence or reduce the amount of money spent may reduce the 
level of harm incurred by gambling. This may involve altering the structural 
characteristics of slot-machines such as reducing the maximum bet and duration of 
reel spin, therefore reducing harm (Sharpe et al., 2005). The findings of Chapter 6 
suggest that programming slot-machines which present a near-miss on at least 45% 
of trials may reduce persistence and lead to a more accurate perception of a near- 
miss is a losing trial. It is possible that presenting a near-miss on 30% of trials may 
be detrimental for the gambler as participants rated these trials as closer to a win 
compared to the participants who were presented with a near-miss on 66% of trials. 
These findings are in line with those of Kassinove and Schare (2001) who reported 
that presenting a near-miss on 30% trials lead to greatest persistence in gambling 
whereas presenting a near-miss 45% resulted in fewer gambles. Although Chapter 6 
measured ratings and Kassinove and Schare measured persistence, both findings
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seem to suggest that when a near-miss is presented on at least 45% of trials, the 
effects are diminished. It seems that with repeated exposure to near-misses, the initial 
‘almost winning’ effect is lost to extinction, as the gambler is being continually 
presented with near-miss trials but not winning any money.
Perhaps the most important findings of the current studies which could 
inform treatment of pathological gambling is the finding that gambling is a verbal 
event characterised by derived relational responding and transformation of function. 
Treatments therefore, which focus on the role of verbal relations in psychopathology 
may be very effective for treating pathological gambling. One such therapy is 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999,
2011). ACT is directly linked to RFT in that according to ACT, the ability to derive 
relations between stimuli and transform the function to indirectly related stimuli, is at 
the root of human suffering (Harris, 2006; Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 
2006). Therefore the therapy works by attempting to “change the way one interacts 
with or relates to thoughts by creating contexts in which their unhelpful functions are 
diminished.” (Hayes et al., 2006, p.8). ACT differs from mainstream therapies such 
as CBT in that the goal of treatment is not symptom reduction, rather symptom 
reduction is a by product. Additionally, clients are encouraged to embrace rather than 
avoid their feelings and fears whilst committing to live in accordance with their 
values (Hayes et al., 1999).
Currently there is no published research into the effectiveness of ACT 
interventions on gambling, however, given that gambling behaviour is influenced by 
the same verbal process that ACT deals with, namely derived relations and 
transformation of function, it is possible that ACT could have a good clinical 
outcome for the treatment of pathological gambling. The six core processes of ACT 
are acceptance, cognitive fusion, being present, self as context, values and committed 
action. Clients are taught that acceptance is an alternative to avoiding a particular 
thought or behaviour (Hayes et al., 2006), as research has shown that trying to avoid 
or suppress a thought may be counterproductive (Hooper, Saunders, & McHugh, 
2010). In terms of gambling, in therapy the gambler may be encouraged to notice any 
urges to gamble and experience the emotions that occur when thinking about 
gambling as opposed to trying to avoid or suppress these feelings. Acceptance is 
employed in conjunction with encouraging a life consistent with the client’s values. 
For example, for a gambler, it may not necessarily be the act of gambling or losing
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money that is causing a problem, but by going to the casino the gambler may be 
neglecting to spend time with his family which then leads to feelings of guilt about 
gambling, if family life is something that the gambler values.
Cognitive fusion refers to “excessive or improper regulation of behavior by 
verbal processes, such as rules and derived relational networks” (Hayes et al., 2006, 
p.6). Therefore, through cognitive defusion, ACT aims to change the way an 
individual relates to their thoughts and alter the functions of those thoughts without 
trying to alter the form or frequency of these thoughts. Dymond and Roche (2010) 
give the example of a gambler being required to say aloud the phrase “I am going to 
gamble today” and repeat this phrase until the functions of that sentence and the 
feelings associated with going to gamble, begin to diminish. Similarly, the gambler 
may be taught to label the thought as just a thought by saying “I am having the 
thought that I am going to gamble today”.
The process of being present involves “ongoing non-judgmental contact with 
psychological and environmental events as they occur” (Hayes et al., 2006, p.9). 
Therefore a client may be required to sit at a slot-machine and notice the thoughts or 
urges to gamble that they may be having, but encouraged to just notice those 
thoughts and not judge them. Finally, ACT encourages committed action which 
involves the client setting achievable goals to ensure living in accordance with their 
values. It may also include exposure techniques, goal setting and behaviour shaping.
Future research is required which examines the effectiveness of ACT in 
treating pathological gambling, in which randomized control trials are conducted to 
compare treatment outcomes with the current prolific gambling treatments, as well as 
control groups who receive no treatment.
Conclusions
In conclusion, the present findings suggest that gambling behaviour is not 
solely controlled by schedules of reinforcement, but rather those schedules can be 
overridden by verbal behaviour. It was shown that slot-machine preference and 
ratings of slot-machines may participate in derived relations and transformation of 
discriminative functions such that individuals may show preferences for particular 
slot-machines despite having not having a history of that slot-machine and having 
never experienced a win on that slot-machine. The present findings provide empirical 
support for the suggestion that gambling is a verbal event, and suggests that the
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contingencies that are controlling a gambler behavior are highly complex and 
remote, however, they are accessible to an experimental analysis and can be 
modelled. Although these studies may only scratch the surface of gambling 
behaviour, they form part of a growing body of experimental, translational research 
on relational frame accounts of gambling behavior, which will hopefully lead to a 
better understanding of this behaviour as well as informing parameters for safer 
gambling, and enabling effective treatments to be developed.
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Appendix 1 
Chapter 2 
Participant Information Sheet
In this study, you will receive a series of instructions and tasks presented on the 
computer. Your job is to read the instructions and to follow them to the best of your 
ability.
The tasks involve performing simulated slot machine gambling. The slot machines 
are virtually identical to those seen in casinos.
You will be presented with two slot machines on-screen, each of a different colour, 
and your task is to click the mouse on the slot machine you wish to play and to earn 
as many points as possible.
Later, you will be given some relational learning tasks in which you will be required 
to select one stimulus in the presence of another stimulus. Again, full instructions 
will be provided to you at the time.
We will also ask you to complete a brief questionnaire about your history with 
gambling. Most people have gambled once in their life, for instance, on scratch 
cards, Lotto tickets, or bingo. Doing so does not mean that people have a problem 
with gambling. We are interested in any experience of gambling that you might have, 
so please just complete the questionnaire honestly.
In the rare event of someone reporting a potential likelihood of developing a 
gambling problem, as indicated by scores on the questionnaire, we may wish to 
contact you in order to let you know about this. It will merely be to inform you about 
this; it won’t represent a formal, medical or clinical diagnosis because the 
questionnaires are being used solely for research purposes.
You can leave the study, or request a break, at any time.
Your rights as a participant, including the right to withdraw at any point without 
penalty, are ensured.
This study is conducted in accordance with British Psychological Society and 
Departmental ethics guidelines.
It is anticipated that the findings of the study will be written up for publication in a 
peer-reviewed journal and presented at international conferences. All results will be 
anonymised and it will not be possible to identify participant’s data.
Please contact for further information: Alice Hoon (294189@swansea.ac.uk)
If you have any questions at all, please ask them now.
If you would like to participate, please ask the researcher for a consent form.
228
s i j j j je n u iu e z
Appendix 2
Chapter 2 
Debriefing Form
This study was designed to examine the way in which people behave on simulated 
slot machines. We first asked you to complete the South Oaks Gambling Screen in 
order to obtain a measure of your experience with gambling. Next, we gave you a 
slot machine task in which the probability of obtaining a reward (a winning spin that 
resulted in the gain of one point) was identical on the two machines. They were, 
however, of different colours.
Then, we taught you that one of the colours stood for, or represented, ‘more-than’ or 
Tess-than’. Finally, we tested to see if you would spend more time on the slot 
machine related to ‘more-than’.
This study was designed to replicate and extend a study by Zlomke & Dixon (2006): 
Modification of slot-machine preferences through the use of a conditional 
discrimination paradigm (2006). Journal o f Applied Behavior Analysis, 39, 351-361.
It is important that you are aware that the questionnaire was used purely for research 
purposes. Occasionally, however, some people produce extreme scores on this 
questionnaire. Later, we will score the questionnaire and if you happen to have an 
extreme score, then we may contact you just to let you know about this.
I hope that this has helped to clarify for you the purpose of the study you have just 
undertaken. Your participation in the study is greatly appreciated.
If any aspects of participating in this study have caused you concern, please contact 
Alice Hoon (294189@swansea.ac.uk)
We would also like to draw your attention, should you need it, to the counselling and 
advice services specific to Gambling that are available from GamCare charity 
(http://www.gamcare.org.uk/)
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Appendix 3
Chapter 3
Participant Information Sheet
The study involves several tasks, presented in successive phases. You will first be 
presented with some relational learning tasks in which you will be required to learn 
to select the correct stimulus. You will be given feedback on your choices. Full 
instructions about the task will be given to you on screen. Please follow them to the 
best of your ability.
The next task involves playing simulated slot machines. The slot machines are very 
similar to those seen in casinos. Again, you will be given full instructions on how to 
play the slot machines.
You will have the chance to win up to £7 in cash on the gambling tasks.
Additionally, the person who makes the least errors during test phases of the learning 
tasks will win an extra £10 cash.
You will also be asked to complete a brief questionnaire about your history with 
gambling. Most people have gambled once in their life, for instance, on scratch 
cards, Lotto tickets, or bingo. Doing so does not mean that people have a problem 
with gambling, however. The questionnaire that you will be asked to complete 
merely assesses your experience of gambling, so please complete it honestly.
In the rare event of someone reporting a potential likelihood of developing a 
gambling problem, as indicated by scores on the questionnaire, we may wish to 
contact you in order to let you know about this. It will merely be to inform you about 
this; it won’t represent a formal, clinical diagnosis because the questionnaires are 
being used solely for research purposes.
During the study, you can ask the experimenter for further clarification at any stage. 
You can leave the study, or request a break, at any time.
Your rights as a participant, including the right to withdraw at any point without 
penalty, are ensured.
This study is conducted in accordance with British Psychological Society and 
Departmental ethics guidelines.
It is anticipated that the findings of the study will be written up for publication in a 
peer-reviewed journal and presented at international conferences. All results will be 
anonymised and it will not be possible to identify participant’s data.
Please contact for further information: Alice Hoon (294189@swansea.ac.uk)
If you have any questions at all, please ask them now.
If you would like to participate, please ask the researcher for a consent form.
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Debriefing Form
This study was designed to examine the way in which people behave on simulated 
slot machines. We first asked you to complete the South Oaks Gambling Screen in 
order to obtain a measure of your experience with gambling. Then we gave you some 
training tasks in which you learned which words went together.
You were then presented with two slot machines to play containing words from the 
previous task. Both of these slot machines paid out on 50% of trials.
In the final phase you were presented with two more slot machines containing words 
from the earlier phase of the experiment and asked to try to win as many points as 
possible. This was to see if you had a preference for either of the slot machines.
It is important that you are aware that the questionnaires used were purely for 
research purposes. Occasionally, however, some people produce extreme scores on 
such questionnaires. Later, we will score the questionnaires and if you happen to 
have an extreme score, then we may contact you just to let you know about this.
I hope that this has helped to clarify for you the purpose of the study you have just 
undertaken. Your participation in the study is greatly appreciated.
If any aspects of participating in this study have caused you concern, please contact 
Alice Hoon (294189@swansea.ac.uk)
We would also like to draw your attention, should you need it, to the counselling and 
advice services specific to Gambling that are available from GamCare charity 
(www.gamcare.org.uk) or alternatively Swansea University Student Support 
Services: student.services@swansea.ac.uk.
Appendix 5
Chapters 4
Participant Information Sheet
The study involves several tasks, presented in successive phases. You will first be 
presented with some relational learning tasks in which you will be required to learn 
to select the correct stimulus. You will be given feedback on your choices. Full 
instructions about the task will be given to you on screen. Please follow them to the 
best of your ability.
The next task involves playing simulated slot machines. The slot machines are very 
similar to those seen in casinos. Again, you will be given full instructions on how to 
play the slot machines.
You will also be asked to complete a brief questionnaire about your history with 
gambling. Most people have gambled once in their life, for instance, on scratch 
cards, Lotto tickets, or bingo. Doing so does not mean that people have a problem 
with gambling, however. The questionnaire that you will be asked to complete 
merely assesses your experience of gambling, so please complete it honestly.
In the rare event of someone reporting a potential likelihood of developing a 
gambling problem, as indicated by scores on the questionnaire, we may wish to 
contact you in order to let you know about this. It will merely be to inform you about 
this; it won’t represent a formal, clinical diagnosis because the questionnaires are 
being used solely for research purposes.
During the study, you can ask the experimenter for further clarification at any stage. 
You can leave the study, or request a break, at any time.
Your rights as a participant, including the right to withdraw at any point without 
penalty, are ensured.
This study is conducted in accordance with British Psychological Society and 
Departmental ethics guidelines.
It is anticipated that the findings of. the study will be written up for publication in a 
peer-reviewed journal and presented at international conferences. All results will be 
anonymised and it will not be possible to identify participant’s data.
Please contact for further information: Alice Hoon (294189@swansea.ac.uk)
If you have any questions at all, please ask them now.
If you would like to participate, please ask the researcher for a consent form.
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Appendix 6
Chapter 4 
Debriefing Form
This study was designed to examine the way in which people behave on simulated 
slot machines. We first asked you to complete the South Oaks Gambling Screen in 
order to obtain a measure of your experience with gambling. Then we gave you some 
training tasks in which you learned a network of words that were ‘same’ or 
‘opposite’ to each other.
You were then presented with two slot machines to play, one which contained one of 
the words from the previous task and had a high payout probability and the another 
slot machine which contained another of the words and never paid out. In the final 
phase you were presented with two more slot machines containing words from the 
earlier phase of the experiment. This was to see if what you learned when playing the 
slot machines, and the network of words you learnt in the first task would affect 
which slot machine you chose in the final phase. So for example, if you had learnt 
that nonsense word A was ‘opposite’ to nonsense word B, and that the slot machine 
containing nonsense word A never paid out, would this mean that you were more 
likely to play the slot machine containing nonsense word B.
It is important that you are aware that the questionnaires used were purely for 
research purposes. Occasionally, however, some people produce extreme scores on 
such questionnaires. Later, we will score the questionnaires and if you happen to 
have an extreme score, then we may contact you just to let you know about this.
I hope that this has helped to clarify for you the purpose of the study you have just 
undertaken. Your participation in the study is greatly appreciated.
If any aspects of participating in this study have caused you concern, please contact 
Alice Hoon (294189@swansea.ac.uk)
We would also like to draw your attention, should you need it, to the counselling and 
advice services specific to Gambling that are available from GamCare charity 
(www.gamcare.org.uk) or alternatively Swansea University Student Support 
Services: student.services@swansea.ac.uk.
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Participant Information Sheet
The study involves several tasks, presented in successive phases. You will first be 
presented with some relational learning tasks in which you will be required to learn 
to select the correct stimulus. You will be given feedback on your choices. Full 
instructions about the task will be given to you on screen. Please follow them to the 
best of your ability.
The next task involves playing simulated slot machines. The slot machines are very 
similar to those seen in casinos. Again, you will be given full instructions on how to 
play the slot machines.
You will also be asked to complete a brief questionnaire about your history with 
gambling. Most people have gambled once in their life, for instance, on scratch 
cards, Lotto tickets, or bingo. Doing so does not mean that people have a problem 
with gambling, however. The questionnaire that you will be asked to complete 
merely assesses your experience of gambling, so please complete it honestly.
In the rare event of someone reporting a potential likelihood of developing a 
gambling problem, as indicated by scores on the questionnaire, we may wish to 
contact you in order to let you know about this. It will merely be to inform you about 
this; it won’t represent a formal, clinical diagnosis because the questionnaires are 
being used solely for research purposes.
During the study, you can ask the experimenter for further clarification at any stage. 
You can leave the study, or request a break, at any time.
Your rights as a participant, including the right to withdraw at any point without 
penalty, are ensured.
This study is conducted in accordance with British Psychological Society and 
Departmental ethics guidelines.
It is anticipated that the findings of the study will be written up for publication in a 
peer-reviewed journal and presented at international conferences. All results will be 
anonymised and it will not be possible to identify participant’s data.
Please contact for further information: Alice Hoon (294189@swansea.ac.uk)
If you have any questions at all, please ask them now.
If you would like to participate, please ask the researcher for a consent form.
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Debriefing Form
This study was designed to examine the way in which people behave on simulated 
slot machines. We first asked you to complete the South Oaks Gambling Screen and 
the Gambler’s Functional Analysis in order to obtain a measure of your experience 
with gambling. Then we gave you some training tasks in which you learned a 
hierarchy of nonsense words.
Then you were presented with two slot machines to play, one which contained the 
middle ranked nonsense word from the previous task and had a low payout 
probability. The other slot machine contained a new nonsense word, and had a high 
payout probability.
Finally, you were given many choices of slot machines to select. These slot machines 
contained the words you had been taught previously. This was to see if the relations 
learned in the earlier tasks would affect your slot machine choice. For example, if 
you had learned that one word was “greater-than” another word in the previous tasks, 
would you then prefer to play the slot machine containing word that was “greater- 
than” the other?
It is important that you are aware that the questionnaires used were purely for 
research purposes. Occasionally, however, some people produce extreme scores on 
such questionnaires. Later, we will score the questionnaires and if you happen to 
have an extreme score, then we may contact you just to let you know about this.
I hope that this has helped to clarity for you the purpose of the study you have just 
undertaken. Your participation in the study is greatly appreciated.
If any aspects of participating in this study have caused you concern, please contact 
Alice Hoon (294189@swansea.ac.uk)
We would also like to draw your attention, should you need it, to the counselling and 
advice services specific to Gambling that are available from GamCare charity 
(http://www.gamcare.org.uk/)
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Appendix 9
Chapter 6
Participant Information Sheet
The study involves several tasks, presented in successive phases. You will first be 
presented with some relational learning tasks in which you will be required to learn 
to select the correct stimulus. You will be given feedback on your choices. Full 
instructions about the task will be given to you on screen. Please follow them to the 
best of your ability.
The next task involves playing simulated slot machines. The slot machines are very 
similar to those seen in casinos. Sometimes you will be asked to rate how close you 
think the slot machine is to a win. Again, you will be given full instructions on how 
to play the slot machines.
You will also be asked to complete a brief questionnaire about your history with 
gambling. Most people have gambled once in their life, for instance, on scratch 
cards, Lotto tickets, or bingo. Doing so does not mean that people have a problem 
with gambling, however. The questionnaire that you will be asked to complete 
merely assesses your experience of gambling, so please complete it honestly.
In the rare event of someone reporting a potential likelihood of developing a 
gambling problem, as indicated by scores on the questionnaire, we may wish to 
contact you in order to let you know about this. It will merely be to inform you about 
this; it won’t represent a formal, clinical diagnosis because the questionnaires are 
being used solely for research purposes.
During the study, you can ask the experimenter for further clarification at any stage. 
You can leave the study, or request a break, at any time.
Your rights as a participant, including the right to withdraw at any point without 
penalty, are ensured.
This study is conducted in accordance with British Psychological Society and 
Departmental ethics guidelines.
It is anticipated that the findings of the study will be written up for publication in a 
peer-reviewed journal and presented at international conferences. All results will be 
anonymised and it will not be possible to identify participant’s data.
Please contact for further information: Alice Hoon (294189@swansea.ac.uk)
If you have any questions at all, please ask them now.
If you would like to participate, please ask the researcher for a consent form.
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